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ABSTRACT
A distributed fault tolerant architecture is suggested
to monitor and control processes of a nuclear power plant.
The purpose of the system is to enhance the continuous safe
operation of the plant and, simultaneously, improve its
productivity.
A methodology for the design is suggested and, from the
requirements of the system, the characteristics of the
control system are determined.
The proposed system uses selected fault tolerant
techniques largely based on the use of triads for
survivability purposes.
The system consists of a fault tolerant central
computer, fault tolerant distributed processors, a fault
tolerant network and microcomputers interfaced to the
sensors of the plant.
A number of design issues are treated: a) the layout
of the elements of the control system in the plant, b) the
determination of computational time and memory requirements
for a Kalman Filter and a Hypothesis Testing algorithm and
c) the reliability and availability of the system to meet
possible regulatory requirements.
Examples and recommendations for the design are given.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. David D. LANNING
Title: Professor of Nuclear Engineering
Thesis Reader : Dr. Paul J. NICHOLSON
Title: Visiting Scientist
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CHAPTER 1
OVERVIEW
The objective of this introduction is to show how
modern techniques, as applied to data acquisition, have not
been considered to their full extent in the recent past and
to describe methods which seem promising for future
incorporation in the nuclear field. Given the scope of the
subject, which justifies separate in-depth work, no attempt
is made for completeness. The interested reader should
consult the referenced material.
1.1 BACKGROUND
Nuclear reactor operations in the US prior to the Three
Mile Island (TMI) event had not benefitted from the use of
techniques that are currently available and which represent
normal practice in other industries and in other countries.
To give an example Dr. Kemeny made a comment about the
obsolescence of control rooms which is applicable to our
discussions. In 1980, as soon as he was in charge of the
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President's Commission he visited some control rooms. In
those opportunities he observed that these installations
were at last twenty years out of date. Afterwards, he read
in a document of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC),
written ten years before, that control rooms were considered
'then' to be twenty years out of date.
Some of the reasons that allowed that situation are:
the nuclear industry depended on heavy regulations
that did not encourage application of
state-of-the-art techniques to daily power
operations. For example, computers were not used
in control room environments because of seismic and
safety class regulations. The regulatory process
imposed delays that no utility was willing to face
[GOLA80]. Lately, some improvements have been
noted in the regulatory process.
· there were no formal studies considering the
economic benefits due to the introduction of modern
techniques in the operation of the plant.
Therefore, it was feared that new regulations could
be enforced without 'demonstrated' economical
incentives. However just one of these techniques
(disturbance analysis) has been estimated to
increase to availability of the plant by 2.2
percent or, equivalently, 8 days per year [COMB80].
Considering that utility losses are from 0.6 to 1.0
- 8 -
million dollars per day if the plant is not in
operation (due to replacement costs, labor,
materials), in one year that utility could be
saving from 5 to 8 million dollars or,
approximately, one half or more the cost of a
computer system.
· not enough space to allow CRTs was included in the
control room of the early designs (ie the CRTs had
to be imbedded in existing consoles, fixed to the
ceiling, etc).
· the allocations of tasks between man or machine and
automatic or manual control were not well defined.
1.2 EXPERIENCE WITH PROCESS COMPUTERS
The role of process computers has traditionally been
reduced to that of a powerful data logger, printer-driver
and off-line core-oriented calculator. They have proved
useful in helping the operators to determine the 'state' of
the plant, although much more could have been obtained even
with the technologies available at the time the plants were
designed.
The importance of process computers in plant operations
is described in [MACR77], a very well documented report and
rather complete checking list for the process control
computer designer. In the study 156 US nuclear and fossil
power plants were surveyed. Some of their findings and
-9-
conclusions are listed below.
When the utility personnel were asked questions
referring to the goals or benefits to be achieved
by the computer system it was surprising to note
that their responses consistently failed to
identify goals. They simply concentrated on
describing computer functions. For example, if
they considered a better understanding of the
'state' of the plant (goal) they mentioned that
they needed more data logging (function) at the
higher level (the higher level corresponds to the
central node or central computer and the lower
level is represented by the elements directly
connected to the sensors).
Some to the functions suggested for incorporation
into the computer system were actually
counterproductive. By flooding the operator with
non-predigested (raw) data, the computer output
could easily saturate him and lead to reduced
understanding of the process.
· A more advisable solution would be to combine some
data (derived or processed as oppossed to raw data
or direct measurements) in a more meaningful way to
the operator, so that he could understand the
situation immediately, without doing any
calculation or having to transform direct
measurements into recognizable parameters. As an
- 10 -
example, in the OVERVIEW of reference [KEME79] , it
is said with respect to the presentation of data in
the TMI-II control room that 'although the pressure
and temperature within the reactor coolant system
were shown, there was no direct indication that the
combination of pressure and temperature meant that
the cooling water was turning into steam'.
Therefore, a failure to recognize an important
objective of the control system (to improve the
safety of the plant by improving the operator's
undestanding of its behavior) and a rather
inappropriate implementation of the means to
achieve that objective (presentation of data in the
control room) led to degraded performance of the
operator and, consequently, to further problems in
the plant.
. There was no response from the 156 power plants
stating that they did not need a process computer;
instead, some of them said that 'as it was
designed' it was not possible to obtain the best
results from it.
· The malfunctions of the process computers were
originally intended to have no impact on the
operation of the plant. However, 78 plant
superintendents indicated that unavailability of
the computer would delay start-up or hold power
generation or derate the plant.
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· The installed computer systems were rated as
follows: Good = 17%, Fair = 50% and Poor = 33%.
· Long construction delays has led to unavoidable
obsolescence. Due to the time spent and the delays
inherent in the construction process, by the time
the utility started to operate the system it was
faced with the fact that the computer manufacturer
did not exist anymore or that most of the
modifications were very difficult to perform due to
differences in the technologies.
1.3 POST-TMI SCENARIO
Due to the TMI incident part of the situation has
changed [LIVI80]. Some of the recommendations of the Kemeny
Commission [KEME79] have been incorporated in new
regulations [NUCL80,1] and designs based on the spirit of
these guidelines have been emerging [NICH80]. These designs
are all intended to minimize the risk of accidents involving
the public. In this discussion 'risk' is defined as the
probability of an occurrence times the consequences of that
occurrence. To satisfy that goal a system is required that
allows the determination of the state of the plant more
accurately and efficiently than is done nowadays. A simple
statement like this one leads to new questions and
conclusions:
- 12 -
· although every designer and user accepts that the
'state' of the plant has to be determined, there is
no consensus on the parameters that form the
'state', the list changing with vendor, type of
reactor (PWR, BWR), operational state (start-up,
100% power, refueling), etc.
· assuming that a system like the one suggested is
designed and operates succesfully, its
implementation would benefit the operation of the
plant enormously, through a decrease in partial
reductions, minimization cf unnecessary trips,
reduction in outage duration (planned or forced)
and early detection of incipient failures to
prevent catastrophic ones [LONG77]: in summary,
improved plant operation and maintenance. All
these could imply that a Productivity aspect may be
incorporated to the Safety aspect of the design.
1.4 ADVANCED TECHNIQUES APPLIED TO NUCLEAR REACTOR OPERATIONS
Application of advanced techniques (noise analysis,
disturbance analysis, parameter estimation, adaptive and
optimal control, digital signal processing, analytic
redundancy, fuzzy sets, artificial intelligence, supervisory
control, pattern recognition, man machine interface, etc) in
nuclear power plants had very minimal use in the US and are
by no eans standart; however, some have been tested in
- 13 -
research reactors like the Halden project in Norway (direct
digital control) or the MIT Reactor (sensor validation and
CRT display development).
The following succint list references some of these
techniques applied to the nuclear field:
· data acquisition and performance monitoring
[SPIT80] ,
· core thermal hydraulics and fault detection and
identification [ORNE81] ,
· modeling of the pressurizer [GEFF80],
· linearized model of the primary system [NAKA81],
· modeling of the feedwater system [MOLI81],
· modeling of the plant and set theoretic control
[C HEN80] ,
· set theoretic control applied to load following
operations [GULK81] ,
· displays of multivariate plant data [BORG81],
· measurements of mental workload in supervisory
control [DARY8 0] ,
allocation of tasks between man and machine in
process control [ROUS81].
Some of these projects and thesis have been done as
part of a joint Charles Stark Draper Laboratory - MIT
project and others are in progress at the time of this
writing.
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The ultimate desire of a control engineer - to provide
full automatic control of a plant - is only in the talking
stages due to:
· licensing requirements that question the
reliability of an automatic control system and the
possibility of interaction between the control
system and the 'engineered safeguards system'.
· research studies with conclusions that, for
single-input single-output systems, the effort to
design LQG controllers was not compensated by the
results because they were similar [BLOM77] or
scarcely better [GRUM68] than conventional analog
PID controllers. However, LQG theory and its
automation had advanced to a degree in which these
statements may not be true anymore, specially in
the more difficult multiple-input multiple-output
case.
· nonlinearities, time delays, noises and space-time
kinetics that make the analysis of the plant (and
the reactor in particilar) far from
straigthforward.
In references [FROG78] , [McMO79] and [TZAF80]
descriptions of approaches to the control of nuclear
reactors are given. In particular, multivariable methods
are treated with special detail due to their promising
results.
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1.5 MULTIVARIABLE METHODS
Multivariable methods can be broadly divided into two
categories: time-domain and frequency domain. The main
outstanding difference is that synthesis procedures were
developed to obtain the feedback system design directly from
the problem specifications in the time-domain, a situation
that it is not characteristic of frequency-domain
approaches. The latter can be thought of as being a design
tools more than synthesis methods.
In the time-domain (also called the state-space
approach) the differential equations describing the behavior
of the plant are expressed in terms of a set of first order
equations. This is a way of introducing the influence of
the past history into its present dynamics, as oppossed to
the 'instantaneous' relationship between inputs and outputs
in the frequency-domain. See references [ATHA71] and
[DOYL80] .
The technique most widely used is the
Linear-Quadratic-Gaussian (LQG) design, in which the plant
is represented by linear first-order differential equations;
the objective is to minimize a performance index which has
quadratic weigths (on a combination of states, measurements
and controls) and noises are gaussian. Another promising
technique is the Set-Theoretic control method, in which the
plant is also linear, but now the disturbances may have
- 16 -
unspecified statistics, the only requirement being that they
are bounded. Bounds are also specified on the states and
the controls. The objective of this procedure is to treat
the states and control constraints explicitly and to provide
the feedback law just with these specifications. An initial
study on the potential applications to nuclear plants was
developed by Chenini in [CHEN80].
In general, some of the advantages of these
state-variable methods are that:
they allow control of decoupled loops and highly
interacting loops with equal facility.
they can very easily handle the nonstationary case
(non-constant matrices in the standard
formulation).
· in some cases they can even work with limited
nonlinearities (ie the extended Kalman Filter).
there is no requirement for the model to have the
same structure as the plant: the state variables
can be determined by any parameter estimation
techniques. However, the use of an appropriate
structure may reduce the sensitivity of the control
law to modeling errors.
many of the performance criteria which the final
control schemes have to satisfy can be interpreted
as economic constraints. For example, in the
nuclear reactor industry the criteria may be to
- 17 -
minimize the amount of xenon so that the reactor is
not shutdown for long periods of time.
But perhaps the most important advantage is that they
provide a systematic methodology to assure the 'stability'
(in a broad sense) of the design in the presence of various
uncertainties (modeling uncertainties or errors, plant or
measurement noises, error in the determination of initial
conditions) and particularly in a very important situation:
the detection and/or identification of sensor or actuator
failures that may 'open' the closed loops.
The conditions under which this is succesfully
accomplished impose very mild constraints on the formulation
of the control specifications. The robustness of the design
and the possibility of improving it systematically are
characteristics lacking in most of the frequency-response
methods. For a rigorous definition of robustness and its
application to multivariable systems see references [SAF077]
and [LEHT81].
The disadvantages of state-space methods are:
they increase the order of the system. In the
worst case they double it and hence it may
expensive to implement it in real time.
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they tend to be too 'sophisticated' to be accepted
for use by industrial engineers brought-up on
sigle-input single-output frequency-response ideas
who essentially needed to use a mixture of physical
insight and straightforward techniques such as the
use of integral and derivative controllers.
With respect to frequency-response methods, the
systematic attack on the development of analysis and design
theory for multivariable feedback systems has been initiated
by Rosenbrock [ROSE69], rejuvenating the frequency-response
approach. His use of a particular technique, the Inverse
Nyquist Array method, opened up a new line of development by
seeking to reduce a multivariable problem to one amenable to
classical techniques (Bode plots, Nyquist diagrams, etc) by
reducing the interaction between different loops. In that
way, single loop techniques could be employed.
The frequency-response model of the plant can be
obtained from step-response tests or frequency-response
measurements exciting the plant with appropriate signals.
The method is not sensitive to model innacuracies since the
user can allow for reasonable uncertainties as he develops
the design. If it is succesful it leads to the possibility
of a simple controller. However, i;. reference [LEHT81],
this technique is shown not to guarantee robustness.
Specifically, the robustness can not be guaranteed at the
- 19 -
essential interface between the plant and the sensors and
actuators; an interface where failure of these components
can compromise the safety of the plant. The same drawback
applies to another technique: the Characteristic Locus,
which is based on the complex transfer function matrix.
Here, the eigenvectors obtained from this matrix are a
measure of dynamic interaction and is one of the paramenters
that the designer uses for his interactive design; by
'judiciously' choosing matrix operators he attempts to
modify them and to obtain suitable closed-loop stability.
Some of the advantages of frequency-response methods
are that:
. there is no need to obtain a great physical insight
into the process that occur inside the controlled
plant (although this will always help) because the
transfer function matrix can be obtained fairly
simply.
· even crude estimates of dynamics and interaction
may give good results.
there is no concern for state estimation,
uncontrollable or unobservable modes (the
requirements for the state-space approach to work).
The drawbacks of these methods consist of:
- 20 -
· lack of systematization. Frequency-response
methods cannot be qualified as synthesis tools, but
only as design or analysis tools.
. difficulty of interpretation of results. Their
concepts are even more difficult to be interpreted
by control engineers than time-domain techniques.
· difficult to use in highly interacting loops and
high order systems.
Other characteristics of these methods and their
application to nuclear power plants can be seen in reference
[McMO79].
If the final objective is "applying the available
modern control techniques to full-scale reactor plants
including all important controlled variables, all phenomena
taking place and all subsystems involved from the reactor
core to the external load" [TZAF80], some more work is
necessary.
1.6 THESIS OVERVIEW
Chapter 2 presents a recommended systematic method of
design that takes in account all aspects of the life-cycle
of the system, the requirements for the system to be
designed, an explanation of the concepts of distributed
systems and fault-tolerance and a proposed preliminary
design.
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In Chapter 3 the connection of sensors, multiplexers,
micro-minicomputers and central computer, as proposed in the
preliminary design, is solved in the case of a PWR plant.
Two examples of the process the designer has to follow
to verify that his design will fulfill real-time
requirements are presented in Chapter 4 -applied to a Kalman
Filter- and in Chapter 5 -in the case of a Hypothesis
Testing algorithm-.
The modeling of the reliability and availability of the
nodes and the network is considered in Chapter 6. As a
result of the insight gained with the use of these models,
recommendations for the design of a network are given in
Chapter 7.
- 22 -
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CHAPTER 2
A PRELIMINARY DESIGN
In this Chapter, a methodology for the design of a
distributed computer system will be presented and concepts
regarding the necessary tradeoffs, to satisfy the
requirements, will- be introduced. This procedure will be
applied to the monitoring of processes in a nuclear p-bwer
plant.
The term 'monitoring' has been used in the Thesis
according to one of the definitions provided by The
Webster's Dictionary [WEBS77]: "to keep track of, regulate,
or control the operation of (as a machine or process)". The
purpose of using this particular definition is that the
concepts of surveillance and control are both included in
the concept of 'monitoring'.
2.1 ON GOALS, OBJECTIVES, REQUIREMENTS AND SPECIFICATIONS
- 27 -
In Chapter 1, reference has bee made to a 'computer
system' thus implying that a computer system is the correct
solution. In this Chapter, a justification for that
assumption is sought.
The design of the current generation of computer
systems is a complex process evolved from ad-hoc rules and
the desire to incorporate more functions at the processing
level. Early systems were not always completely
satisfactory for the following reasons:
. the final objective of the system (or the goal) was
not clearly specified.
· the system was designed with one purpose in mind,
and that purpose was given by the designer of the
system, not by the prospective user.
it was difficult to modify the system to extend its
applicability.
maintenance procedures were inadequate resulting in
reduced availability of both the computer system
and system being controlled.
reliability goals were not explicitly addressed in
the design.
The feedback from this experience has enabled a more
systematic design process to be evolved which includes
defined phases and iteration checkpoints. Although there
are many methodologies, they all begin with the definition
- 28 -
of the objectives to be accomplished by the proposed system.
Under the new philosophy, every design is the
consequence of a collective decision process undertaken by
three groups: the user, a supervisor selected by him and a
design team. Each one has a different aim in the design
procedure. The user needs a means of accomplishing its
goal; in conjunction with the supervisor he defines the set
of requirements to be obeyed by the system. Both check that
the design really works by validating the expected system
performance against predefined specifications. The designer
is in charge of translating these requirements into
specifications with his knowledge of the technology.
The use of the following concepts, used later in this
Chapter, require a precise definition: goal, objective,
requirement and specification.
GOAL: The goal is the (highest) purpose to be
accomplished by the system, as defined by the user.
This definition does not match with the one provided by
[GOLD79] where he defined goal as 'a statement of some
system condition that is desired without a prescription of
the means of achieving that condition'. This statement
really corresponds to the definition of requirement provided
below.
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In this thesis the highest purpose is to provide a
means of assuring the continuous safe operation of a nuclear
power plant.
OBJECTIVE: while the goal is defined by the user with
respect to the purpose of the system , the objective is
defined by the supervisor and designer. For simplicity it
will be assumed that the objectives of these two groups are
the same although an extension to consider that such is not
the case is straightfordward. The goal is an abstract
definition communicated to the designer and the supervisor
group by the user.
Differences in the terminology stress that only in very
few cases will both goal and objective completely agree. In
most of the situations the user will try to use the system
for purposes not contemplated in the design and the
supervisor and designer will also make efforts to
incorporate ideas of their own. This process has been
commonly compared to that of a source (the user) sending
information to a receiver (the other groups) through a noisy
channel, a paralellism with concepts of information theory.
According to this theory some information is lost in the
channel (the user cannot communicate all of his ideas) and
some noise is taken by the supervisor and designer as valid
information (the functions they add to the system to
'satisfy' the user). The only solution for making this
discrepancy small is to provide feedback at different phases
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of the life-cycle of the system design evolution.
In this thesis the design objective is assumed to be
that 'the system assures the safe operation of the plant and
that, in addition and without being in conflict with that
goal, improves its productivity'.
It can be thought that this objective was worked out
with the user because the experienced the designer tells the
user that it is possible to include some concepts and
functions in the system's design without adversely affecting
the user's goal, facilitating system's update and
maintenance and easing the ground for future regulatory
allowances (or needs).
Note that there are many ways of improving the safety
of a plant and its productivity. For instance it is
possible to perform reliability evaluation programs and
identify deficiencies by correcting them; to use of
simulators in the training of operators; to write better
documentation; to improve the design of control rooms, etc.
It is assumed that these alternate methods of achieving the
user's goal have been considered by the user or the
supervisor already.
REQUIREMENT: global properties that all operations at
a particular interface must satisfy. The requirements do
not have to referenced to any implementation because the
most effective way of accomplishing a given requirement may
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be by different functions at different levels (in a
hierarchical design). In fact, by defining the requirements
at the interfaces (the higher one being the operators or
other computers and the lower one the sensors) the principle
of no-implementation is invoked.
Procedures and objectives to write down the
requirements were detailed in [HENI80]. His approach to
requirements documentation can be condensed in three
principles:
· formulate questions before answering them. In that
way distinct 'concerns' will be identified,
· separate these concerns assigning different items
to different teams so that if a change has to be
made to a certain item, other teams would not have
to revise their designs,
. be as formal as possible.
On the other hand the concerns should be identified so
that the requirements formulation would accomplish the
following:
Specify external behavior only; do not imply a
particular implementation.
Describe the interfaces so that the design teams
know the constraints. In this thesis the higher
level of the proposed system will interface with
operators and other computers; the lower level
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will interface with the sensors already installed
in the plant. Both define clear constraints to the
designers. The higher level constraint will
indicate the approach to man-machine interface that
should be used by the software team and how to
organize the data bases so that they can easily
accessed (with minimum delay and high reliability),
and the hardware team will know what protocols must
be used with other computers, where and how to
control the displays and how much memory they will
need for that purpose.
Desijn to allow changes to be made easil.
Modifications in requirements will imply changes in
design and implementation. The more independent
they are from the beginning, the easier changes
will be made later in the design.
Document precisely to provide good reference
material. The purpose of the documentation is not
to be a tutorial, rather it must serve other
designers to understand quickly what was intended.
Record forethought about the life-cycle of the
system. For example, in this Thesis it was
envisioned that in the future there is a
possibility to include more sensors,
microprocessors or actuators to implement control
of some of the plant subsystems. Consequently, the
design must accommodate at least two scenarios: an
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initial one with a minimum number of signals going
from the sensors to the computer system and an
extended one where there will be additional control
signals going from the computer system to the
actuators.
Characterize acceptable responses to undesired
events. Examples of undesired events have been
considered in this case to be sensor, hardware and
software failures and plant transients.
SPECIFICATION: A specification becomes the definition
of the expected performance for a particular operation or
module of a system. Each specification, or group of
specifications, has to satisfy a requirement.
It is useful to break the specifications down into
functional (or logical) and performance specifications.
Functional specifications define the operation or module
functions (function + constraints + accuracy + relationship
with other modules) and the performance specifications
define the resources needed by the operations or modules
(processors, memory, time, sensors, data links) to meet
their functional specifications.
The following is a brief analysis of two requirements
and specifications which will be treated extensively in
Chapters 4 and 5. Both examples correspond to the
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definition of functional specifications. Given that the
determination (by measurement or estimation) of state
variables is necessary to perform most of the functions of
the system, a Kalman Filter implementation is discussed in
Chapter 4. The Kalman Filter is chosen in preference to
other filtering solutions to minimize the mean square error
between the estimated and the actual variables. Once the
variables are determined they may be used for other
purposes: for example, to determine if a parameter is out
of range due to system or sensor malfunctions. An algorithm
(the Sequential t-Test) is suggested in Chapter 5 to detect
if the computed mean of a series of measurements is
'representative' of the true mean of the population. This
method is used to satisfy another kind of performance
specifications, in this case time specifications because the
algorithm assures that the detection is made in a minimum
number of observations.
2.2 DESIGN METHODOLOGY
Many studies cover different aspects of computer
design: ie fault tolerance in distributed processing
[GOLD79], reliabilility design for computer control
[ROSE81] , software maintainability [MUNS81] , software
validation [DEUT81] and [LEVI81] and overall design [TURN77]
and [WEIT80]. The last two provide guidelines which can be
succesfully integrated into a single one more powerful
methodology.
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According to reference [TURN77] it is known that there
are several myths related to the development of computer
systems, namely:
· Stating valid and complete requirements for a new
computer system is a relatively simple task.
H· ardware and software can be purchased or developed
separately and fit together later, and subsequently
adapted to the administrative and procedural
environment.
· Software is different from hardware and must be
managed differently.
· Management review mechanisms used in hardware
development are superflous for software (or are
impossible to conduct).
Many hardware inadequacies can easily be offset by
simple software changes.
Acquisition of software can be treated as a
production-like process, similar to procurement of
standard hardware.
Software, once developed, hardly ever needs to be
changed again.
Support of software in operational systems is
essentially the same as maintenance of the
hardware.
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These inadequate concepts have produced the frustations
mentioned in Section 2.1 due to shifted schedules,
unsatisfactory performance, dilution of responsibilities,
costs exceeding estimates and unmaterialized benefits.
The methodology proposed in this Section is based in
those introduced by Turn [TURN77] and by Weitzman [WEIT80],
although some modifications are introduced. FIG.2.1
indicates some of its characteristics: phases, feedbacks,
checkpoints and responsibilities.
As indicated in Section 2.1, three kinds of
organizations are assumed to be responsible for the whole
computer system development. They are the user, the
supervisor and the designer. The relationship among them
should be made evident by constructive criticisms, efforts
to accomplish the goal and well defined authority areas.
FIG.2.1 illustrates some of these concepts. The definition
of the goal and the selection of the supervisor is
necessarily left to the user; the definition of the
requirements is a primary responsibility of the user, but it
is advisable to receive suggestions from the supervisor. On
the other hand, the Specifications definition phase is a
primary responsibility of the supervisor and now the user
must simply be an authorized observer. In other phases of
the methodology it will be important that these three
organizations are constantly informed of the system design
progress. Whenever 2nd or 3rd priorities of supervision are
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indicated, it is understood that they mean that the
organizations should be informed of the results of that
phase, and detailed information should be available only on
request.
Feedbacks have been incorporated into the model
indicating tradeoffs, modifications, redefinitions, etc.
From the beginning, checkpoints have to be defined stating
how the progress of the design will be measured (ie
parameters used to evaluate the design may be cost, total
number of people recruited for the project, number of lines
of source code written (in the Development Phase), man-hour
figures, etc)
A brief explanation of the Phases of the methodology
will now be presented.
REQUIREMENTS DEFINITION: during the
requirements definition phase the organizations in charge of
defining them (the user and the supervisor) will attempt to
assure 1) that the definition of the requirements really
represents what the goal intends to encompass, 2) that that
systems already installed in the user's organization cannot
satisfy the requirements to be a viable alternative to the
proposed system and 3) that these existing systems cannot be
upgraded to satisfy the totallity of the requirements. In
summary, it is intended to know if a new system is the best
solution for the organization.
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The concept of 'system' in the previous paragraphs do
not refer exclusively to computer systems or control
systems, to give some examples.There, the concept of system
is much broad, and it is related to show that procedures and
functions that are performed by the user's organization at
the moment of the design of the new computer system cannot
fulfill the totallity of requirements.
The list of requirements for the system proposed in
this Thesis is shown in FIG.2.2. Note that the necessity of
having a computer system is a consequence of requirements
number 2 (real-time processing), 5 (keeping large records
and retrieving data at request) and 6 (interfacing with
other computers).
SPECIFICATIONS DEFINITION: during the
specifications definition phase, the validation of the
technical and economic aspects of the requirements is made.
Users and developers are confronted to ascertain the
technical feasibility of implementing a system to satisfy
the stated requirements. Tradeoffs are expected to be made
and the feedback with the previous phase (Requirements
definition) will be intense. The following questions must
be answered (adapted from reference [TURN77]): What degree
of technical risk or uncertainty is involved in meeting the
requirements? Is any research indicated? For the problem
considered in this Thesis detailed algorithms and models of
the plant should be available or they would have to be
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developed. Is the projected schedule appropriate compared
to the schedule of the construction of the plant or the
planned outages of the station? Are there any particular
technical aspects that require extraordinary management
measures?
After completion of the technical review and several
iterations of reinterpreting requirements and modifying
specifications, a detailed group of specifications is given.
This set is outlined below in Section 2.4.
The Specifications Design phase should be performed
mainly by the supervisor's group, because it has experience
in such a work. The supervisor's group would work very
closely with(in) the user's organization in order to
understand how his ideas can be succesfully materialized in
that environment.
DESIGN: the design phase should be performed by an
organization independent of the user and the supervisor
organizations.
The first part of the design phase (the Preliminary
design) may be based on a set of techniques which can be
partly automated. The idea behind the use of these
techniques is that the functions that the system has to
perform can be decomposed into so-called 'abstract
processes' and interactions between them.*
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For example, if the idea is to design a monitoring
system some of the abstract processes that can be identified
at the lowest level of the system (as defined in Chapter 1)
are:
· a timing method (clock) to initiate activities
. acquisition of signals from sensors
· conversion of signals into meaningful (engineering)
units ('signals' are transformed into 'data')
. filtering of data
· tables containing (upper and lower) limits for the
sampled data
· overa.ll control of the acquisition process
. modelling of the process of the plant being sampled
· comparison between sensor data and previous data
(filtered) or analytically derived (analytic
redundancy)
· indication of alarms
· detection of failed sensors
· self-tests for the unit
* An abstract process is informally defined as the
activity resulting from the execution of a program with its
data by a sequential processor. See reference [WOLF77] for
a rephrase of this concept in terms of concepts from state
machine theory.
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Some of the interactions among processes are:
· clock signals to initiate processes
· numerical values from the filtering and modelling
processes to be compared in another process
· alarms sent from the comparison process to the
indicator of alarms.
Once the processes have been defined and their
interaction perfectly stated, an implementation is sought.
The implementation is made by grouping processes into sets
so that the interaction (exchange of data) between sets
should be much less than the interaction inside each set.
An example of this implementation may be that variables
which are needed for processing in one section of the plant
should be located in non-volatile memories near the process,
and only those variables that are used for calculations
involving more than one process should be transmitted to
another physical location. With this concept of 'local
processing' the amount of data transferred in the net is
kept very low. This is the approach followed in this Thesis
for the design presented in Section 2.4.
Upon completion of a preliminary design, the detailed
design begins. An iterative process is to be expected
between these two phases. New information that is available
may modify some design constraints considered earlier in the
design; ie, new technological improvements, budget
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modifications, etc.
Finally, the development of the system includes an
implementation of the detailed design in such a form that
can be tested and, in the case of hardware, passed into
production. For software, a number of methodologies are
available which should be considered as leading to neat
designs, good interaction with the hardware design and
useful documentation. It must be remembered that, although
the 'structural form' of hardware (equipment) and software
(lines of instructions) differ, some requirements are
applicable to both of them (testability, documentation,
maintenance). Software design teams should consider these
as requirements also applicable to their final product, even
though such requirements have not been strictly specified
(simply because requirements must be developed independently
of implementation).
The following three phases have not been modified and
they were originally defined by Turn et al. in the
referenced material [TURN77].
TESTING: the testing phase comprises three distinct
steps ( 8 and 9 in the notation of FIG.2.1.) involving
distinct organizations (the user and the supervisor). The
first step is not necessarily totally separate from the
development of the system (the last step in the design
phase). In fact, it is assumed that the designer will test
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the system against a limited set of parameters before the
date specified to proceed to the next phase (where the
supervisor will test it more thoroughly). Testing of the
system performance aganinst the design specifications
(indicated as 8) must be performed by a technologically
competent group independent of the system developer (the
supervisor). The principal question is whether the system
performs as specified in the detailed design specifications
produced in step (4).
The second step (9) must be performed by the eventual
users to test the systems's functional performance and to
see if it satisfies the user's needs. It may turn out that
although the original specifications are satisfied, the user
finds that the real implementation of that set of
specifications does not completely satisfy his requirements.
New iterations will then be required.
Finally, when the system works as it is required, a
very important phase is performed: the documentation
corresponding to the tests performed and the actual
responses from the system in the factory environment. This
phase, frequently overlooked by the user (but not by the
designer), will provide benchmark results for future
releases of the system.
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PRODUCTION AND INSTALLATION: in hardware systems,
completion of the test step is followed by conventional
factory production. For software, the production phase is
minimal: error-free copies of the original programs must be
made and distributed to the user. The absence of a software
production phase is one major distinction between hardware
and software, specially in terms of funding. Nearly all of
the software acquisition cost consumes development funds,
putting additional strains on a traditionally tight budget
category.
OPERATIONAL USE AND MAINTENANCE: the final test of the
system's ability to satisfy the need defined by the user
comes in the actual operational use of the system in the
user's power plant. At this point, the user has formally
accepted the system from the designer, and the
responsibility for support is transferred to the user, to
another supporting organization or it could remain with the
designer itself.
Maintenance guarantees that the system remains
operational despite the natural deterioration of the
system's hardware. Since there is no intrinsic wear-out of
software, software support mainly involves product
improvement (increasing efficiency, reliability or
supportability) and correcting design oversights and errors.
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MODIFICATIONS: this phase can initiate profound
changes in the system that they may force a complete
repetition of the preceding steps. The most 'limited'
changes will occur in the case of activities initiated once
the system has arrived at its final destination and is
installed (ie maintenance). Modifications in the
installation step could 'simply' imply a repetition of the
design phase. However, most of other modifications (new
user goals, new set of requirements, product enhancement
through incorporation of new technologies), could in general
imply a reversion to even earlier phases.
2.3 DISTRIBUTED FAULT TOLERANT COMPUTER SYSTEMS
As an introduction to Section 2.4, where the
specifications for the proposed system are given, the
concepts of distributed computer systems (DS) and fault
tolerance (FT) need precise definition. In fact, many
systems already in the market have these characteristics,
implemented in one way or another, although the concepts on
which they are based are not found clarified anywhere in the
design process. For example, some systems, although
physically decentralized, are really centralized with
respect to the management and use of information, an
attribute that makes them really centralized systems (ie
plain remote multiplexing). With respect to FT many systems
already in the market apply it in some, but not all, design
levels; the malfunctions for which the de. n is fault
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tolerant are not characterized; reliability calculations
are nonexistent or extremely simplified and validation of
the design has never been made.
The concepts of DS and FT need to be integrated as a
necessity of achieving higher survivability than in
centralized systems in environments where large processing
of data is required. Two commercial applications are
banking and industrial control systems. However, in these
applications there is often no guarantee that the system
performs with any level of reliability or availability. The
vendor may guarantee maintenance or the provision of spare
parts by contract, but not any level of performance.
By contrast, in highly critical situations (aircraft
control systems, power plants, communication systems, etc)
there may be a need to assure and test for a desired level
of survivability. In most of the situations the way in
which the survivability of the system can be validated is by
making conservative assumptions and using judiciously chosen
analytical or simulation methods. Real demostrations to
check some parameters (ie mean time between failures) may
take a very long time, use resources unprofitably and have a
very high standard deviation (because of the small samples
considered). Such actual demonstrations should only be used
when there a fairly significant number of componentes to
test and when the material and labor costs of repeating the
experiments is not substantial. In this category the most
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complex components that can be tested are boards or, in a
few cases, groups of boards (and connectors and cooling fans
and power supplies) forming a working unit. However, the
threats, malfunctions, consequences and means of coping with
them will differ according to the component or group of
components that it is tested.
Two uses of distributed computer systems in the nuclear
plant environment are those directly related with monitoring
and control of the processes. For such a purpose the most
common structure has a hierarchical configuration consisting
of a) a central computer, b) groups of other (typically less
powerful) computers distributed either functionally or
physically over the plant and c) links that connect these
two groups. The central computer has the roles of
supervision, system reconfiguration, communications control,
display control, long term central memory, communication
with other computers and interaction with operators. The
distributed computers are somewhat autonomous, dedicated to
special functions, easily expandable and usually replicated
for reliability. These two elements communicate by means of
links to form an organized system. If CRTs and 'smart'
sensors (sensors coupled with microcomputers to perform a
limited set of functions) are included in the design, CRTs
are usually controlled by the central computer and the
sensors communicate directly with the distributed computers.
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Definitions of distributed systems abound (in reference
[DOBR81] twenty-one definitions are given) but most of them
are based in the three components described above.
Advantages and disadvantages of DS have been described
elsewhere [AKOK78]. The advantages applicable to the case
presented in this Thesis are:
· rapid response to local needs
· objective oriented
· reduced overall system complexity
l· ow start-up costs
· low incremental expansion costs
· high performance/cost ratio (operations per second
per total cost)
* high benefits/cost ratio (total benefits per total
cost)
· prolonged life
· easier maintenance
· easily expandable to more hardware and functions
· forces modular programming
· smaller programs
· esier to debug and maintain
· less complexity in documentation
· less specialized support
· components (also software) can be provided by many
vendors
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· easier testing and self diagnostics (at low levels)
· newer hardware technology on the average
· enhanced signal integrity (digital signals less
corrupted by noise and
temperature effects)
However, some disadvantages should also be noted:
· idle resources
· complexity of the reconfiguration process
· complex routing of data
· difficult validation
In the last years, efforts have been made to integrate
the idea of fault tolerance within the framework of
systematic design to imply a conceptual reverse of the
traditional 'ad hoc' methods for the design of distributed
computer systems. According to traditional methodologies
designs are made by thinking of the functions the system has
to perform during more than 99% of its life, when it is
working in its primary dedicated functions (analyzing
measurements, controlling actuators, etc). Instead, the FT
approach is based on a systematic way of designing (that
does not weight more heavily those primary dedicated
functions) but it concentrates efforts on 'robustifying'
characteristics that will allow the system to spend even
more time in its primary functions. This can be
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accomplished by defining threats and malfunctions, creating
ways of detecting them, identifying the failed units and
reconfigurying the system or allowing a 'graceful'
degradation to a state with less computational requirements.
These functions have not been appropriately considered in
the past until it was too late and modifications were almost
prohibitive.
In one way or another, some FT methods have been
applied since the first computers were built in the 1950's.
These early FT methods essentially consisted of providing
redundant hardware. Later, more reliable components were
used, diagnostic tests were employed, quality assurance and
system tests were introduced at the manufacturer's level and
finally structured programming, methodologies for
requirements, specifications and validation made the
important contributions of 'division of the problem into
manageable parts' and 'systematization of the design'.
In order to understand the idea of FT the concepts of
threat, malfunction and consequence are introduced, (based
on [HOPK80] ): a threat is a stress producing an anomalous
condition or malfunction, which has as a consequence: a
modification in the normal behavior of the system.
A system may be designed to prevent threats from
producing malfunctions, and/or it may cope directly with the
malfunctions themselves. The objective is that the
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consequences to the jobs being performed by the system are
to be minimal. Threats and malfunctions depend on the
implementation.
Three categories of threats can be identified:
· limited environmental stress (ie aging) causing
components to lose their original characteristics
over a long period of time.
· abnormal environmental stress (high radiation dose
rate) that disrupt components in a short time, and
· design errors in the system.
Now the definitions of failure, error and fault will be
introduced. They all are malfunctions, which can be divided
into four levels:
· physical malfunctions (component failures)
· signal-level malfunctions (faults)
· data-level malfunctions (errors)
· system-level malfunctions (catastrophic system
failures)
The idea behind a FT design is that (reference
[HOPK80] ):
* some faults can be tolerated all the time or all the *
* faults can be tolerated some of the time, but not all *
* the faults all the time. *
- 52 -
Summarizing, threat induced malfunctions and their
consequences are to be contained by FT features.
FT methods can be broadly divided into two
complementary branches: fault-intolerance and
fault-tolerant methods [AVIZ71]. The total resources
allocated to achieve the required reliability must be
divided between these two methods.
Fault-intolerance is an attempt to eliminate the causes
of unreliability before the system starts the computing
process in its actual application. This is accomplished by
· using reliable components (low failure rate)
· providing good packaging (low influence of the
environment)
· testing components, boards and systems (during
design and after installation)
· developing modular software
· handling correct and updated documentation
· devising maintenance procedures according to the
requirements given by the user (ie procedures may
be different for high or low reliability
applications)
On the other hand, fault-tolerance is defined as the
capability of the system to overcome malfunctions without
human intervention by means of protective redundancy. This
redundancy can be achieved by
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· additional hardware or hardware redundancy
· additional software or software redundancy
· repeating operations or time redundancy
Hardware redundancy can be divided in two categories:
static and dynamic redundancy. Static redundancy
techniques, also called fault-masking or parallel-redundancy
employ multiple, identical components (processors, memories,
buses, switches, etc), operating simultaneously in parallel.
The advantages of this approach are that
· it is simple,
· detects a high proportion of transient and
permanent faults (at the signal level),
· provides instantaneous fault masking containing the
propagation of its effects to higher levels,
· it is easy to design (just include standard voting
circuitry) and
· is becoming less expensive due to reductions in
hardware costs.
However, the technique is not free of disadvantages.
They include
increasing number of interconnections and addition
of extra hardware (and/or gates to provide voting)
that could effectively increase the failure rate of
the unit,
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· non applicability to the highest levels of the
design (too costly to replicate everything),
· not useful for common-mode failures in:
· software
power
· clocking
· synchronization
buses
. protocols
· design errors
· manufacturing process
· uncharacterized environmental stresses.
In the dynamic redundancy approach, after a threat
-occurs, a) a malfunction is detected, b) a real-time
recovery process begins to identify the failure and/or
failed unit, and, if necessary, c) replace it by a spare or
d) degrade the system by cancelling processing of incorrect
or suspected functions.
The advantages of dynamic redundancy are that:
· there is a good modularization of the design,
· the system survives as long as there are enough
spares,
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· the effect of transient errors are eliminated,
· adjustability of the number of spares to the
particular application can be made in the case that
modifications are required,
· diagnostic programs can check spare parts and
assure that they are error free when they are
needed.
The main disadvantages with these more sophisticated
forms of redundancy are that they are more difficult to
design and to validate.
The use of software redundancy is made by including
programs that provide fault-detection or recovery at various
levels in the computer system. Three major forms are
· multiple storage of critical programs and data,
· test and diagnostic programs at various levels in
the hierarchy of the design and at the various
phases of the systems' life-cycle and
· restarts of the executive.
The advantages of this feature are that
it can be provided after the hardware has been
designed if it is seen that more protection is
required and
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. it can be easily modified.
The main disadvantages are, as always, the difficulties
of assuring completeness and the validation of the design.
However, any effort made in this direction is useful.
Time redundancy is based in repeating or acknowledging
programs after a malfunction has been detected. Two
techniques are
· repeated execution or acknowledgment of a module of
a program (microinstruction, macro, subroutine) and
· restart of a program with an uncontaminated set of
variables after reconfiguration has been made
(rollback).
This category of redundancy is employed with the other two
types previously discussed. Real-time constraints tend to
limit the application of time redundancy.
In a FT design, a combination of hardware, software and
time redundancy are employed.
2.4 A PRELIMINARY DESIGN
Based on the requirements detailed in FIG.2.2 and
knowing the characteristics of the power plant in which the
system is to be installed, a preliminary design can be
drawn. The final preliminary design is shown in FIG.2.3.
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The simultaneous analysis of the requirements will
provide a preliminary set of the characteristics of the
system that will be designed.
The first characteristic, as explained in Section 2.1,
is derived from the requirements 2, 5 and 6 and it is the
necessity of a computer system. An analysis of the rest of
the requirements will provide more characteristics of that
system.
The second characteristic, obtained from requirements
1, 2 and 10 (namely that the tasks performed by the system
have to be in real-time and that the total cost of the
system must not be very high) suggest that the candidate
architecture should be distributed. Otherwise, a
centralized system with such real-time capabilities could be
very expensive (ie array processors)** for this application.
On the other hand, a distributed system based on powerful
but not expensive processors could be configured in a
** The use of array processors could probably be
justified for particular applications: for example, on-line
spectrum analysis. However, one of the drawbacks of array
processors is that their reliability is, in general,
extremely low (the other important drawback being its high
cost). Some facilities that use array processors have
reported mean time between failures of the order of a day.
- 58 -
process-oriented structure, taking advantage of the
modularization. In that way, requirement 7 (dealing with
changeability and expandability) could also be satisfied.
One way of achieving that process-oriented modularization
would be to use off-the-shelf components.
The third important characteristic at the system level
is implied by an analysis of the survivability requirements
8 and 9. According to Section 2.3 a careful consideration
to two fault tolerant techniques must be given: fault
intolerance and fault tolerance. Fault intolerance tries to
prevent threats from originating malfunctions. On the other
hand, fault tolerance is related to the concept of
malfunction containment: the design is oriented to detect
and contain malfunctions and consequences within the levels
in which they were originated; ie, avoiding propagation of
the consequences of a malfunction. Both of these concepts
(fault intolerance and fault tolerance) mean extra cost on
any design by increasing the amount and quality of hardware,
software, design and test, effort, maintenance, etc.
The first tradeoff appears when confronting the results
from the previous paragraphs: off-the-shelf components with
stringent survivability characteristics. Normally the
acceptance of one solution will preclude the other because
most of high level off-the-shelf components (boards,
processors, systems) cannot satisfy fault tolerance by
themselves (ie as provided by the manufacturer) and
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considerable effort should be dedicated by the designer,
first, to develop tests and procedures to check some
parameters that are loosely specified by the manufacturer
and, second, to incorporate some fault tolerance in the
design. In some ocassions, it may be advisable to use
original designs for special parts of the system.
If the system is divided into levels, there are a
number of techniques applicable to each particular level
(those underlined were used in this preliminary design).
Computerized control systems can be divided into four
levels (component, module, subsystem and system level),
connected to two environments (sensors and operators or
other computers). The sensors interface with the computer
system at the source layer* and operators interface with the
system by means of the central computer (central node*) or
computers connected to it.
Decisions related to the sensors involve the number of
* Note the terminology that it is used in this and in
the following Chapter (FIG.3.3): sensors are connected to
multiplexers that are at the 'source layer', the outputs of
multiplexers are sent to concentrators that are at the
'concentrator layer' and concentrators are connected among
themselves (creating an effective network) and to a central
computer located in the 'central node'.
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sensors that have to be connected (ie redundant or not) and
the quality of the signals they will be sending to the
multiplexers. If the computer system has to be installed in
a plant that is in the process of being built, these points
can be discussed by the designer; if the computer system
has to be integrated into an existing plant, the amount and
quality of the original sensors will almost be untouched.
However, an opportunity to interface additional sensors to
the computer is rarely presented.
With respect to the computer system, at the lowest
level (gates, registers, connectors) redundancy of
components may become very awkward due to many
interconnections, and very costly because there are many
units. At this level, two approaches seem useful: use of
high quality components to reduce failure rates and coding
(in its multiple versions of error detection (ED) or error
detection and correction (EDC)). However, the use of high
quality components increases cost and, with respect to
coding, the more bits are used the more complicated and
slower the uncoding schemes become and more useful bits (of
data) are used. References [PETE72] and [PRAD80] treat this
topic at length. In the design presented
double-error-detection and sing le-error-correction are
employed, because it handles transient errors, it is not as
slow as more complicated schemes and provides automatic
correction of single failures.
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At the next level, the components are interconnected to
form boards, power supplies, etc. A list of the errors and
schemes to cope with them at this level can be seen in the
IBM Fault Tolerant Network Study [IBMF80]. The typical
fault tolerant scheme for high reliability short-life
applications has been to replicate components and to provide
a voter (2 out of 3, 2 out of 4) to compare their outputs
and reject those that fail. Although at first sight this
seems correct, a closer examination will prove that the
scheme is only useful when each pattern of failures is
expected not more than once in the lifetime of the system
(or at least until the failed element is replaced) or these
failures do not occur symultaneously in more than one
component. Otherwise, (ie in a 2 out of 3 structure), the
outputs of two failed units would be preferred instead of
the healthy one. Another problem, constantly overlooked, is
the failure rate of the voter itself, which may preclude (at
least) three healthy and more expensive components of
delivering their outputs when needed. The risk in using a
voting structure is very high. A solution to this problem
is to include reconfiguration and recovery.
Next, at the subsystem level (concentrators,
peripherals), the idea is to use available (off-the-shelf)
components with critical design parameters well
characterized (reliability, maintainability, spares
availability, compatibility of equipment) and with some kind
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of redundancy and implemented malfunction detection,
identification and reconfiguration. The kind of redundancy
will depend on the application. For modest applications
requiring low reliability, one unit working and one spare
(powered or not) or two units working in parallel with a
voter may be enough. In these designs, upon detection of a
malfunction, a signal is sent to the operator's console
and/or a light is activated on the board itself. Sometime
afterwards, the board is manually replaced by another board
which is supposed to work as soon as it is connected. Many
criticisms can be made of structures that use that kind of
redundancy from the standpoint of high reliability
applications and they are:
costly and ineffective use of the hardware (ie in
the double board configuration, whenever a
difference in the outputs of a voter are noted,
both boards are replaced, even when, more often
than not, only one of them would be affected).
these designs depend on the performance of a
hardwired voter, having the same drawbacks that
were noted before.
it is usually assumed that the component that
replaces the failed one is in perfect operating
condition although there usually is no way of
knowing if that is the case without performing some
tests on it. It is interesting to note that every
testing scheme applied by the manufacturer can only
- 63 -
find a percentage of the total number of failures
the board has, in the same way that commercial
software is commonly released with 'bugs'.
Therefore, the assumption of perfect spares may not
always be correct.
replacement of the failed unit by a good one is not
made in a short time (less than one second) but the
delay may leave the system with unadequate
protection for long periods of time (hours).
One solution to the problem of redundancy at this level
is to employ more (than two) arallel redundancy with voter
implemented in software and reconfig uration. The minimum
number of working units has to be three to detect single
failures unequivocally. This configuration (three
processors working simultaneously with the same inputs and
producing the same outputs) is called a triad. The
selection of the actual number of units (three, four or
more) will be done in Chapter 6, where the reliability and
availability of the units is modelled and analyzed.
However, the use of techniques that have a certain
amount of decision (switching spares on) must assure that
those decisions are taken by a non-failed unit. The use of
testing will guarantee, within certain limits, that the
units work correctly (at least for those tests). In
reference [HAYE80], testing methods are divided into two
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broad categories: concurrent (or implicit) and explicit.
Concurrent approaches include mostly coding. Explicit
methods can be applied by a processor to itself (self-tests)
or to another unit (external testing). A more complete and
updated list of testing methods is given by Williams et al
in reference [WILL82].
Note that even with these techniques: coding,
self-tests, external tests, redundancy and reconfiguration
the spectre of some common-caused malfunctions still exists*
(ie software errors, design errors). The problem of
synchronization has been solved by Daly et al in [DALY73]
with their design of a fault tolerant clock.
The use of redundant software has been traditionally
rejected for two reasons: cost and voting only on the
outputs. Using only one validated version of the software
and voting it every few instructions or every instruction,
bit by bit, may allow error discovery at the instruction (or
subroutine) level. Voting only the final results of a
program does not provide information about its structure, in
case of problems. See reference [HOPK80].
Finally, at the network level, two major components
remain to be addressed: links and duplication of central
computers. With respect to the links, at least one design
exists that considered the fault tolerance of a network with
'intelligent' nodes [SMIT75]. In this way, reconfiguration
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and recovery at the highest level is accomplished by
rerouting data. Each node is interconnected to at least
three other nodes (this will be specified in the network
layout design, Chapter 3). Also, each node contains the
necessary circuitry to be connected to other nodes. Thus,
some links and nodes can remain idle and, in the event of a
reconfiguration, they could be used. Note that this concept
differs from standard designs with modest reliability
requirements where the links are 'hardwired' in the design
(ie there is no possibility of changing the established
routing of data). One approach that may be used to build
these nodes can be extracted from LEVASSEUR's design
[LEVA79] of a serial and parallel interface circuitry,
programmable and reconfigurable.
The double central computer architecture is not
considered if the central computer is already fault tolerant
(and by that it is meant a computer designed to guarantee a
minimum of reliability). The reasons behind the rejection
* The term common-caused is preferred to common-mode
because what is common is the nature of the malfunction and
not the way its consequences are propagated. Common-mode
malfunctions can be detected but their origin can not be
diagnosed easily. Common-caused malfunctions can not be
reliably detected and their diagnosis is even more
difficult.
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of an architecture with double central computer is that they
are useful only for limited reliability requirements.
Control systems with these computers have not been connected
to safety systems and requirement 7 indicates the need to
provide control without precluding these feature. An
alternate approach to the acquisition of a central fault
tolerant computer is to build one with rather standard
components, following a systematic method of design, testing
and validation. However, the magnitude of the effort will
be comparable to that of designing the rest of the network
and, consequently, this approach is not recommended.
The requirements that remain to be analized, 3 and 4,
characterize the functions that the system will have to
perform with respect to the lower layers (sources and
concentrators) and the final destination of the outputs
produced by the system.
With signals acquired from the sensors, a first and
limited amount of processing will be required. The signals
will be compared to upper and lower limits or other kinds of
thresholds as indicated in Chapter 5. At the same time
other checking will be made with signals coming from
redundant sensors (if they exist) measuring the same
quantity, or from data derived from dissimilar sensors
combined in appropriate fashion. One more test can be made
by using analytic models to calculate signals similar to
those of the processes that are being sensed, providing a
- 67 -
rather independent way of verifying the measurements. This
procedure is called analytic redundancy.
The first elemental processing: comparison to limits
and another sensors or data, can be made with microcomputers
installed in the same cabinets where multiplexers are
located. Sensors are hardwired to multiplexers,
multiplexers write data in memories and processors take data
from the memory, make the calculations and send the results
(fewer data than sending every sensed variable) through
fiber optics cables to the concentrators, located in nodes
distributed througout the plant. In the concentrator nodes,
the main computations will be related to the modelling of
the processes (Chapter 4), Hypothesis Testing algorithms
(Chapter 5), normal management of data (to another nodes and
to the central computer for keeping records) and abnormal
procedures (alarms created as a result of a mismatch in the
comparisons made at the source and concentrator layers).
The central computer is in charge of providing the
means for operators and other computers to access the files
and the rest of the system. Files have to be accessed by
the minicomputers connected with the central computer to
generate the displays required by the operators. Computers
can be linked with the system, for example, to provide
immediate maintenance (this possibility may be offered by
the designer of the system) or to provide or request data
routinely (process computer, other user's computer systems).
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A summary of the processing of signals and their
conversion to data in the system says that the lower layers
will filter, smooth and synthesize signals so that they can
provide reliable data to be used higher in the hierarchy of
the system. System routines running in the central computer
and in the utility computer will be used to assess the
safety and productivity of the plant as intended in the
original user's goal. As an example of the use of this
overall management of information see [MOT077].
Finally, a review of the distributed system must be
made to look for the overall reliability. If certain
multiplexers and links are found to be weak points in the
design, redundant multiplexers and links have to be provided
and, due to the same considerations that dictated
triplicated processors at the concentrator layer, they will
also have to be triplicated. Note, however, that links that
connect concentrators among themselves do not need
replication because of the existance of the fa'ult tolerant
network.
2.5 CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter, a methodology for the design of
computer systems has been introduced and it has been applied
to the preliminary design of a computer system to monitor a
nuclear power plant.
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The idea behind the method is to present a list of
requirements: the characteristics of the system can be
extracted from the requirements, and not viceversa. The
process is iterative and involves three organizations: the
user, a supervisor and the designer, each one with different
purposes and structures.
Definitions of different concepts used throughout the
Thesis have been given: objective, goal, requirement,
specification, distributed system, fault tolerance, threat,
malfuction, failure, fault and error.
The proposed system is a distributed computer system,
which makes use of fault tolerant techniques to achieve the
desired degree of reliability (which consists in
ellimination of single failures) and which does not rely in
brut force redundancy (which was shown that it can not cope
with every malfunction). The structure of the system and
the functions to be performed have also been delineated as a
consequence of the analysis of the requirements.
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OBJECTIVE AND REQUIREMENTS
APPLICABLE TO THE MONITORING SYSTEM
! OBJECTIVE A nuclear power plant monitoring system
REQU IREME NTS
! !
1 A monitoring system is required for a nuclear
I power plant.
2 ! It has to interface with sensors distributed
! !. throughout the plant and sample, process,
! store and display data,
I I
3 ! Some variables have to be compared with
! ! predetermined limits and/or with models of
I I some of the subsystems of the plant.
I I
4 ! Given anomalies in the comparison (item 3),
!  some sensor data may be rejected or the
I operators may be alerted, or both.
I I
! 5 ! Operators may ask for past, present or future
! I values of some variables, design 'or
! ! operational data from the plant, monitoring
system status (what elements are operational)
II " and present maintenance data of the plant.
! I ...
6 I The system has to interface with computer
I systems (process computers, utility computer)
7 ! It must allow expansionsto .incorpor.ate- more
! I sensors, mo.d.els and functions, (including
I control of some of the subsystems by means of
! actuators).
8 I Single failures must neither disable all of
!  system's functions nor impact adversely the
! operation of the plant.! ·
9 ! It must be readily modifiable to allow the
! ! incorporation of new technologies and
! ! improved algorithms.
! !
! 10 ! It must be easily maintainable (except in the
! case of catastrophic incidents).
. !
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CHAPTER 3
THE NETWORK DESIGN
In this Chapter one of the basic problems in the
system's preliminary design will be addressed: the
connection of signals distributed throughout the plant to a
central computer. This question is also referred to as the
layout problem.
The problem will be discussed, formulated and solved
for the two scenarios postulated in Chapter 2: an initial
one when the main function of the computer system will be
those of surveillance and a second one, ocurring later in
the life of the system, when some control will be allowed.
The objective is to minimize the installation cost of
the network.
3.1 THE DISTRIBUTION AND CHARACTERISTICS OF SIGNALS IN THE
PLANT
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Given that the arrangement of signals in a plant
changes from station to station (and from year to year), it
is necessary to use an idealized plant to show how to find
the optimal solution to the layout problem. For that reason
a typical Westinghouse PWR - plant will be used, using the
data provided in reference [UNIT76]. The arrangement can be
seen in FIG.3.1.
The plant consists of a reactor building (RB), turbine
building (TB), emergency feedwater pump building (EFPB) ,
primary auxiliary building (PAB), waste treatment building
(WTB), fuel handling building (FHB), cooling tower area
(CTA), intake structure (IS) and yard area (YA).
The RB includes the reactor containment with 4 primary
loops and their steam generators, reactor cooling pumps,
pressurizer, piping and the safety injection system.
The TB houses the turbine generator, condensers, pumps
and feedwater heaters.
The EFPB contains the auxiliary feedwater pumps,
auxiliary feedwater control valves and the demineralized
water pumps.
The PAB houses most of the auxiliary systems for the
reactor coolant system, which are the chemical and volume,
low pressure safety injection, residual heat removal and
containment spray systems.
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The WTB contains the liquid and gas waste processing,
boron recovery and solid waste systems.
The FHB houses the underwater fuel storage facilities.
With respect to the signals themselves they are divided
into four main categories:
· building
· scenario: initial
growth
· function: non-safety
safety
monitoring (non-control)
control
· electrical characteristics: analog
digital
A summary of the tabulated data in [UNIT76] and
applicable to our case is presented in FIG.3.2. Note the
following:
the non-control signals are used for indication,
alarm and recording (IRA).
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· signals classified into the 'initial scenario'
subcategory are those that can be found in the
non-safety and safety non-control subcategories;
more explicitly, every signal except the ones used
for control. The difference between the 'initial'
and 'growth' scenarios is the inclusion of the
control signals.
· the control signals can be thought to be composed
of two groups: those that go from the field to the
computers and the commands of the computers
responding to signals received from the plant.
· to make the problem understandable two important
simplifications have been made. First, a
distinction is not made for 'electrical
characteristics', although, in real life, the I/O
cards of every multiplexer have a fixed amount of
analog and digital lines, condition that could be
incorporated as one more set of constraints in the
following Section. Second, no distinction has been
made in signals that go from the field to the
computer and viceversa, although, again, there are
input/output limitations in doing that.
an extra 20% of signals per building is included in
the last column of FIG.3.2. That is used in
Section 3.2 to account for limited expansions.
3.2 THE CONNECTION PROBLEM
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Given a multiplicity of sensors, computers and other
data sources spread over a certain area and some measures
that characterize the network and the traffic expected
between the various sources, the desire is to optimize a
function based on those measures. The most general solution
(if it exists) will provide the optimal network.
Some of these measures could be delay times
(considering or not the possibility of reconfiguration in
the network), buffer sizes, installation costs, link
capacity, connectivity, number of sources connected to one
concentrator, reliability, etc. The optimization could
imply the minimization or maximization of one, some or all
of the measures considered.
The difficulty in deriving a solution will depend on
the size of the network (number of nodes or links), the
number of the measures to be optimized and the constraints
imposed on the system. The complexity of the problem will
determine whether an optimal or suboptimal solution is more
appropriate and will also suggest an analytical, Monte Carlo
or heuristic method. For complex networks the optimization
procedure is iterative and more than one method is used.
Surveys of methods for centralized and
distributed networks design are given in [FRAN72] and
[SCHW77].
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In this section the formulation of the connection
problem will be presented. The structure of the network
will consist of sources distributed throughout the plant and
connected to concentrators, which in turn are connected
among themselves and to a central computer. The sensors are
assumed to be hardwired to the source layer (ie the
multiplexers). Their location in the plant does not concern
to the problem at hand. Their inclusion would provide
unnecessary detail at a very low level. If changes would be
made at that low level, no modifications would be noted at
higher levels of the design. The sources are assumed to
consist primarily of multiplexers and those processors that
perform the data validation. The concentrators consist of
more powerful microcomputers in charge of higher level
functionis with respect o the sources) such as modelling,
ai.riar ?ltering, comparisons between the filtered signals
from the sources and the variables calculated in this layer,
etc.
The sources and concentrators are located in nodes,
which will be called distributed nodes, to distinguish them
from the central computer, located in the central node.
This same structure will be used in Chapter 6 for the
analysis of the reliability of the network.
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Summarizing the distribution and nomenclature of the
elements in the plant, it can be said that the objective of
this layout problem is to minimize the capital cost of a
distributed system consisting of sources of signals,
connected to distributed nodes which are connected among
themselves and to a central node.
Assume that the sources, distributed nodes and central
node are located in concentric layers, displayed in FIG.3.3.
The outer layer contains m sources of signals (groups of
sensors representing the number of signals per building as
displayed in FIG.3.2, not isolated sensors) indexed with the
letter i, (1 < i < m); in the following layer, the n groups
of concentrators are indexed with the letter j, (1 < j < n);
the innermost layer contains the central node.
The links' symbology designate the connection of layers
with letters and the connection of nodes with subindices.
According to FIG.3.1 the nomenclature for the links is the
following:
· wij = link between a source located at node i and a
concentrator located at node j,
. xio = link between a source located at node i and
the central node,
· yjl = link between a concentrator located at node j
and another concentrator located at node 1,
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zjo = link between a concentrator located at node j
and the central node.
The set of variables can only adopt two numerical
values: 0 (there is no link) or 1 (a link exists).
The capacity of a multiplexer located at node i will be
indicated with the symbol Pi. That capacity represents the
maximum number of signals that can be connected to the
multiplexer. Similarly, the maximum number of signals
accepted by an analog to digital converter (ADC) located at
node i will be indicated with Ai and the maximum number of
digital signals accepted in a digital to analog converter
(DAC) also located at node i is Di. For the problem treated
in this Thesis, only one kind of multiplexers and converters
will be used.
The number of signals produced per source is indicated
with Si and the numerical values that this variable adopts
were shown in the previous Section, under the heading
'Scenario' in FIG.3.2.
The objective function to be minimized is the total
installation cost of the network. This includes the design,
equipment and labor cost of the installed hardware. The
cost of the software is not considered because it is assumed
to be a constant for a distributed system *.
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The variables to be found are the number of links and
the number of concentrators.
The costs that weigh these variables have the same
subindex nomenclature used for the nodes and the links.
They are:
· cij = initial cost for link wij
· cio = initial cost for link xio
· cjl = initial cost for link yjl
* cjo = initial cost for link zjo
Consequently, the objective function to be minimized is
F = min { Z cij * wij + cio * xio +
i j i
+ cjl * yjl + cjo * yjo j (3.1)
* Actually the software costs are quantized, in time
and in size of the system. In TIME because with changes in
the available technologies some functions may not be made
anymore in software and they are provided installed in
hardware (called firmware). In SIZE because systems are
designed as to manage resources between defined limits.
Above these limits, some parts of the software must be
rewritten to allow the expansion, implying modifications in
routing tables, reconfiguration procedures, priorities,
protection, etc.
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i j
This objective function will be minimized subject to a
set of constraints. They are:
a minimum number of converters and multiplexers
must be available to provide the interface with
sensors. These constraints may be incorporated as
one more set of constraints when they are solved by
the computer program or they can be calculated by
hand when the network is small enough. In the
present problem they will be calculated by the hand
method.
The constraints can be written as
SAi' - Ak2 * NAi < 0
SDi' - Dk3 * NDi < 0
Si' - Pkl * NMi < 0
for all i
for all i
for all i
SAi' = (number of analog signals at node i) * 1.2
SDi' = (number of digital signals at node i) * 1.2
NAi = number of ADC boards at node i
NDi = number of DAC boards at node i
NMi = number of multiplexers at node i
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where
j
communication lines from the sources to the central
node must exist. This constraint is indicated by
E wij + xio = 1 for all i (3.2)
j
The assumption has been made in (3.2) that the
source i will communicate with either a distributed
node (link wij) or with the central node (link
xio), but not both. Other constraints of a similar
kind that could be enforced could be that the
source i has to have two links to different
concentrators and that can be indicated as
Z wij = 2 for all i
J
or that the source i has to be linked with two
or three concentrators and a maximum of one link to
the central node, which can be written as
Z wij + xio = 3 for all i
j
In this Thesis the constraint given by
equations (3.2) will be used.
if there is no input to a node j, there should be
no output to the central node. That is indicated
by
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Z wij - zjo > 0 for all j (3.3)
i
Here, if there is no input to the node j, the
sum of all wij's for all i's (links arriving to j)
will be zero, and this will be the upper bound of
the numerical value of the variable zjo (link from
the node j to the central node). Given that the
lower bound for all variables considered is zero,
zjo is forced to be equal to zero.
limits on the number of links between concentrators
can be stated. A parameter TESTC will be used for
that purpose. The maximum of TESTC occurs in the
case of a fully connected network, where
n-1
TESTC = i
i=1
and n is the index that corresponds to the
last group of concentrators. For example, if n=4,
TESTC=6; if n=5, TESTC=10, and so on. Then, the
constraint can be written as
Z Z yjl = TESTC (3.4)
j 1
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there must be a minimum number of links from the
concentrator layer to the central node. This
constraint is related to reliability requirements.
A very small number of links is not desirable
because of the possibility of saturating the
bandwidth of the link in case of reconfiguration
(ie too many signals through one link), although
the ever increasing capacity of the fiber-optic
links almost removes this constraint for small
networks. The constraint can be written:
Z zjo = TESTD (3.5)
j
There must be a correspondence between the
number of nodes in the concentrator layer (TESTC)
and the maximum number of links between nodes
(TESTD). For example, if TESTC=4, then TESTD=6;
if TESTC=5, then TESTD=10, and so on.
Actually, TESTC is used as a variable
parameter in the design of the network and it can
be thought as a special case of the more general
formulation
TESTC1 < yjl < TESTC2
j 1
where TESTC=TESTC1=TESTC2, and TESTC1 and TESTC2
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can be understood as being the minimum and maximum
number of nodes that can be assumed for the
network, respectively.
Equation (3.5) is a special case of the more
general case where the equal sign is replaced by a
less than or equal sign.
concentrators have a limited processing capability.
This set of constraints, also related to
reliability considerations, effectively limits the
maximum number of sources to which a concentrator
could be connected in order to prevent saturation
of 'healthy' nodes in the case of reconfiguration.
If such a maximum is denoted by Sj, then
£ Si' * wij < Sj for all j (3.6)
i
the capacity of direct hook-up of the sources to
the central node is limited. Process computers
only accept a very limited number of sources
directly connected to its input cards. This
constraint is expressed as
Z Si * xio < So (3.7)
i
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As it is formulated, the problem at hand is one that
requires an integer programming solution. All of the
variables are of the 0-1 type.
The constraints can be written in the following way:
GROUP A
(i=1)
(i=2)
(i=m)
GROUP B
(j=1)
(j=2)
wij + xio = 1
w1l + w12 + ... + wn + x10o = 1
w21 + w22 + ... + w2n + x2o = 1
wml + wm2 + ... + wmn + xmo = 1
wij - zjo > 0
i
w1l + w21 + ... + wml - z10o > 0
w12 + w22 + ... + wm2 - z2o > 0
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win + w2n + . . . + wmn - zno > 0
GROUP C = Z Z yjl = TESTC
******* j 1
y12 + y13 + y14
+ y23 + y24
+ y34
+ ... + yln +
+ .*. + y2n +
+ ... + y3n +
.. + y(n-1)n
GROUP D = Z zj o = TESTD
******* j
z o + z2o + . . . + zno = TESTD
GROUP E = Si' wij < Sj
******* i
(j=1)
( j=2)
S1' wl 1 + S2' w21 + . .. + Sm' wml < S
S1' w12 + S2' w22 + ... + Sm' wm2 < S
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= TESTC
1
(j=n)
(j=n) S1' wn + S2' w2n + ... + Sm' wmn < S
GROUP F = Z xio < So
******* i
S1 x10o + S2 x2 + . + Sm xmo < So
Having introduced the objective function (3.1) and the
constraints (3.2) to (3.7), the next step is to apply the
equations to our particular problem.
3.3 COSTS INCLUDED IN THIS PROBLEM
In this Section the installation problem will be
addressed. Their costs will be applicable to the
distributed nodes (source and concentrator nodes) and all
the links in the plant. It will be assumed that the cost of
the central computer does not depend on the particular
distribution that the other two layers adopt.
The costs will include design, equipment and labor.
At the lower level the sensors are interfaced with the
use of converters (ADC and DAC) and multiplexers. For the
purpose of finding an approximate total cost it is assumed
that converters accept 32 signals per board and multiplexers
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.
accept 64 lines per board. With these capacities at hand,
the detail of units per building and the total number of
these interfacing units for the whole plant are given in
FIG.3.4. Total costs can be derived by using these figures.
Assume that the average cost of these ADC, DAC and
multiplexers is $ 1000 dollars per unit (triplicated all of
them in the m nodes of the source layer), that they have to
be packaged into a chassis (approximately $ 5000 dollars per
chassis with triplicated power supplies) and that there will
be m of those chassis, the total cost of the hardware in the
source layer becomes
3 * m * 1000 * (total number of ADCs, DACs and
multiplexers as given by FIG.3.4) +
+ 5000*m [ dollars ]
The total hardware cost at the concentrator layer will
be the cost one of the replicated (at least three)
processors times the number of nodes (which has been called
n). Taking as a reference the cost of a triplicated AUGUST
SYSTEMS** control computer to be $ 50000 dollars (including
expanded non-volatile memory and triplicated power
supplies), the total cost of the hardware of the
concentrator layer will be 50000*n [dollars].
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For the cases at hand and applying the above equations,
the hardware cost of the source + concentrator layer is
$650000 for the INITIAL scenario and $927000 for the GROWTH
scenario. Assuming that the cost of integration and test is
15% of the total hardware cost, the partial cost of
hardware, with their installation and testing, becomes
around $750000 and $1070000 dollars, for the INITIAL and
GROWTH scenarios respectively.
With respect to links, it is assumed that
links between the sources and the multiplexers (not
optimized in this problem) are twisted pair cables
installed at a total cost of
dollars
[ --------- ]536.383 + .552 * dab
signal
where dab = distance [feet] from a to b. These
costs are taken from reference [UNIT76], and
include the cable, tray, soldering of terminals,
labor and testing.
The rest of the links (wij, xio, yjl, zjo) are
fiber optic links. The cost (transmitter, fiber,
receiver, installation and testing, from reference
* AUGUST SYSTEMS is a registered trademark of AUGUST
SYSTEMS INC.
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[IFOC79] ) for a single link is
1770.00 + 3.255 * dab [ dollars ]
Note that, although the cost per signal is larger for a
fiber optic link, it soon becomes cost effective when more
than a few signals are sent through the same fiber, for a
fixed distance dab.
In Chapter 2 it was shown that redundancy was to be
used to replicate some components, so that the requirement
of not allowing a single failure to isolate some nodes could
be satisfied. Consequently, links corresponding to the
variables wij and xio are triplicated. The rest (yjl and
zjo) is not replicated due to the redundancy already created
by using the variable TESTC.
In the following Sections, the cost of the
configuration adopted by the links will be calculated and
that cost will be added to the previous costs corresponding
to the source and concentrator layers, to find the
installation cost of the system (without considering the
central computer and applications software).
3.4 THE SOLUTION TO THE CONNECTION PROBLEM
In a network with m sources and n concentrators, the
total number of variables can be derived by noting that
there are
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mxn
m
n(n+1)/2
n
wij variables,
xio variables,
yjl variables and
zjo variables.
Consequently, the total number of variables is
n
( n + 1 ) * ( --- + m )
2
With respect to the constraints, Group A provides m
equations, Groups B and E give n equations each one, and the
rest (Groups C, D and F) , 1 equation per group. The total
number of constraints then becomes
2n + m + 3
In a real life situation a number of possible locations
for the concentrators would be identified by the user's and
the designer's team and the main purpose of the integer
programming solution would be to pick the subset of nodes
and links that minimize the cost of the network subject to
the corresponding set of constraints.
For example, the PWR considered in FIG.3.1 had at least
54 possible locations where sources of signals could be
located (m=54). Considering that there could be 20 places
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where to install the concentrators (n=20), the number of
variables goes up to 1344 and the number of constraints to
97. For some integer programming codes such a number of
variables is prohibitive.
In the problem at hand and introduced in Section 3.1,
the plant is divided into 9 areas (m=9). The possible
concentrator locations are 5 (n=5) and consequently,
TESTC=10 and TESTD=5 for a fully connected network of
concentrators. Note that the more general network that
includes the central node is also fully connected because
TESTD has been assumed to be equal to the maximum possible
value, n, indicating that there has to be one link going
from the central node to every concentrator location. From
the standpoint of redundancy of links at the concentrator
layer, every node communicates with the other four,
providing adequate redundancy at first sight.
From the preceding equations the total number of
variables for this problem is 69 and the number of
constraints is 22.
The distances between the different elements in which
the plant has been decomposed are shown in FIG.3.5. Based
on these distances and the considerations introduced in
Section 3.2, the costs that weight the variables are
calculated and shown in FIG.D.1 and the constraints are
displayed in FIG.D.2 (Appendix A).
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3.5 OPTIMAL AND SUBOPTIMAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CONNECTION
PROBLEM
Computerized 0-1 integer programming (IP) solutions
initially look for a linear programming (LP) solution. The
LP solution, if it exists, is optimal in the sense that it
minimizes (in our problem) an objective function and no
other combination of variables will provide a lower
numerical value for the objective function. The set of
variables given by the LP solution is a set of real numbers.
The final IP solution begins with the optimal solution
produced by the LP procedure and it gives a (possibly) new
solution. This IP solution, in general, will be suboptimal
in the LP frame.
In the case presented in this Chapter, the procedure
indicated above has been followed using the computer program
SESAME, offered in the Information Processing Services (IPS)
at MIT.
SESAME reads an input file of data specifying the
problem and writes the results in output files. The input
file and the output files are given in Appendix A. The
results are discussed in this Chapter. The actual input
file used in this Section is shown in FIG.A.3 and the
outputs provided by SESAME are shown in FIG.A.4 to FIG.A.7.
A pictorial summary is presented in FIG.3.6. The output
file in FIG.A.6 corresponds to the input file FIG.A.3.
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As recalled from Section 3.2, two situations have been
envisioned in the life of the system: an initial scenario
and a growth scenario, called 'INITIAL' and 'GROWTH',
respectively, in the SESAME environment. These two
situations have been combined with two more cases. Given
that there are five possible locations for concentrators,
the first case considers that only four of them will be
linked to the central computer and the second case takes in
account all of them. Consequently, these considerations
give a total of four possibilities:
4 links,
4 links,
5 links,
initial scenario
growth scenario
initial scenario
5 links, growth scenario
('INITIAL4'
('GROWTH4'
('INITIAL'
('GROWTH'
---> FIG.A.4)
---> FIG.A.5)
---> FIG.A.3 and
FIG.A.6)
---> FIG.A.7)
The following are notes
obtained (note that they are
solutions):
applicable to the results
the LP solutions, not the IP
4 LINKS, INITIAL SCENARIO:
total connection cost is calculated to be $
104778.94 dollars (see below for a modification to
this cost). The cost is given by SESAME once the
SOLUTION procedure is called, and appears in the
output in the column ..NAME..., row FUNCTIONAL.
The numerical value is in the column ..ACTIVITY...
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5.
(see Appendix A).
· The variables appear in the section called COLUMNS
SECTION. It can be seen that they all are equal to
0 or 1; then, given that they are integers
already, there is no need to call the IP solution
procedure.
· the total number of signals connected to a
particular concentrator is obtained from the ROWS
SECTION in rows corresponding to the Group E
constraints (ie the total number of signals
connected at concentrator number 2 is 3844, 41 of
them coming from building 4 and 3803 from the
reactor building) and the number of lines available
for connection appears in the next column ...SLACK
ACTIVITY....
· the link from concentrator 1 to concentrator 2,
y12, has been considered a single fiber optic cable
in Section 3.3. For reliability reasons, as
explained in Chapter 2, it is convenient to
replicate it. Note that this procedure does not
have to be repeated for other concentrators because
there are at least 3 links going to the rest of the
concentrators or to the central node. When 3
links, instead of one, are considered, the cost of
that path increases from $ 3235 to $ 9705, raising
the total connection cost to $ 111248.94 dollars.
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the final cost assumed for the network will be the
sum of the costs considered in Section 3.3 for the
sources and the concentrators ($750000 dollars) and
the cost found in this Section for the links
($111250 dollars), which totalize $861250 dollars.
4 LINKS, GROWTH SCENARIO:
. the total connection cost is the same as before ($
111248.94 dollars). Remember that these are
connection costs and the 'GROWTH' solution assumes
that there will be no need to make any change in
the original layout found in the 'INITIAL' solution
if the capacity of the concentrators is raised, as
planned, from 4096 lines to 5276 lines.
. however, now the LP solution has two values which
are not integers. The reason for that being than
the 5180 signals from the Reactor Building
(building 5) cannot be totally connected to one
concentrator. Instead, 97.14% of them are sent to
concentrator 2 and the rest are connected to
concentrator 3. Given that the difference is so
small (only 148 signals out of 5180) and that the
costs of reconnection (changing from the initial to
the growth layout) will be higher than upgrading
concentrator 2 to accept that difference, this
last solution (ie upgrading concentrator 2) is
preferred.
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· the solution is suboptimal and arises from
technological considerations.
· the modifications to the original solution are then
a) the link y12 has to be triplicated and b) the
concentrator 2 has to allow the connection of 148
more sensors.
· the total installation cost of this configuration
is the sum of the costs corresponding to the source
and concentrator layers (obtained from Section 3.3)
$1070000 dollars and the cost of the links obtained
in this Section, $111250 dollars, which make a
total of $1181250 dollars.
5 LINKS, BOTH SCENARIOS:
both scenarios produce optimal LP solutions which
also are optimal IP solutions.
again, there is no difference in the total cost of
connections, that total being $ 127627.00 dollars.
in the 'INITIAL' scenario, building 9 is connected
with the concentrator 4 (ie w94 = 1.0). In the
'GROWTH' scenario, the output of SESAME indicates
that building 9 has to be connected to concentrator
3 (ie w94 = 0.0 and w95 = 1.0). However, given
that the costs of connection between building 9 and
each of the two connectors is the same, it is seen
that the difference has been given by the procedure
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followed by SESAME in the search for the optimal
solution and, given also that the allowed total
number of signals connected to a concentrator (4096
in the 'INITIAL' scenario and 5276 IN the 'GROWTH'
scenario) is much higher than the total number of
signals actually connected, it is concluded that
the difference is irrelevant, there is no need to
change the link w94 to the new position indicated
(w95) and both layouts can be used interchangeably.
the total installation cost for the network, as
said before, will be the sum of the costs
corresponding to the source and concentrator layers
and the cost of the links. For the 'INITIAL'
configuration the cost becomes $877630$ dollars and
the 'GROWTH' configuration will cost $1197630
dollars.
3.6 CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter, a typical nuclear power plant has been
chosen to exemplify how the connection of multiplexers
(sources of signals to which the sensors are interfaced) can
be accomplished through concentrators and how these elements
can be interconnected to provide a network whose purpose is
to communicate the concentrators to a central computer.
This problem is referred to as the layout problem.
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It was shown that the formulation of the layout problem
can be posed as a 0-1 integer programming problem in which
the total connection cost is minimized. That cost has been
called 'connection cost' and is a component of the total
'installation cost', which includes also the cost of the
hardware installed with the multiplewers (analog-to-digital
and digital-to-analog converters, power supplies, chassis)
and concentrators (which were considered stand-alone
components).
Typical data has been used to provide an applicable
solution in four cases and the results were presented
discussing their significance. Modifications had to be made
to the solution given by the computer program used to solve
the problem to accomodate the solutions to the cases at
hand. The four cases include a combination of the following
two situations: a) 4 or 5 links must be connected to the
central computer and b) two scenarios are considered for the
life-cycle of the system. The first scenario ( 'INITIAL')
considers only the surveillance of sensors of the plant,
while an extented scenario ('GROWTH') takes in account the
possibility of exercising control over some of the subsytems
of the plant.
The total installation costs have been calculated to be
4 links, INITIAL scenario ---> $ 861250 dollars
4 links, GROWTH scenario ---> $ 1181250 dollars
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5 links, INITIAL scenario ---> $ 877630 dollars
5 links, GROWTH scenario ---> $ 1197630 dollars
without considering the cost of the central computer and
software costs, which are assumed to be the same for the 4
and 5 links configurations, although different between the
'INITIAL' and the 'GROWTH' scenarios.
A pictorial summary of the resulting configurations and
the installation costs is given in FIG.3.6.
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CHAPTER 4
IMPLEMENTATION OF A KALMAN FILTER
In this chapter a useful technique for estimation
purposes -Kalman filtering- (KF) will be introduced.
Although this concept of filtering is not new, it has not
been widely applied in some areas where the constraints of
on-line implementation made it difficult. The wide
availability of general purpose and inexpensive
microprocessors has removed this limitation and has
facilitated its implementation.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In the following paragraphs of this introductory
section the need for estimation will be addressed,
techniques that can be used for that purpcse will be
mentioned and the advantages of the KF over these methods
will be considered.
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It will be useful to begin by describing the structure
of a typical control system.
A control system that can be succesfully implemented in
a limited number of cases is one consisting of a plant
excited by inputs driven by a human operator. That operator
'observes' the behavior of the controlled plant (primarily
from the measurements he has available), compares that
information with the expected behavior he assumes for the
plant, evaluates the differences and acts accordingly,
graduating the inputs, to maintain these differences small.
In this way, a closed-loop structure is obtained.
This structure, shown in FIG.4.1, is used whenever the
time constants of the plant are long enough to allow the
operator observe the responses, predict what the future
values of the important parameters will be and take a
decision on whether the controls should be positioned to
correct, if necessary, the behavior of the plant.
In processes where
changes of the observed parameters are very fast,
interactions between loops make the prediction of
the observed variables difficult or
hazardous situations preclude the use of a human
operator,
an automatic control system is needed. This control system
will have to take decisions based on available observations
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(measurements) or inferred data (estimates).
These estimates have to exhibit some desirable;
characteristics. They have to be unbiased, so that their
expected value is the same as that of the parameter being
estimated. They have to be minimum variance, so that the
error covariance is less than or equal to any other unbiased
estimate. They also have to be consistent, so that the
estimated parameter converges to its true value as the
number of measurements increases.
Some of the techniques available to obtain estimates
with these characteristics are least-squares, weighted-least
squares, maximum likelihood and Bayesian estimation. A
description of these methods can be found in reference
[GELB77]. For gaussian random variables, identical results
are obtained in each case. In order to find the estimates
linear operations on the measurements are made.
Consequently, they ae called linear estimators. It can be
proved that, under the very mild condition that the noises
are gaussian, a nonlinear filter cannot do better than a
linear filter to find the estimates. If by
optimal estimator it is meant one which minimizes the mean
square error, the KF is the optimal linear estimator. Its
derivation can be seen in references [KALM64], [JAZW70] or
[GELB77].
- 116 -
Then, the KF is an algorithm used to provide estimates
of selected parameters that define the behavior of the
plant. Recall, from FIG.4.1, that the 'plant' has been
defined as a combination of the original plant, the sensors
and the actuators. The incorporation of a KF to the plant
can be seen in FIG.4.2. The addition of the KF will help
the operator in the decision process because he now has
available estimates of those state variables that were not
directly measured. With respect to FIG.4.1 this scheme
represents an improvement and it is the one considered as
the first possible scenario in the life of the computer
system proposed for the plant.
An even better situation would be one where the control
functions of the operator are replaced by a similar group of
functions of the computer system, and this is the second
scenario in the design proposed in Chapter 2. The structure
is shown in FIG.4.3. In this case the inputs to the plant
are given by an optimal control law easily applied on-line,
feature that makes the method attractive for implementation.
For the derivation of this control law see reference
[KWAK72].
Summarizing what has been explained, the KF provides a
simple means of estimating unmeasurable parameters of a
plant, and these estimates are optimal in the sense that the
variance of the error between the estimated and the real
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parameter is a minimum which cannot be improved with any
other filter. These estimates can be used to improve the
knowledge of the plant and to aid in its control, either by
an operator or by a computerized control system.
Previous treatments of this topic can be seen in
references [GURA7 1] , [MEND71] and [SCHM70] , to name a few.
However, they have been limited to the calculation of the
number of additions and multiplications necessary to produce
the updated estimates and the time consumed by any other
operation was considered explicitly only for particular
cases.
In the following sections the model of the filter is
shown, the time and memory requirements between updates are
calculated and these quantities are used with the concept of
'instruction mixes' to calculate the time and storage
required for its on-line implementation.
In this Chapter a calculation will be made to find the
total time and storage needed for the implementation of the
filter under the rather general condition of time-varying
error covariance matrix Qk (see Notation, Section 4.2).
Operations that were only partially considered before or
applicable to only one kind of processor will now be
included.
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4.2 THE MODEL OF THE STANDARD KALMAN FILTER
The particular KF to be used will depend on
characteristics of the process to be 'observed'. The
selection of the Standard Kalman Filter as the algorithm to
be treated in this chapter has been made to apply the
procedure to estimate the computational complexity to a
technique that is gaining popularity in the nuclear field
and at the same time to have a frame of reference to
estimate the order of the linearized models that can be used
in real-time calculations. FIG.4.2 shows the calculations
that take place in the execution of the algorithm.
The equations necessary to produce the updated
estimates xk+l,k+l are [GURA71] , [GELB77]:
System model
xk+l,k xkk + r * wk (4.1)
Measurement model
zk+1,k = H * xk+l,k + vk (4.2)
Error covariance extrapolation
Pk+l,k = * Pk,k * Vt + Qk (4.3)
Kalman gain
Kk+1 = Pk+l,k * Ht * [H * Pk+l,k * Ht + R]-1 (4.4)
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Error covariance update
Pk+l,k+l = Pk+l,k - Kk+1 * H * Pk+l,k (4.5)
State estimates update
zk+l,k+l - zk+l,k (4.6)
xk+l,k+l = xk+l,k + Kk+1 * vk+l (4.7)
Initial conditions
E{x(O)} = xO, E{(x(O)-x(O))(x(O)-x(O)t)} = P0
Notation
n
m
x
xk,k
r
wk
H
vk
Pk+1,k
Pk+ 1, k+ 1
= number of state variables = order of the
system
= number of measurements
= state estimate vector = dim(nxl)
= state estimate @ tk given measurements
were made @ tk
= state transition matrix = dim(nxn)
= system noise distribution matrix = dim(nxl)
= system noise @ tk
= measurement matrix = dim(mxn)
= measurement noise @ tk
= extrapolated error covariance matrix =
dim(nxn)
= updated error covariance matrix
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vk+1
= system noise covariance matrix = dim(nxn)
= measurement noise covariance matrix =
dim(mxn)
= Kalman gain @ tk+1
= innovation @ tk+1
= transpose of (.)
= expected value of {.%
Assumptions
The matrices B, r, H and R
The matrices P, Q and R
Noises: .system noise w
zero mean, with
and that will
.measurement noi:
are constant.
are symmetric.
is Gaussian (normal),
covariance matrix Q,
be denoted as N(O,Q).
se v is also N(O,R).
.noises are uncorrelated, that
indicated by E wj vkt = O
for all j,k
will be
Figure 4.4 (modified from [GELB77] will prove useful in
understanding how the KF works and introduces the concepts
of extrapolation and update. Assume that a set of
measurements are taken at time tk. These measurements,
zk,k, are used to find the innovations k which will update
the estimated states variables xk,k-1 extrapolated from
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Qk
Rk
Kk+ 1
vk+1
(. )t
E{.}
tk-1. The Kalman gains Kk are obtained from the covariance
matrix Pk,k-1 and they are used to update the estimated
state variables and the covariance matrix P. With this set
of updated quantities and the use of the state transition
matrix and the new measurement covariance matrix Qk, a new
extrapolation is performed. The acquisition of a new set of
measurements at tK+1 will initiate the cycle once more with
a new update.
For generallity, the update of the covariance matrix Q
was considered. A procedure to accomplish this and its
proof were presented in [D'APP66]. Figure 4.5 is a
flowchart that shows how the algorithm works. At every
sampling instant ti (where i = ...,k,k+1,...) an nxn matrix,
D', is initialized and the parameter r that determines the
number of iterations is reset to zero. The matrices D' and
F' are calculated by doing
AT
D'(r+l) = * ( F'(r) * G * Qk * G - D'(r) * F )
r+1
where
AT
F'(r+) = ----- * ( F * F'(r) )
r+1
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with D' (O) = 0 and F'(O) = I.
Note that the matrix F'(r+l) is calculated just once,
when the model of the subsytem is loaded in microprocessor's
memory. After that it is a constant.
The matrices D" and are defined by
o
D" = Z D'(i)
i=O
and
c:
= Z F'(i)
i=O
Having calculated the state transition matrix 0, the
matrix Qk is given by
Qk = D" * 
If the Qk matrix converges to the desired predetermined
accuracy or the final number of iterations has been reached
the algorithm terminates; otherwise,it continues.
The characteristics of the method are that "it
converges rapidly (10 < r < 22) to five or six place
accuracy in single precision" with " AT significantly less
than the dominant time constant of the system under
analysis" .
- 123 -
4.3 OPERATIONS AND STORAGE REQUIRED BETWEEN UPDATES
Some of the particularities considered in this
implementation of the KF are that
· If it is decided that it is not necessary to update
the error covariance matrix Qk at every sample, the
parameter r that controls the number of iterations
must be set to zero.
· the matrix inversion algorithm. In this work it
will be assumed, following reference [GURA71] that
the inversion requires ((m**2*(m+3)/2)+q*m)
operations for an mxm matrix; the parameter q was
set equal to 5 in [SCHM70], 7 in [GURA71] and 10.25
in [WEIT79] .
· the processor and particular clock frequency used
(in this case, a MOTOROLA Mc68000 microprocessor
based system with an 8MHz clock). The processor
defines the number of machine instructions executed
per operation and the clock determines the time
required to perform a machine instruction.
a reduction in the number of operations and in the
storage is possible if the symmetry of some
matrices is considered and an efficient allocation
of the matrices, vectors and intermediate results
is performed.
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The analysis of the number of operations and storage
required in the KF algorithm can be divided into two stages:
first the Standard KF itself and second, the update of the
Qk matrix.
The sequence showing the operations performed in the
first stage is presented in FIG.4.6. The update of the Qk
matrix is considered separately but it follows the same
guidelines. Divisions are not taken in consideration
because there are very few of them and substractions are
counted with additions because the number of machine
instructions per operation is the same.
As a result of the counting made in FIG.4.6 the number
of multiplications (NMUL) performed between updates (with q
= 7) gives:
NMUL = 1.5 n**3 + 1.5 n*n + 2.5 n*n*m +
+ 3 n*m + 1.5 n*m*m +
+ 7 m + 1.5 m*m + .5 m**3 (4.8)
and the number of add/substr. (NADD) is
NADD = 2.5 n**3 - .5 n*n + 2.5 n*n*m +
+ .5 n - .5 n*m +
+1.5 n*m*mm + .5 m*m + .5 (4.9)
The storage required at this stage depends on the fact
that the dimension of the measurement vector z, which is
equal to the number of outputs, m, may be smaller, equal or
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greater than the order of the system, n. Under these
conditions, the storage of data becomes:
for m < n (.5n)(n+4m+5)+m (4.10)
for m = n .5 (5 n*n + 7 n) (4.11)
for m > n (.5n)(n+2m+5)+m(m+1) (4.12)
Repeating the procedure to calculate the number of
operations performed and the storage required for the update
of the Qk matrix the following results are obtained
(neglecting the 2(r+1) divisions):
multiplications (n**3) (2r+3) + n*n* (r+1) (4.13)
add/substr. (n**3)(2r+3) - n*n (4.14)
storage of data 5.5 n*n + .5 n (4.15)
As a final element to calculate the total storage it is
necessary to know the amount required by the applications
programs. The Standard KF program size was shown in
[MEND71] to be 488 words long (140 words of main program and
348 words of subroutines), or, equivalently, 996 bytes. The
storage for the program shown in FIG.4.5 can be calculated
with the techniques developed by [HALS76]. In that work it
was stated that some parameters of a program could be
calculated with a very acceptable accuracy just knowing the
number of inputs plus outputs the program has and the
language used to write it. Given that there are 5 inputs
and 2 outputs, the program length in ASSEMBLER is 115 bytes.
Then, the program storage becomes
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storage of program = 1111 bytes
Now the elements to calculate
multiplications is available from
add/subst.: (4.9) and (4.14) and
(4.11), (4.12), (4.15) and (4.16).
the total number
(4.8) and (4.13);
for storage: (4.1
Finally the totals become
multiplications
.5[(n**3)(4r+9)+(n*n)(2r+5+5m)+n(6m+3m*m)+
+m(14+3m+m*m)] (4.17)
a dd/s ubst.
.5 (n**3) (4r+11)+(n*n) (5m-3)+n( 1-m+3m*m)+
+m(2+m)+1] (4.18)
storage [bytes]
for m <
for m =
for m >
n 12n*n+4nm+6n+2m
n 16n*n+8n
n 12n* n+2nm+ 6n+2m* m+ 2m
+
+
+
1111
1111
1111
(4.19)
(4.20)
(4.21)
4.4 INSTRUCTION MIXES
What has been calculated -arithmetic operations- is not
enough to determine the time spent between measurement
updates because three other classes of operations
necessarily performed by the processing unit have not been
- 127 -
of
for
0),
(4.16)
taken into account. They are divided into logical, control
and input/output (I/O). Every application program operates
with these four categories of instructions and, according to
the particular use(navigation, track and command, radar data
processing, real time, control and display, etc) the
percentage of instructions in the actual program execution
varies [CORS70]. For example, in numerical applications,
the highest percentages are likely to be found in two
categories: arithmetic (multiplications, divisions,
additions and substractions) and control (loading registers,
requesting data from memory). Such a blend of instructions
is called a 'instruction mix'. One example of it -for real
time- can be seen in FIG.4.7, with the typical execution
times that correspond to a MC68000. The individual
percentages corresponding to multiplications and
add/substractions, 5% and 16%, have been modified to adapt
the percentages to this application, where it is known that
they are in the approximate ratio
(multiplications).(add/substractions) = 1.12. As their sum
has to be 23% for this instruction mix, it is seen that the
individual percentages should be 10.8 and 12.2 respectively.
Expressing the required time to perform the
calculations in terms of the number of multiplications and
add/subst. is a straightforward derivation:
TT = Total Time = 11.447 * NMUL + 3.197 * NADD (4.22)
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where NMUL is given by (4.17) and NADD by (4.18).
Given that NMUL - 1.12 NADD, it can be seen from the
above equation that including those operations that are not
exclusively multiplications and additions increase the
execution time by 51.61%.
Applying the equations to different values of n and m
FIG.4.8 is obtained and doing a least squares fit to the
data the results are the following (TT = Total time in
seconds, S = storage in kilobytes):
for m = n/2 TT = 3.641 10 -4 n2 .9 2 3
S = 0.249 n °6
for m = n TT = 3.932 10'4 n2 .9 27
S = 0.231 n 1 3
for m = 2n TT = 5.372 10 -4 n 2 91 5
S = 0.203 n .3 02
Plots corresponding to these equations can be seen in
FIG.4.9 for the ranges of interest (4 to 20 state
variables).
4.5 CONCLUSIONS
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The conclusions on the real-time use of a KF can be
summarized in the following statements:
the time spent increases with the third power of
the number of state variables (n). The importance
of obtaining Reduced Order KFs is immediate: the
model of the plant that is used should be limited
or reduced to a manegeable number of state
variables (14-15 seems to give a good update
interval - 1 second). If the reduction is a must,
it could imply a loss of accuracy of dynamics
modelling. Reducing the number of state variables
without losing too much accuracy is an art in the
control field and there are not well-proven
methodologies to do that automatically. Therefore,
an alternative approach that deserves attention is
the real-time 'batch' processing suggested by
[MEND71] where the number of measurements to be
processed is divided into batches. However, as can
be seen from FIG.4.9 the sensitivity of total time
required to produce the updated variables (TT) to
the number of measurements is second order with
respect to the changes in the number of state
variables.
the storage increases with the number of state
variables to a much lower power. For the ranges
considered (at most 20 state variables), there are
no limitations due to storage because
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mini-microcomputer boards already come with 32 or
64 Kbytes of ROM (programs) and 64 to 128 Kbytes of
RAM (data) and there are no problems in obtaining
more memory in additional boards.
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CHAPTER 5
A SEQUENTIAL DETECTION ALGORITHM
5.1 INTRODUCTION
There are a number of situations in which it is
necessary to know (within a specified confidence level) if a
certain parameter (ie estimated mean) is equal to a
predetermined constant or stays within predetermined limits.
If this is not the case it could be necessary, for example,
a) to alert an operator that something is not functioning
properly so that he could take the appropriate correcting
actions or b) indicate that the plant is working about a new
nominal operating point and, consequently, a new linearized
model will represent it better.
In these cases the observed data is drawn from a
population with an assumed (or to be calculated) probability
density function and within that assumption some other
parameters are calculated (mean, standard deviation,
variance, standard deviation of the estimated mean, etc).
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When only one parameter of the population is sought, that
situation is called a point estimation. The interval
estimation finds the interval that includes the population
parameter for a given confidence level. Hypothesis testing
decides if the population parameter is contained inside the
given interval for specified type I and type II errors
(d efined below) .
The objective of this chapter is to show how to
estimate the time and storage required by a particular
sequential detection algorithm (the Sequential t-Test or
StT) with a similar methodology to that shown in Chapter 4,
and oriented also to real-time applications. Two features
that make the algorithm useful for on-line implementation
are that
it was designed so that the average number of
observations to reach a decision is minimal and
it does not need to calculate the variance of the
observed parameter (if coupled with a Kalman Filter
a minimum mean square error between the observed
and the estimated parameter is assured).
The objective of the Chapter is not to propose the
actual implementation of the StT simply because in this work
it has not been compared to other methods for
sequential detection. That comparison would not only depend
on time and storage requirements but on other conside tions
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as well, for example accuracy and stability of the
algorithm, which will depend on characteristics of the
observed process.
5.2 HOW THE SEQUENTIAL DETECTION WORKS
In Hypothesis Testing the following steps are taken: a
particular probability density function pdf (normal,
binomial, Poisson, etc) is proposed as representing the
observed population. Hypothesis regarding the relationship
between the estimated data and some predetermined limits are
stated, a numerical criterion on which to base the decision
is calculated, samples of measurements are taken, data is
analyzed, the decision is made and the sequence begins once
more.
FIG.5.1 represents a normal pdf of the estimated
parameter 8 vs. 8 itself. In the region labelled ACCEPT
the decision is to accept the calculated value of the
parameter O as an estimate of the true mean of the
population for the specified interval. This is the HO or
null hyphotesis. If the estimated 8 falls outside the
interval 81 < < 2, the decision is to REJECT the HO
hypothesis, and this is called the H1 or alternative
hypothesis.s
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The acceptance or rejection of hypothesis leads to two
errors named:
type I : although HO is true, the decision is to accept H1.
type II: although H1 is true, the decision is to accept HO.
Th e first kind of error happens when a correct
numerical value of the estimated parameter is taken as
incorrect. The second kind of error occurs when an estimate
of that parameter, which falls outside the limits 1, 2, is
taken as a valid representative. From the figure and from
what has been expressed it is seen that the further apart
are these limits the smaller the chance of making the
errors. The price to be paid is an increase in the number
of observations to reach a decision.
The probability of making a type I error is a and that
of making a type II error is S. When the number of
observations and a are fixed, becomes a function of a
(Neyman-Pearson th eory [WALD47], Bayesian tests [HANC66] ).
However, when a and are fixed the number of observations
b ecomes a random variable. Th e average number of
observations to arrive to a decision is the parameter
minimized in the sequential test that is going to be used,
making it useful for real-time applications.
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WALD in [WALD47], proposed a series of detection
methods based on a series of pdfs (normal, binomial, etc)
and with other characteristics as well (simple and composite
hypothesis, etc). Two of them were considered for
evaluation in this thesis and in both the parent population
was assumed normal: the first considers as known parameters
the mean and standard deviation of the population and the
second considers that the only known value is the mean. Th e
first test is called Sequential Probability Ratio Test or
SPRT. However, for generality, it was decided to use the
second test, called the Sequential t-Test or StT.
Given that 81, 2, ... ,l81 are the unknown parameters of
the population under test, a simple hypothesis is made when
unique values are assigned to them. For example, if the
proposed distribution of the population is normal it can be
defined with two parameters: the mean and the standard
deviation. If the mean is assumed to be, say 81 = 10.0 and
the standard deviation 2 = 2.5, the hypothesis to be tested
is simple. In this case the SPRT may be used. When one or
more of the parameters is not uniquely determined, for
example if 81 = 10.0 but 02 is 2.1 < 2 < 2.7, then the
hypothesis is called composite, and this is our case.
5.3 THE SEQUENTIAL t-TEST
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Assume that the mean of a population normally
distributed is and that the estimated mean is eo. If the
standard deviation of the population (unknown) is a, it is
possible to say that eo can be taken as the true mean
whenever the error 1(8 - o)/aI is less or equal than some
specified value 6. According to this procedure it is
possible to define that the error is a given percentage of
the -unknown- standard deviation. The test accepts with
probability 1-a the hypothesis that 80 is the mean of the.
population and rejects it with probability B.
Given the sequence of observations xl,x2,. i,xn drawn
from the above population, the test, as originally proposed
by [WALD47] is based on the comparison
8/(1-a) < pn/pOn < (1-)/a (5.1)-
where a and B are the probabilities of making errors -of
the first and second kind respectively and
-1 -1 n 1 -1 n
-I--- exp(----) (xi-o-8a) ' + ----- exp(----) E(xi-9o+6 )t]dopln a(o**n) 20a 1-1 (o**n) 20a' 1-1l
.---. __ _----------------------------------- (5.2)pon - 1 -1 n
2 ------ exp(----) (xi-eo) do
Jo (o**n) 2a 8 i-l
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The test is initiated when a threshold is violated.
That threshold could be prescribed in terms of upper or
lower absolute limits for a measured variable or a
difference between results obtained from, say, analytic
redundancy calculations and the estimated parameter from a
Kalman Filter for a non measurable variable. The smaller
the difference between the upper and lower thresholds, the
more frequent the StTs will be performed. The bigger the
difference between them, the higher the probability of not
detecting a change in the mean value of the estimated
parameter. The tradeoff will depend on the characteristics
of the measurements being sampled.
Additional observations are taken as long as p1n/pOn
stays within the limits, the hypothesis is accepted as soon
as
pln/p0n < (1-B)/a
and it is rejected as soon as
6/(1-a) < pn/p0n.
Although the test reaches a decision as soon as any of
the two previous conditions are satisfied, the actual
programs to perform the sequential detection routines should
include a specified number of repetitions so as to eliminate
almost completely the possibility of accepting erroneous
decisions.
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Perhaps the most important reason why the StT was not
widely used is because its implementation required a set of
Tables created only for that purpose [AMS749] . The
contribution of this thesis is to provide an algorithm that
can be used with microprocessors (see Appendix B) and avoids
completely the use of any table.
5.4 TIME AND MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
Following the work done in Chapter 4, the algorithm
will be decomposed in its constitutive operations. Th e
total time spent in one iteration will be the sum of the
time spent per operation times the number of operations per
iteration. In this case it will not be necessary to use a
prefabricated instruction mix to find the approximate
percentage of the executed operations because the program
has been implemented in a HP-67 programmable calculator and
the actual number of operations will be taken directly from
that program, described in Appendix A.
An additional complication, not considered in the
instruction mix used in Chapter 4, is the need to use
special purpose subroutines to calculate square-roots,
logarithms and exponentials. The details can be seen in
Appendix B.
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The total number of operations, the time to perform the
and the total storage are detailed in Appendix C. Note that
the number of operations is different depending which
iteration number is considered but it is a constant after
the sixth sample has been taken (n=6). From this Appendix
it is seen that the time required to perform one iteration
(one per sample) is roughly equal to one milisecond and the
total storage (program + data) is approximately 800 bytes.
The maximum number of signals (sensors) connected to a
microprocessor or the sampling rate can be obtained as a
consequence of these results.
Given that
· the total time of execution is roughly equal to one
milisecond per iteration in the microprocessor
considered and
. a percentage (PS) of the total number of sensors
connected to the microprocessor is sampled every TS
seconds,
it can be seen that the total number of sensors that can be
monitored by the microprocessor is 100000*TS/PS. If 20% of
the sensors (PS=20) are sampled every second (TS=1 ), the
maximum number of sensors to be connected is 5000.
- 150 -
However, many other programs will be running in the
same unit (routing and filtering algorithms, self-tests,
etc) and that maximum number of sensors will be sensibly
reduced by a factor RF, which can be defined as the
percentage of the time that the microprocessor is expected
to be busy with the sequential detection algorithm. Th en,
the maximum number of sensors becomes 1000*TS*RF/PS. If, as
before, TS = 1, PS = 20 and now RF = 10, the maximum number
of sensors to be connected is reduced to 500.
If the case that all sensors are not sampled at the
same time, sensors that work with the same sampling rate can
be grouped for the purposes of analysis. If the generic
group is called i, the sampling rate applied will be called
TSi and those sensors will represent a percentage PSi of the
total number of sensors.
With this notation, the maximum number of sensors to be
connected is
1000 * RF
ilast PSi
i=1 TSi
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As an example and using the previous figures, if now
half of the percentage of sensors considered before (PS1=10)
are sampled every second (TS1=1) and the rest (PS2=10) is
monitored every 5 seconds (TS2=5 ), the maximum number of
sensors becomes 833.
Consequently, in order to be able to connect more
sensors to a microprocessor the percentage of time that the
processor will use for sequential detection (RF) must be
increased, or the sampling must be made less frequently
(higher TS) . The parameter PS cannot be controlled by the
designer: PS will be small (PS will tend to zero) if the
plant is running smoothly and PS will be big (PS will tend
to 100) if there has been a transient or abnormal operating
conditions, because many thresholds that initiate the StT
will be exceeded.
Conversely, given the number of sensors assigned to
processors located in the nodes of the network (obtained
from Chapter 3) the sampling rate can be calculated.
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter a sequential detection algorithm, the
Sequential t-Test, has been introduced. This test decides
if the parameter observed from the sequential measurements
obtained from the sampling procedure is contained within a
specified interval set a priori by the user or the designer.
For example, it would determine if the mean of a certain
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temperature being measured in some subsystem of the plant is
consistent (ie its values are inside an interval specified
by the user for a certain probability of making a mistake:
taking a valid measurement for a wrong one or viceversa).
Note that the concept of sequential detection involves
the use of a probabilistic interval as opposed to a rigid
fixed interval based on upper and lower limits.
A fixed interval validation procedure detects those
instances on which the measured parameter is outside the
limits indicated by the interval. The advantage of this
procedure is that it is almost instantaneous (it only
requires one comparison and a few logic steps) and gives the
indication that some 'abnormality' has occurred. However,
the big dissadvantage is the amount of false alarms
generated because the parameter has only temporarily gone
out of bounds. In this procedure, the seriousness of the
abnormality is determined by the width of the interval. The
usual procedure to compensate the amount of false alarms is
to identify a series of zones in which the measured
parameter can stay, for example, green, yellow and red
zones. The parameter can stay freely inside the green zone,
it may be a fixed number of times in the yellow zone (ie per
minute) and, in case that this fixed number is exceeded or
that it goes to the red zone, an alarm will sound and the
operators will be alerted. However, a usual mechanism for
the operators to bypass these false alarms is to increase
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the width of the intervals, effectively dimishing the
validation procedure.
Another dissadvantage of this fixed interval procedure
is that it does not make decisions, it can only detect a
change and inform the operator that something has ocurred.
On the contrary, a probabilistic interval as set by
Hypothesis Testing, determines the amount of false alarms
from the very beginning and its primary purpose is to make
decisions. In the case of false alarms, even when a
parameter could be temporarily out of bounds, the only
action to be taken is that a test will be initiated and, if
it was the case of a very short (in time) excursion, the
decision of the test will be that nothing went wrong and
more measurements will be taken.
With respect to the decisions taken by the algorithm a
procedure could be automatized to have meausurements
identified as unreliable and disregarded after a series of
checks are made (ie to repeat the test a number of times).
In this case, the operator can be transparent to this
automatized procedure if enough information on the process
is available (redundant sensors or analytic redundancy
calculations) .
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An implementable solution to the problem of signal
validation may to incorporate both fixed and probabilistic
interval methods into one algorithm. With this structure, a
mild threshold can be specified (fixed interval) and, if the
parameter exceeds its limits, a sequential procedure
(probabilistic interval) can then proceed to identify if a
permanent change has ocurred or not in the measured
parameter.
A design that could incorporate both the Kalman Filter
(Chapter 4) and the Sequential t-Test to provide a more
powerful data validation is suggested in Chapter 7.
The Sequential t-Test algorithm was implemented in a
programmable calculator and an example was given in Appendix
B.
It was shown that the total time required for its
implementation in a MC68000 microprocessor-based system is
roughly one milisecond per iteration and that the total
storage requires almost 800 bytes.
Finally, the maximum number of sensors to be connected
to this unit and the rates at which they are sampled were
calculated.
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Applied
IROBABILITY DISTRIBUTION FUNCTION OF AN ESTIMATE
************a*******************************
p(;)
From BAK, T., Miathematics for scientists, NY, 1966
? IG .5 .1
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CHAPTER 6
SURVIVABILITY MODELING
From Chapter 2 it may be recalled that one of the
requirements of the system proposed to monitor the plant is
that it has to tolerate single failures. As a consequence
of this requirement some fault tolerant and fault intolerant
techniques were introduced in the preliminary design shown
in Section 2.4. Commercial designers often design without
specifying either the threats that will act upon the system
or the malfunctions that are to be prevented from
propagating through the hierarchies of the system. Thus, in
most of the commercial designs validation, the step after
the design has been completed, becomes almost impossible
(s imply because there is nothing to validate against: if
the failure modes are not characterized there is no possible
verification of the behavior of the system).
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In this Chapter an approach in the direction of
validating the design will be taken by modeling
survivability characteristics of the network presented in
Chapters 2 and 3. Numerical results will be obtained.
Following the line of previous chapters it must be
remarked that approximations about the true structure and
characteristics of the system will be made and that the
results obtained will be purposefully general. More detail
will have to be included by the user of these methods to
find results applicable to each case. For example, a single
number to specify the failure rate of the units is not
given, simply because that figure will depend on the
technology at hand. Rather, typical numbers will be quoted
and it will be possible to say that if a certain level of
survivability is required, the failure rates of the
individual units will have to be better than some values.
These values can be found using the programs presented in
Appendix G.
Finally and based on the results of this chapter,
recommendations about the structure of the network will be
given.
6.1 DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM
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The analysis of a system to be modeled requires the
specification of
· the structure of the system,
· the appropriate measure of performance and
· the parameters that affect the measure of
performance.
In the case treated in this Chapter two systems are
modeled into three Models. The first system consists of
replicated components located at the source and concentrator
layers (multiplexers + processors at the source layer and
concentrators at the concentrator layer, called distributed
nodes in general). Th e second system corresponds to the
whole network, including the previous two layers and the
central computer.
Three different models are used because different
measures of performance are required and different
parameters influence these measures. Model I models the
reliability, availability and other parameters of the
distributed nodes by using a continuous-time discrete-state
Markov model of the nodes. Model II models also reliability
and availability but now it refers to the network as a
whole, considering nodes, links and the central computer. A
Markov model would have too many states to be considered for
MODEL II, running times would be prohibitive for even small
networks and, consequently, another approach is sought. By
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using a recursive algorithm the reliability and availability
can be calculated efficiently. In Models I and II, the
influencing parameters are the failure rate of the
individual units, the repair rate of the repairman, the
total number of units and the coverage (defined below).
Model III, a queueing model, provides general results that
treat in great detail the influence of repair in repairable
components. The model can be applied to a system composed
by units that exhibit the same failure rate and repair
rates. The complete list of measures and parameters will be
presented when the models are defined.
6.2 RELIABILITY AND AVAILABILITY MODELING AND THE CONCEPT
OF COVERAGE
The term 'survivability' has been used in general to
refer to the those characteristics of the system that will
quantify the likelihood that the system's functions are
performed as required. In particular, reliability and
availability concepts will be used extensively in both MODEL
I and MODEL II and other reliability measures will be
introduced for MODEL III.
In this Thesis, reliability at time t will be used by
defining it as the probability that the system is working at
time t, given that it was working at time 0 with probability
1, and no repair has been made from a failed state to an
operating state**. However, minor repairs (for operational
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states) are allowed. These minor repairs will be assumed to
be executed by non-specialized personnel, and will typically
require less than an hour (considering that the required
person has to a) be available, b) look for a new spare unit,
perhaps c) check some procedures, d) install the unit and e)
check the behavior of the system afterwards.
The design team will have to consider provision for
this kind of 'minor' maintenance from the beginning of the
design. For this purpose, the (sometimes called) 'minor
replaceable unit' or 'line replaceable unit' has to be
designed. This will be the only unit that can be replaced
by non-technical personnel, without affecting the normal
work of the node. The maintenance to take the system off
the failed state will be assumed to be provided by trained
personnel, which may be split into two phases: during the
first phase, maintenance personnel may check the node from
their facilities, which are typically located far from the
plant. For that reason appropriate links between the
computers have to be provided. During the first phase, the
malfunction and possibly the cause of the malfunction will
** This definition is applied to the nodes'
reliability. For the whole network another reliability
measure will be used, although the definition given above
will still be applicable to th e nodes modelled in the
network.
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be intented to be determined without going to the location
of the system. Thus, appropriate measures could be taken or
the required hardware to be used during phase 2 could be
identified.
In case the problem can not be solved in the first
phase, the second phase requires technical personnel to go
the plant and solve the problem in situ. This kind of
maintenance, which can be called 'major' maintenance, will
take longer than the 'minor' maintenance.
Availability from time 0 to time t is defined as the
probability that the system will be working in that interval
of time, given that it was working at time 0 with
probability 1, and repairs were allowed to take it from the
failed state to an operating state.
These definitions of reliability and availability are
somewhat standard. Some authors (Buzacott, for example, in
[BUZA70] ), have used the terms 'point availability' as an
equivalent to reliability and 'interval availability' as
synonymous to availability. Of course, as long as the
concept is perfectly defined, either definition can be used.
In actual calculations (for example in the programs
AVALNODE and AVALNET) it will be used the fact that the
'point availability' and 'interval availability' have the
same numerical value as time tends to infinity. Thus, one
integration will be avoided.
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It can be seen from the definitions of reliability and
availability that the conceptual difference is given by
considering the 'major' repair or not. From Chapter 2, it
may be recalled that the system has a 'minor' repair
capability of reconfiguration (ie an operator or, more
often, by a repairman which takes out a failed unit and
replaces it with a new one), and that capability is not
considered repair as it relates to the difference that
exists between both concepts.
In the case treated in this Thesis, namely that of a
control system installed in a power plant, major repairs
will be possible and, consequently availability will be of
interest. The reason for recommending the use of
availability to quantify the performance of the system is
because the influence of the repair rate is shown
immediately in the results. Reliability may be used only in
applications that do not have (or can not have) external,
specialized repair. Note that reliability could also be
defined not taking into account the minor repairs as well;
that would be the situation of a computer in an unmanned
spacecraft, for example.
Reliability results will be used to show the
sensitivity of the design to certain parameters, because
reliability values are more easily obtainable than
availability values. However, the concepts presented in
this Chapter are primarily intended to be applicable to the
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availability of the network.
After Bouricius et al, referenced in [BOUR71], the
concept of coverage was used to quantify the complexity of
the reconfiguration procedure. Before that, reliability
models used combinatorial results or fault tree models that
took into account the failure rate of the components that
made up the system and, explicitly, the failure rate of the
switching circuitry that switched spares on. However, when
the function of reconfiguration was performed by software,
it was necessary to use a new parameter to signify whether
the reconfiguration procedure had been succesful or not,
after a malfunction was detected in the system.
Formally, in reference [BOUR71], coverage is defined as
the conditional probability that, given the existence of a
failure in the operational system being modeled, the system
is able to recover and continue information processing with
no permanent loss of essential information. Consequently,
coverage = Prob[ system recovers / detected malfunction ]
To obtain the coverage that corresponds to a system:
a) the designer has to specify tests that induce
malfunctions to the system and write down different tests
that detect those malfunctions, b) the designer has to
create procedures that allow the system to identify its
actual structure after the malfunction has ocurred (in terms
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of what elements are working and the amount of spares that
are availabl e), c) the system has to switch one non-failed
spare on and change the status of the spare to the status of
working unit. Hence reconfiguration is an involved process
and,moreover, the functions performed by the system during
the reconfiguration have to be transparent to the rest of
the working 'healthy' processors.
6.3 MODEL I, MODELING OF THE NODES. POSSIBLE CONFIGURATIONS
In Appendix E, the modeling of systems by means of
Markov models is treated. In this Section, the concepts
described in Appendix E will be applied to model the nodes
of the network. Some other parameters of the nodes will be
found with Model III which uses a queueing model approach.
Model II is dedicated to the network, and uses the results
of Model I.
Many configurations can be analized, and they all will
depend on which states are considered operational and which
not, how many units are taken in account, from what initial
state and to what terminal state transitions are mde, etc.
For example, in the case treated in this Thesis, the nodes
are modeled as it is shown in FIG.E.1 (reliability) and
FIG.E.4 (availability) . Other authors have used similar
architectures (see references [BEAU77] and [NG76] ), although
they did not explicitly treat the case of varying a) the
number of operational states and b) the number of spares for
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different coverage values. Th es e two cases will b e
considered numerically in the following two Sections. In
the rest of this Section, the difference among the
configurations will be explained.
The first difference that can be made involves the use
of a different strategy for repair than the used in Appendix
E. In Appendix E, it was assumed that the 'minor' repairs
were made to take the system from a state with J operational
units to another state with J+1 operational units. Another
repair strategy that can be considered is restoring the node
to its original state (all units working). This model was
called 'Improved Model I'. However, the improvement is
negligible and, consequently, unnoticiable in the
performance of the system. Although it makes sense to
replace all defective units at once, as suggested by the IM
rather than one unit at a time, both models (Model I and
Improved Model I) can be used interchangeably.
On the other hand, the terminal state of the 'major'
repair is important, and the highest availability of the
node will be obtained when the terminal state has as many
operational units as possible. This last configuration can
be seen in FIG.E.4.
Having settled the repair strategy to be used, the next
topics to be treated involve an analysis of the number of
operational units (working and spare units) and the states
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that are considered operational or failed.
Following the guidelines given in Chapter 2, it will be
assumed that triplicated units will be the basic structure
used for the nodes in the source and concentrator layers
(see Chapters 2 and 3 about the nomenclature, also displayed
in FIG. 3 .3). In addition, to these triplicated working
units, a number of spares could be added so that, in case of
failure of one of the working units, one of the spare units
can be switched automatically by the reconfiguration
algorithms running in the nodes themselves. None, one or
two units can be considered to be spares (it will be shown
that it is not necessary to consider more than 2 spares).
Consequently, the number of operational units will be 3, 4
or 5.
What happens if three units are working, a malfunction
ocurrs and there is no spare to switch on? Here is where a
big difference (in terms of reliability and availability)
can be made. The options that exist are, broadly, two. Th e
first option assumes that the system may continue operation,
although, perhaps, some funtions will not be performed
anymore (for example, the testing strategy among units may
change, although self tests can be performed as before).
Due to this (possible) reduction in the performance of the
node (that will have even less impact in the performance of
the system), the situation will be called 'with degradation'
(WD). It must be stressed that, depending on the functions
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that the node units has to perform, there may be no
degradation at all. The second option assumes that the
system becomes suddenly non operative because single
failures, in the node, can not be detected anymore by
comparing the malfunction syndrome among the three units.
This case has been labelled 'without degradation' (WOD).
Combining the possible numbers of spares to be
considered (three) with the degradation cases (two), gives
six possible configurations to be studied.
6.4 SELECTION OF THE CONFIGURATION AND BASIS FOR COMPARISONS
The reliability of the six configurations mentioned in
Section 6.3 will be analized in this Section by making use
of the program RELCOMP, included in Appendix G. A sketch
that shows the variables used in that program and the
comparisons that were made can be seen in FIG.6.2. The
models are drawn in FIG.6.3.
The program RELCOMP was us ed to make an initial
investigation of the parameters that affected significantly
the reliability of the model and, once those parameters were
identified, to use more specific models for the analysis.
* *
* The first observation is that, allowing degradations, *
* always increases reliability, for the same failure rate, *
* repair rate and coverage. *
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**
This situation of having a better performance is not
surprising. What is remarkable is the big difference that
may occur by allowing degradations. For example, for a node
with 3 operational units (3 working units and no spares),
with a failure rate of 0.1 [failures/hour] , a repair rate of
0.1 [repairs/hour] and a coverage of 0.99, the variable used
to calculate the ratio between the reliabilities of the node
WD and the node WOD is numbered 24 in FIG.6.2. Assuming
that the system starts with all its units working at time 0,
the reliability ratio is:
time
[hours]
0.9
10.0
20.0
30.0
100.0
150.0
r eliab. WD/r eliab . WOD
1.3
16.0
200.0
2500.0
1.0 1011
2.8 1016
* The second observation is that the amount of spares *
* to be used depends on the mission time and the coverage, *
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* *
*
* for a fixed failure rate and repair rate.
* *
That the amount of spares depends on the mission time
can be verified by assuming two configurations (say one
configuration with 4 operational units and the other
configuration with 5 units) and varying the coverage to see
when the reliability of both are equal. In th e following
table, the coverage will be specified with too many
significant figures only to show that a small variation in
the value of the coverage will imply a large change in the
mission time (def ned as the time that takes to both
configurations reach the same reliability value). ** For
units with a failure rate of 0.01 [failures/hour] and a
repair rate of 0.1 [repairs/hour] , the reliabilities have
the same numerical value at
Time with coverage (see figure)
[hours]
100. 0 0.99277 FIG.6.4
500.0 0.991094 FIG.6.5
** Note that the mission time is very sensitive to
changes in the coverage but, on the other hand, the
reliability is almost insensitive to changes in the
coverage. Thus, there is no purpose in specifying a mission
time unless the coverage is known with great accuracy.
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*
1000.0 0.99088
In the last two cases, the reliability of the system
with 4 units is more reliable than the system with 5 units
before the 'crossing' time (for example 500.0 hours for
FIG.6.5). After the crossing time, the system with 4 units
is less reliable. It must be noted again that to design or
to measure the coverage of a system is not a simple task and
it is doubtful that it will be possible to specify coverage
to the levels of resolution that are indicated in the above
list. Perhaps, it will not be possible to specify it better
than 1%; doubtfully better than one per thousand. See
reference [BAVU75] about the upper and lower bounds for
coverage and methods of computing values for the coverage.
* *
* The resolution of the procedure to specify the *
* coverage would have to be very high to decide the exact *
* amount of spares to be used so that, for critical values *
* of the coverage, the reliability obtained from the *
* system is guaranteed to be a maximun, for a specified *
* mission time. *
A closer analysis to the table presented above, shows
that, for a fixed time, (say 500.0 hours) the node with 4
units will exhibit the same reliability that a node with 5
units for a certain coverage (0.991094), and the node (with
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FIG.6.6
4 units) will be more reliable (than the node with 5 units)
for longer missions as long as the coverage decreases. For
higher values of the coverage, the mission time for a node
with 4 units is shortened (with respect, always, to a node
with 5 or more units). This behavior, as it may b e
expected, does not only occur with 4 and 5 units but it was
verified with smaller number of units (3 and 4 units). An
explanation is provided in the next Section.
From this observation, it can be concluded that
* *
* the lower the coverage, the lower the number of units *
* that can be operational to maximize the reliability of *
* node. *
* *
If the minimum number of units to be initially working
in a node is 3, as considered before, another way of stating
this conclusion is that
* *
* there are situations in which a node will be more *
* reliable if it has less spares (or even no spares) than *
* another node with more spares, and those situations will *
* depend on the numerical value of the coverage. *
* *
* Thus, the presence of spares may decrease the *
* reliability of the node. ******** 
* *
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Th is result has been faintly mentioned in th e
literature [BOUR71] and no stress has been given to it,
although the more costly aspect of indiscriminate
replication of the number of components has been the basis
of many designs since then.
Perhaps one of the reasons for not emphasizing this
observation is that it was known since the early '70s that
the coverage has to be very close to one to be able to talk
of a very reliable system, and most of the authors directly
set the coverage equal to one when doing their analysis. In
other cases they made the analysis for only one set of units
and did not consider varying simultaneously the number of
units and the coverage.
A summary of the results obtained so far can be
observed in figures FIG.6.7, FIG.6.8 and FIG.6.9. In those
figures, the reliability of four configurations is
presented. One of the configurations, labelled OS (zero
spares) in the figures, represents three units working in
parallel, with no spares, and it also assumes that, if one
of the units fail, the node will be considered failed ('no
degradation' ). This configuration corresponds to the upper
left model in FIG.6.2. The rest of the configurations
assume that degradations are allowed: the first model
assumes also no spares, and is labelled OW (no spares with
degradation), the second model considers one spare and is
called 1W and the last model works with two spares and is
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identified as 2W. These last three models correspond to the
lower models shown in FIG.6.2. For the purposes of showing
the desired effect, the nodes are assumed to work with a
failure rate of 0.1 [failures/hour] and a repair rate of 0.1
[repairs/hour] .
In the first figure, FIG.6.7, a low value of coverage
is used to show that allowing degradations increases the
reliability of the node (OW, 1W and 2W curves exhibit a
higher reliability than the node represented by OS, for all
times after time 0), and that the no spares configuration is
preferrable to the one or two spares solution.
The next figure, FIG.6.8, shows that a much higher
value of coverage, 0.99, reverses the situation, namely, for
configurations with 2 (1) spares will exhibit higher
reliability than conf igurations with one (none) spares.
Note also that the reliability of the node is now much
higher than before, and this is due to the higher coverage.
An intermediate value of coverage must exist where
nodes with, say, two spares have the same reliability as
nodes with one spare. This equality is found when the
coverage equals 0.87 as illustrated in FIG.6.9. If the
figure is carefully examined, it will be noted that the
notation written near the top of the figure and between the
time 1 hour and 2 hours indicates that the no spares
configuration (OW) is more reliable than the other nodes
- 175 -
with spares (1W and 2W). However, the notation located at
coordinates (60 hours, 0.13 reliability) shows a condition
for what two spares are preferred to 0 spares (always with
degradations allowed) .
It is not obvious that a node with no spares may be
more reliable than the same node with spares. Therefore,
the following discussion is provided to explain the reasons
by analyzing the extreme values that the coverage may adopt,
and its influence on the reliability of the nodes.
The configurations selected to explain this behavior
are the center and right models in the upper line of
FIG.6.2, namely those with 4 or 5 operational units (1 or 2
spares) and not allowing degradations, in order to make the
explanation simple. The comparison is shown in FIG.6.10 for
the four cases, ie the combination of having one or two
spares and a coverage of 0 or 1.
For the lowest possible value of coverage (z ero),
consider the first case (upper-left), in which the node is
composed of 4 units in series compared to the second case
(upper-right), in which the node's behavior is that of 5
units in series. It is known that the more reliable system
is the one with less units, thus, for the minimum coverage,
the upper-left node structure is preferred. Therefore, when
the coverage is zero, a configuration with n+1 units is less
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reliable than a node with n units.
The concept of 'series' configuration is used in this
Section as a valid analogy although the units will not be
electrically connected in series. The term 'series
equivalent model' will be used to indicate the analogy.
Actually, in the operation of the system, the units will be
using the same inputs and software voting will be provided
to the outputs. These triplicated units, voting bit by bit
(or every few bits) their outputs, are indicated with the
letter 'W' (for Working) in FIG.6.10. The spares will be
indicated with the letter 'S'. In the configurations with
zero coverage, a malfunction will inhibit th e
reconfiguration procedure and, therefore, in the analogy it
is assumed that the units are connected in series because,
in a series system, if one unit fails, the system is
declared failed.
In a configuration with a coverage of one, malfunctions
can not inhibit the reconfiguration which is always assumed
to be completed. A system with n operational units (3 units
working and n-3 spares), after reconfiguration, will end up
working with n-1 units (3 units working and n-4 spares).
Therefore, it can be imagined that, during the life of the
node, n-3 configurations (of coverage equal to zero) were
used, although not simultaneously. An imaginary switch is
included in the output of the 'series equivalent model, to
show that, when the node begins to work, the switch is
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connected to the system that has n units and, after a
malfunction occurs, the switch will be connected to the next
configuration, which has one less unit. Therefore, instead
of declaring the node failed when the malfunction occurs as
it is made in the upper models of FIG.6.10, the node is
allowed to work in the new conf iguration, effectively
increasing the life of the node. In the following
paragraphs, the case of coverage equal to one will be
treated for nodes that initially have 4 and 5 units.
The highest value of coverage is one (ie, every
malfunction is succesfully managed and there is only one
transition from the operational states to the failed states)
and two cases will be considered. The case shown in the
lower-left corner corresponds to a node that can only make a
transition to a new structure with 3 working units. In this
case it is assumed that the system starts with four units
working before any malfunction occurs. Thus this behavior
can be thought to be similar to a node of 4 units working in
series such that, in the event of a malfunction, the node
can be reconfigured to a node of 3 units working in series.
This case may be compared to a structure (lower-right) that
allows 5 units (in series) be reconfigured to 4 units (in
series) and then to 3 units (in series) before executing a
transition to the failed state. Evidently, because of the
extra mission time represented by having the initial 5 units
on line, this configuration is more reliable than the node
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presented in the lower-left corner. Thus, when the coverage
equals one, a system with n+1 units is more reliable than a
system with n units.
Consequently, given that for a coverage of 0 one of the
configurations is more reliable than the other and that the
situation changes when the coverage equals one, there must
be some intermediate value of the coverage in which both
structures exhibit equal reliability. Clearly also from
FIG.6.10 the increase in coverage will give an increase in
reliability with the added expense for the capabilities of
r econf igur ation.
Th e analysis of this counterintuitive observation
provides an even more interesting result. This result will
permit,in a single graph, the integration of the parameters
failure rate, repair rate, coverage and total number of
operational units.
Doing the analysis of nodes with a different number of
operational units (3, 4 and 5), it was noted that the ratio
of the parameters failure rate and repair rate uniquely
defined the coverage at which the reliability of a node with
any number of units matched the reliability of a node with
one more (or one less) unit. Figure FIG.6.11 indicates
these results. For example, for a node with 3 operational
units with a failure rate of 0.01 [failures/hour] and a
repair rate of 0.1 [repairs/hour], if the coverage is less
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than 0.9828, the node, as it is, will be more reliable than
the same node with 4 operational units (3 working and 1
spar e) . *
In figure FIG.6. 12, it is shown that the amount of
spares needed depends on a) the ratio of failure and repair
rates and b) the coverage. Th e curve 34 indicates the
coverages that make 3 and 4 operational units exhibit the
same reliability at the times indicated in FIG.6.11. Th e
curve 45 shows the same behavior for 4 and 5 operational
units. The region below curve 34 corresponds to situations
in which the node with 3 units is more reliable than the
same node with more units. The region between curves 34 and
45 indicates the situation when it is more reliable to have
4 units. In the upper region, 5 units will be preferred.
It can be observed that, for values of the failure
rate/repair rate applicable to individual units of a
computer system (0.0001 < FR < 0.001 and RR = 1.0), the
coverage will have to be extremely h igh in order to ustify
* The reliability is calculated at (1/3*failure rate)
hours, to establish a basis for comparison although it can
be observed that, for some situations, the reliability will
not change at all for any time considered (FIG.6.6) or it
will not change appreciably in the time span of interest
(FIG.6.9).
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the inclusion of sares. In most of the cases, having three
units working in a triad configuration (same inputs and
software voting on the outputs) will be enough.
It can be seen that the assumption of having 3 links
going from the multiplexers (located in the source layer) to
the concentrators (in the concentrator layer) is reasonable
and mathematically justifiable, because the failure rates of
the cables are very low and their repairs (actually
replacement) do not take too much time.
6.5 MODEL II, MODELING OF THE NETWORK
In Section 6.2 the reliability and availability of the
nodes has been defined and their formulation and solutions
were presented in Appendix E. With respect to the network
another reliability measure will be introduced.
The preliminary design of the network presented in
Chapter 3 will be used in this and the following sections.
It must be recalled that the configuration consist of n
nodes (see FIG.3.3) connected, by means of fiber optic
links, between themselves and to a central computer which,
for the purposes of this analysis, will be considered one
more node. Thus, effectively, the new network will consist
of n+1 nodes. It will be assumed that the configuration is
fully connected (also called 'complete graph' ) as the
examples of FIG.3.6 indicate. Consequently, there will be
n(n+1)/2 (non-triplicated) links.
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It will be said that a link is working if there exists
at least one connection through it between the nodes on
which the arc is incident, otherwise, it is 'failed'. The
probability that the link incident on nodes j and 1 is
working will be indicated p(jl) and the probability that it
has failed will be q(jl)=1-p(jl). Link failures will be
assumed independent. Note that the links considered are
those that are called yjl and zjo in Chapter 3.
The term 'reliability measure' will be used to indicate
a derived parameter, function of the input parameters
failure rate and repair rate of the units, number of units,
failure rate of the links and number of links. Many
reliability measures could be used to quantify the
survivability of a network, for example a) the probability
that a specified number of nodes is not disconnected from
the network, b) the average number of failed units or c) the
average number of failed links.
The objective of this Section is to calculate the
probability that the whole network will not be disconnected
into 2 or more subnetworks by failures of the links or the
nodes. This objective will be the 'reliability measure' of
interest.
The following two definitions will explain what is
understood by reliability and availability of the network in
this Thesis.
- 182 -
When reliability (as defined in Section 6.2) is used
for the nodes of the network and the links are not repaired
if they fail, the probability that no node is disconnected
from the network will be the reliability measure of
interest. This measure will be called network reliability.
When the availability (as defined in Section 6.2) is
used for the nodes of the network and the links admit
repair, the probability that no node is disconnected from
the network will be the reliability measure. This measure
will be called network availability.
It will also be assumed that every failure rate and
repair rate corresponding to the units that conform the
nodes and the links are independent. However, th e
assumption that the repairs of diff erent nodes are
independent will be relaxed in the queueing model of the
network (MODEL III).
One more assumption will be that links are identical.
Thus, the same failure rate and repair rates will be applied
to every link in the network.
The algorithms used and detailed in Appendix F will be
based in a work made by Buzacott in [BUZA80] . The program
to calculate the reliability and availability of the network
are called RELNET and AVALNET, respectively, and they are
included in Appendix G.
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In order to show how parameters impact on the
availability of the network, standard numerical values will
be used. Results will be presented for a network with the
following typical set of parameters:
NODES
Number of units per node 3
Failure rate of the units [fail./hour] 0.001
Repair rate (minor) [rep./hour] 1.0
Repair rate (major) [rep./hour] 1/24
Coverage 0.95
Number of nodes (including the central computer) 5
CENTRAL COMPUTER
Failure rate [fail./hour] 0.00001
Repair rate [rep./hour] 1/10
LINKS
Failure rate [fail./hour] 0.00001
Repair rate [rep./hour] 1/2 4
The parameters corresponding to the central computer
have been selected so that a steady state availability of
0.9999 would be obtained for the central computer, and they
have been obtained from FIG.F.1.
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The results of the availability analysis for this
example is shown in FIG.6. 13 (output from AVALNET) and
FIG.6.14 (plot from AVALNET).
It can be observed that the steady state results do not
indicate extraordinarily high availability: 0.9963 for the
nodes and 0.9951 for the network**.
The availability of the network can be upgraded if some
of the parameters are modified. In particular, the
following modifications were made (and the results are
included) :
** The characteristic that the reliability of th e
network decreases as the number of nodes increases has a
simple explanation. The reliability measure for the network
has been indicated to be the probability that the network is
not disconnected. Thus, as the number of nodes increases,
the probability that a node can fail is increased.
Consequently, by definition, the probability that the
network will fail is also increased. This phenomenon is
similar to the decrease in reliability in a series system as
the number of units increases. A simple proof of this
assertion and the parameters from which it depends can be
obtained from the equations given in Appendix F.
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Steady state
availability
Failure rate Coverage Node Network Plot
(0.001) (0.95) (0.9963) (0.9951) (FIG.6.14)
0.0001 0.95 0.9996 0.9985 FIG.6.15
0.001 0.99 0.9991 0.9965 FIG.6.16
0.0001 0.99 0.99993 0.9996 FIG.6.17
A failure rate of 0.0001 [fail./hour] and a coverage of
0.99 are parameters that indicate a high quality design.
Even with these values the availability of the system is not
higher than 0.999 unless both parameters are simultaneously
considered. It will be shown immediately that the
availability of the network is very sensitive to these
parameters (small changes in the failure rate and the
coverage imply significant changes in the network's
availability). The specification of these parameters could
be made stating that it is required, for example, a failure
rate better than 0.0001 for individual units and that the
coverage should be no less than some value representative of
the state-of-the-art (see [BAVU75] for some of these values
and how to calculate them - in 1975 -). Even so, the task
of the designer will not be easy to assure that his design
parameters comply with the specifications.
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In order to know how the rest of the parameters
affected the availability of the nodes and the network,
those parameters that could be more critical to be specified
were considered. They include the failure rate and the
coverage (whose influence was noted in the last example),
the (major) repair rate and the availability of the central
node. The rest of the parameters do not impact
significantly the availability of the design. The cases
were considered with respect to a reference case, whose
defining parameters are:
NODES
Number of units per node
Failure rate of the units [fail./hour]
Repair rate (minor) [rep./hour]
Repair rate (major) [rep./hour]
Co v er a g e
Number of nodes in the network
3
1/3 33 3
1.0
0.5
0.95
5
0.9999
CENTRAL COMPUTER
Availability
LINKS
Failure rate [fail./hour]
Repair rate [rep./hour]
0.00001
1 /2 4
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These parameters correspond to a 'better-than-standard'
computer system with a modularization that allows not
lengthy repairs. In particular, the central computer
availability is exceptionally good for a commercial system.
The parameters that were modified are a) failure rate
to 0.001 and 0.0001 [fail./hour] , b) coverage to 0.9 and
0.99, c) (major) repair rate to 1 and 1/24 [rep./hour] and
d) the central computer availability from 0.99 to 0.99999.
The results are presented in FIG.6.18 where the availability
of the nodes and the network are plotted.
From the observation of FIG.6.18 the following
conclusions can be made:
· the network availability can be no better than the
availability of the least available node
(distributed or central computer) for the ranges of
the parameters considered.
changes in some of the parameters may produce
significant variations in the availability of the
network only when the availability of the central
computer is very high. Thus, if the central
computer is not very reliable, it is unnecessary to
improve the availability of the individual nodes,
because the network availability will not change
appreciably.
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if the individual nodes are unreliable, there is no
purpose in improving the central computer (although
the cost of the configuration will increase
dramatically). Thus, it represents no solution to
use a fault-tolerant computer as central node if
the components that are appended to that computer
are unreliable (ie non replicated processors).
For the cases presented in Chapter 3, the use of the
last set of variables give the following availabilities for
both the INITIAL and the GROWTH scenarios:
4 links 5 links
node ! 0.9999004 0.9999004
network ! 0.998602 0.998503
It can be observed that the difference between the
steady state availabilities of the case with 4 links and 5
links will be unnoticiable in actual operations. However,
those numbers can give an idea of the levels of
survivability that can be expected unless not-standard
provisions are considered. ( Standard provisions are a
single bit for parity checking but not error correction and
detection, a duplicated component but not a triplicated unit
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with spares, redundant links but not a network of links,
diagnostic software packages but not dynamic reconfiguration
of the system, etc). If the requirements specifying the
availability indicated a minimum of 0.99 for the network,
the design accomplished its objectives with respect to this
point (subject to validation). However, if the requirements
indicate that the minimum availability should be 0.999 or
higher, further work is required.
A minimum availability of 0.999 for the network will be
attainable with a little effort, although that level will
not be attained with standard components, ad-hoc design
methods and a minimum of fault tolerance.
A minimum availability of 0.9999 will be much difficult
to attain and to validate. Significant efforts should be
undertaken to prove that a system with that level of
survivability can be effectively designed.
6.6 MODEL III, QUEUEING MODELING
In previous Sections some reliability measures of the
system proposed in Chapter 2 have been calculated. Other
reliability measures are very difficult a calculation with
the models presented (for example non-exponential
distributions) or even to model (ie it has been assumed that
the repairs in different nodes were independent, although
with only one repairman that would hardly be the case). The
model presented in this Section (MODEL III) will allow to
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calculate some more parameters that could be used to specify
a computer system. For the purpose of modeling, results of
queueing theory will be used.
That a computer system can be modeled by using
queueing models is not new. However, one of the models
needed to understand the behavior of the system invokes
multiple repairmen. Also, the interrelation of the
parameters make it difficult to understand how the
modification of one parameter will affect the results (ie
the sensitivity of the results to the modeling parameters) .
For the ranges of failure rates and repair rates that will
be used in the computer system presented above there is a
graphical way of presenting results so that tradeoffs can be
made inmediately. Graphical results are common for systems
with only one repairman, but the author is not aware of
similar methods for multiple repairmen.
Another difficulty is that it is not always clear what
parameters are input and which can be considered as output.
For example, for the designer that designs the units from
scratch, the specification for the variable failure rate of
the units will be an output, because he will have to design
a unit with a specified failure rate and the rest of the
parameters will be rather fixed. However, if the designer
works with off-the-shelf units, the failure rate of the
units will be fixed, and other parameters will have to be
variable so that tradeoffs can be made. The graphical
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procedure allows one to make iterations without any
difficulty, and any parameter of the system can be input or
output.
Since there may be situations when the system may
require more than one person to repair failed units, the
possibility of multiple repairmen is considered for the case
of 'minor repairs' (see Section 6.2). However, one of the
requirements presented in Chapter 2 was that the maintenance
and repair of the system has to be simplified to a maximun
and, thus, a minimum of personal for repair is required.
For this reason, the ideal minimum is to have only one
repairmen and situations will have to be identified so that
this objective is accomplished.
The purpose of this Section is not to introduce the
reader to the concepts of queueing theory which can be
obtained by consulting many references such as [KLEI67] and
[ALLE78]. Rather, the application of those concepts will be
presented to model some parameters that are very difficult
to analize analytically with other theories or that would
require lengthy Monte Carlo simulations ** to produce
similar results.
The principal concepts necessary to understand the
queueing system presented in this Section can be obtained
from FIG.6.19, which introduces the nomenclature to be used.
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The computer program QWR (Queue With Repairs), included
in Appendix G, was used to generate the results used a
posteriori for the graphical solution.
The units that are modeled with this MODEL III are
those units that can be under 'minor repairs' and one of the
characteristics of those units is that they have to be
subject to the same failure rate ALFA and the repairmen
should be able to repair them in the same average time
1/AMU. Thus, physically different units could be modeled
with this MODEL III. Consequently, if the characteristics
of the replaceable units in the source layer and the
concentrators in the concentrator layer are similar (see
layer notation in Chapter 3), they all could be added up to
be the 'units' by the model.
David Kendall (see reference [ALLE78] ) developed a
shorthand notation that will be followed to describ e
queueing systems. The Kendall notation has the form
**It is noted that a useful characteristic of Monte
Carlo simulations is that they produce a myriad of results
but at the expense of a multitude of runs. Even more
results could been obtained with a Monte Carlo simulation
than with queueing models, although not with the simplicity
and the possibility of making quick tradeoffs as it is
offered in this Section.
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A/B/KC/K/m/Z. Here, A describes the interarrival time
distribution to the 'queue' of FIG.6.19, B the repair time
distribution, KC the number of repairmen, K the maximun
number of units allowed in the queueing system (also called
system capacity), m the number of units in the environment
that provides the queueing system with a continuous flow and
Z the queue discipline.
The time distribution used for the symbols A and B that
is of interest to this work is the exponential distribution
because of the Markov or 'memoryless' property of the
distribution. Thus, if the distribution is exponential, the
expected time remaining to complete the service of a unit
(for example the repair of a unit) is independent of the
s ervic e already provided. The use of the exponential
distribution for the operation and the repair of the units
is indicated by replacing A/B by M/M. The maximun number of
units allowed in operation, in the queue and in repair, in
the cases at hand, equals the number of units in the plant
(which has units in operation and failed units waiting for
repair) plus those units that are being repaired (with the
repairmen in the plant making the replacements). If the
spares are in 'hot standby' (electrically connected to the
system to detect the failures and to minimize the time to
reconfigure the node) the spares will be considered in
operation too. Thus, the total number of units will be K,
the maximun number of units allowed in the system. The
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queue discipline (the rule for selecting the units to be
repaired) is assumed to be first-come-first-served and the
omission of any symbol in the corresponding Kendall notation
indicates that this type of discipline has been selected.
Consequently, the above notation indicates that the
queueing system of interest to these discussions can be
written M/M/KC/K/K.
The system works in the following way: units are
working in nodes of the network and if a unit fails it
enters into a 'waiting list' for repairs (queue) . If there
is a repairman available (not repairing another unit), the
unit will initiate the repair procedure which will last an
average of 1/AMU hours. If there is no repairman available,
the unit will wait until the first repairman finishes with
his previous repair. When a unit has been repaired, it is
returned to be installed in a node. Note that there is no
requirement that the same unit has to go back to the node;
the only specification is that a unit has to wait (to be
identified and replaced) and that the repair (replacement)
has to last an average of 1/AMU hours.
The parameters discussed in the previous paragraphs are
indicated in FIG.6.19. Th e model works with random
variables that are defined by the distributions assumed in
the model, in this case exponential distributions. Th e
averages are the expected values of those random variables.
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Reliability measures that are defined for the queue are
ALQ (the average number of units to be repaired), WQ (the
average waiting time in queue to be repaired considering
those cases in which the units do not wait for repair and
those cases in which the units have to wait for a repairman
to be available), D (the probability that a unit has to wait
to be repaired) and EQ (the average waiting time only for
those units that must wait, ie, there is no repairman
available) . For the queueing system (queue and repair
sections of FIG.6.19) the following reliability measures are
used: AL (the average number of units down (ALQ + units in
repair)), W (the total average waiting time (WQ + time in
repair) ) and ALAMBDA (the rate of incoming units to the
queueing system).
Typical parameters were used to calculate the above
reliability measures with the equations shown in FIG.6.20
(from reference [ALLE78] ) and implemented in the program QWR
(included in Appendix G). The results from these
calculations were incorporated into one nomogram (FIG.6.21).
In the nomogram, the same scales are used for the
variables W and WQ and for the variables L and LQ. An
example will be useful to show how to work with it, the
results obtained and the accuracy that it may be expected
from those results.
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EXAMPLE:
assume that a network has 7 nodes and 5 units per node
(K=35), that the failure rate of the units is 0.001
[fail./hour] (ALFA=0.001), that there are 2 repairmen (KC=2)
and that each one can repair one unit in an average time of
10 hours (AMU=1/10).
The following procedure has been used to calculate the
parameters presented above in order to compare the results
from the nomogram with the results calculated by using the
QWR program.
Proc edure:
. first, calculate the ratio ALFA/AMU (0.01);
· second, with ALFA/AMU, KC=2 and K=35 find ALQ in
the scale named L(q) (it gives ALQ=0.009);
· third, on the same graph, but on the lower vertical
scale to the right, find D (D=0.05);
· fourth, with ALFA/AMU and AMU (0.1) find th e
intermediate variable x (x=0.001) and then, with x
and K=35, find ALAMBDA in the horizontal scale
labelled A (ALAMBDA=0.035);
· fifth, move the value of ALAMBDA to the vertical
scale A and, with the previous value of ALQ=0.009,
find WQ (WQ=0.23);
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· sixth, move the value of D=0.05 to the upper
vertical scale D and, from that point and with the
previous value of WQ=0.23, find EQ (EQ=4.7);
· seventh, as W=WQ+( 1/AMU) the same scale that
represents WQ, can accomodate W, because the only
difference is the addition of the inverse of the
repair rate. Thus, W=0.23+(1/0.1)=10.23, which is
represented on the same scale;
eighth, as done with W and WQ in terms of
representing both parameters on the same scale, the
same occurs with L and ALQ **, Then, both L and ALQ
can be represented on the same scale (called for
that reason L(q)) and, with ALAMBDA=0.035 and
W=10.23, the graph gives AL (AL=0.4).
ninth, and for the purpose of this analysis, the
same parameters are used as input to the program
QWR, and the previous graphical results are
compared to those obtained from this step. The
results are shown below:
** because of the relations (AL=ALAMBDA*W and
ALQ=ALAMBDA*WQ) known as Little's formulas.
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STEP PARAMETER
1 ALFA/AMU
2 ALQ
3 D
4 ALAMBDA
6
6
7
WQ
EQ
W
8 L
0.009
0.05
0.035
0.23
4.7
10.23
0.4
0 . 00975
0.05008
0. 0346
0 .28
5.62
1 0.28
0.35
It can be seen that the error is not significant for
some parameters although it may be as high as 20% for
others. The graph should be used to estimate those
parameters that can not be directly calculated from the
available equations (for example trying to obtain the
failure rate of the units or the number of repairmen as a
function of the probabilities D and EQ) . Once the
parameters are identified, a more exact calculation can b e
made with the program QWR, but note that the QWR program
only accepts as inputs ALFA, AMU, K and KC as inputs.
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-7.7
-0 .001
1.2
18.0
-16.0
-0 .5
14. 3
ERROR( % )GRAPH QWR
The parameters calculated by either of the two methods
presented may be used to specify the characteristics of the
computer system. For example, one of the most critical
parameters of interest is the number of repairmen. Th e
organization of the program QWR can be used to find this
variable only by iteration. With the use of QWR, FIG.6.22
was calculated. In that figure, the inputs are the failure
rate and the repair rate of the units (ALFA and AMU), and
two significative parameters are found as a function of the
number of repairmen (KC): the probability that a unit has
to wait for repair (D) and the time that a unit who must
wait has to stay in the queue to be repaired (EQ). If the
repair time is small compared to the waiting time in the
queue, the parameter EQ will be of interest; otherwise, if
the waiting time in the queue is small compared to the
repair time or if both times are comparable the total
average waiting time (W) will be used. In the case at hand,
the repair times are small with respect to the queueing
times, then, EQ will be used.
The behavior of other parameters (ALQ, L, WQ and
ALAMBDA) was also investigated, but the only parameters that
appeared critical from the point of view of the
survivability of the system were D and EQ, which could,
thus, be used to specify the system.
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To specify the system to the designer (see Chapter 2)
limits for some of the parameters could only be given by
engineering judgement. Since the units of a given computer
system should not wait too long to be repaired, it seems
reasonable to say that a) the probability that a unit has to
wait to be repaired should not be larger than 1% (although
perhaps saying less than 5% would be enough) and b) units
should not wait for repair longer than the average time that
takes to repair one of the units (EQ=1/AMU, .
With these ideas in mind those parameters that could
represent the desired system can be extracted from FIG.6.22.
The figure was calculated for a total of 20 units in the
system.
As an example, assume that D=0. 01. If the average
repair time is one hour (AMU=1.0 hour) then EQ is 1 hour.
If the desire is to have only one repairman, from the
figure, those parameters that should be required for the
units and the repair service to comply with the above
requirements are ALFA/AMU better than 0.001 and AMU better
than 1.0 [repairs/hour] . Consequently, a failure rate
higher than 0.001 with a repair service that takes more than
1 hour will imply that the probability that a unit has to
wait will be much higher than 1% (for example a failure rate
of 0.01 [failures/hour] and a repair rate of 0. 1
[repairs/hour] will give a probability of waiting of almost
20%), although the expected time EQ will only be a little
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more than before (1 .15 hours) 
A set of conclusions can be extracted from the
observation of FIG.6.21 and FIG.6.22.
The performance of the computer system can be
succesfully modeled as a function of the parameters
that were used in Sections 6.4 and 6.5, in
particular as a function of the ratio of the
failure rate to the repair rate (see figures
FIG.6.12 and FIG.6.21). Those parameters can be
used to specify the system to the designer or, once
the system is built, to make modifications in the
existing system. The usefulness of modeling the
system with these parameters is that they can be
verified during actual operation by appropriate
meas ur ements.
· Th e parameters that define the behavior of the
queueing system can be represented graphically in
the range of interest of the input parameters, and
that nomogram can be produce immediate results for
non obvious tradeoffs.
· The probability that a unit has to wait for repair
(D) and the expected time in queue for the units
that must wait (EQ) appeared as relevant parameters
to a) specify, b) design and c) validate the
reliability characteristics of a computer system.
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· As verified with the previous concepts of node and
net availability, there are ranges in which the
modification of some of the parameters do not
impact the b ehavior of the queueing system
significantly and there are ranges where the impact
is important. Note that a reduction in the failure
rate in FIG.6.22 will reduce the value of D
significantly, although the variable EQ will almost
be unchanged for a failure rate/repair rate ratio
lower than 0.001.
· Since it has been considered that 'minor repairs'
are those repairs modeled by the queueing system
and it was shown that only one repairman could be
enough to effect the repairs (which will consist
mainly in replacement of the failed units), the
repair service will not affect the structure and
functions of the personnel dramatically. **
6.7 CONCLUSIONS
In this Chapter the concepts of Markov modeling, graph
** For the example shown in FIG.6.22, when ALFA/AMU
equals 0.001, the rate at which the units arrive to the
queue is 0.002 [units/hour] , or an average of 1 unit per 500
hours of operation (1 unit every 20 days). These numbers do
not seem to impose a real burden to the operators.
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theory and queueing theory have been applied to the
evaluation of survivability concepts of a computer system.
Th e network presented in Chapters 2 and 3 has been analyzed
with these models. The network is composed of links that
connect nodes. These nodes are composed by a number of
units, each at least triplicated.
In a broad sense, the term survivability has been used
to indicate reliability and availability. In particular,
the difference between reliability and availability has been
assumed to be that the existence of repair from the failed
state is included in the calculation of availability. The
survivability for the network has been defined as the
probability that no node is disconnected from the rest of
the network. When reliability is used to model the nodes of
the network, the survivability of the network is called
'network reliability'. When availability is used to model
the nodes, the survivability will be named 'network
availability'. Since in this Thesis it was assumed that the
network would be implemented in a nuclear power plant,
repair will always be available and consequently,
availability will be of interest.
Three models have been studied: MODEL I, MODEL II and
MODEL III.
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MODEL I is a Markov model of the survivability of th e
nod es.
MODEL II solves the survivability problem of the
network, applying the results from MODEL I for the nodes and
modelling the network as a graph. The links and nodes of
the graph are subject to failures.
MODEL III is a queueing model of the system, which
considers the repair of all the units (that make up the
nodes) that are in the network.
MODEL I showed that the reliability of a node was
increased if, instead of declaring it failed when less than
three units were working, the node was allowed to continue
in operation, situation that was named 'degradation' ,
because some functions that were routinely performed with
three units in the node could not be accomplished anymore.
The model also showed that the parameter 'coverage' ,
defined as the conditional probability that if a malfunction
occurs the units will detect it and a spare will be switched
on affecting a succesful reconfiguration, is the decisive
parameter to determine the amount of spares that the node
will be allowed to have ready for automatic recovery. In
particular, the model showed that there are cases in which
the reliability of the system decreases if the number of
spares is increased, counterintuitive argument that was
shown to have a simple explanation.
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It was shown that varying the ratio of the failure rate
to repair rate, along with the coverage of the units, allows
determination of the amount of spares that are required to
maximize the availability of the node.
The model also showed that the availability goes to a
steady state. It will be assumed in the future that this
steady state availability will be used when reference is
made to availability. Note that another scheme to have a
reliable system could be to 'reset the system to time zero'
by changing all failed units in the nodes when the
availability crosses a certain level. However, since the
availability decays very fast in the first (roughly) 100
hours, a little delay in that maintenance procedure will
prevent the unit from keeping within Consequently, such a
maintenance procedure will not be recommended as viable.
MODEL II showed that the availability of the network
was lower than the availability of the nodes because of the
definition used for the network survivability and for the
ranges of the parameters considered.
It was also found that the availability of the network
is less than the availability of the least available
component (node or central computer). The recommendation of
designing with high quality components (for the nodes and
the central computer) is obvious from this result.
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Another result from MODEL II is that, if some of the
components are unreliable, very little will be gained in the
availability of the network by modification of some other
parameters.
The failure rate of the units, the coverage and the
availability of the central computer are the parameters
whose changes most affect the availability of the network.
The availability of the configuration proposed in Chapters 2
and 3 was shown to be 0.9985 ('5 links' case) and 0.9986 ('4
links' case, see nomenclature in Chapter 3). It is also
found that:
. a network availability of 0.99 was readily
ob tainab 1 e,
. a network availability of 0.999 was attainable with
efforts, and
· a network availability of 0.9999 was possible by
concentrating significant efforts in the
survivability of the system, and that such a design
was difficult to validate (considering that the
requirement of maintaining low costs is kept).
In order to be analyze the repair system (or 'service')
MODEL III was used. The usual assumption of independence of
the repair distribution among nodes can be relaxed with this
model.
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A graphical method for analyzing the system
developed and shown to be useful to perform tradeoffs.
was
It was observed, very much as found with MODEL I, that
the ratio of failure rate to repair rate was a parameter
that could be used to specify characteristics of th e
queueing system.
Given the failure rate,
of units, other parameters
of the system can be found.
made for th e numb er of
the repair rate and the number
that define the characteristics
For example, estimates can be
repairmen that are necessary to
maintain certain variables below certain levels
probability of a
a few percent and
that must wait
repair one unit.
will allow the
service. The res
repairmen showed
failure rate of
[f ailur es/hour]
unit waiting for repair (D) being less than
* expected time in queue for those units
(EQ) being less than the average time to
The use of these variables 'D' and 'EQ'
determination of the quality of the repair
ult of the analysis on the number of
that one repairman could suffice if the
the units is kept lower than 0.001
and the repair rate higher than 1.0
[repair/hour] . This is a condition that could be
accomplished with modularization of the components and
consideration of the repair strategies from the beginning of
the design.
- 208 -
such as th e
Similarly to the findings of Section 6.5 with respect
to the sensitivity of the network availability to changes in
some parameters, it was found that some parameters were very
sensitive to changes while others were not, depending on the
magnitude of the variables failure rate, repair rate and
their ratio.
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= Failure rate of the units [failures/hour]
s Repair rate of one repairman [repairs/hour]
= Total.number of units (units per node * # of nodes)
- Total number of repairmen (KC = 1, 2, ... ; KC < K)
- Average number of units to be repaired
= Average waiting time in queue to repair [hours]
= Probability that a unit has to wait to be repaired
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* Rate of incoming units [units/hour]
- Server utilization
Comment : these parameters are modeled in both the graphical method and
in the program QWR, with the exception of RHO, which exists
only in QWR.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this Thesis, issues in the design of a monitoring
system for a nuclear power plant are discussed. The first
two Chapters address eneral concepts about nuclear power
plant control systems and the characteristics of a system
suggested to satisfy the requirements proposed. From
Chapters 3 to 6, on the other hand, detailed issues are
considered.
In this Chapter, a summary of the characteristics of
the proposed control system is presented and recommendations
applicable to the design of such a system are given.
7.1 SUMMARY OF THE THESIS
In Chapter 1 the need for control systems is presented.
In these control systems a wide variety of techniques could
be integrated to aid the operator in his understanding of
the status ('state') of the plant. Thus, it is expected
that the operation of the plant would be improved. Such a
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system is called an Integrated Control System (ICS) to
stress that integration should exist in the following areas:
· objective definition: the Safety aspect and the
Productivity aspect in the operation of the plant,
· cooperation among the user, the supervisor and the
designer,
· availability of information at various points in
the system, as required.
· design of the computer system.
In Chapter 2, a methodology for the design of the
system is introduced (FIG.2.1). The first step of the
methodology is the identification of the goal to be
accomplished by the system; ie to assure the continuous
safe operation of a nuclear power plant. Again, a variety
of techniques can be invoked. For example: the upgrading
of the training of operators by the use of simulators or
performing modifications in the design of the plant or
installing a monitoring system. It has to be clear that the
new system, the ICS, may only be one of the various means of
upgrading the operation of the plant and another techniques
should be considered as well.
After deciding that a control system is required for
the operation of the plant, the functions and
characteristics of the system are sought. The analysis of
the requirements for the system (FIG.2.2) provides the first
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ideas on which to base the design. After tradeoffs among
the requirements were made, a preliminary design is
conceived (FIG.2.3).
Two scenarios are envisioned for the system. During
the first scenario, called 'INITIAL', only monitoring of the
variables is performed by the system (thus, there are no
connection to the actuators). During the second scenario,
named 'GROWTH', it is supposed that control on some
variables will be allowed, and, consequently, digital to
analog converters and actuators will be needed (the system
will require hardware modifications). Control algorithms
will also have to be developed (software mdifications will
be done).
The ICS is a fault tolerant (FT) distributed system
consisting of a) a FT central computer (located adjacent to
the control room), b) FT distributed computers (situated in
the buildings of the power plant), c) a FT network that
connects the central computer and distributed computers and
d) a number of microcomputers and multiplexers that provide
the interface between the sensors and actuators in the plant
and the distributed computers. The snsors and actuators
are the only interface between the 'processes' of the plant
that are monitored (ie core, steam generator, pumps,
turbine) and the ICS. The gross distribution of the
functions of the system can be seen in FIG.2.3.
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Distributed processing is considered as the most viable
alternative because it is powerful enough to satisfy the
computational requirements for the system. The
modularization facilitates the system's design, testing,
maintenance and expansion to add more functions. On the
other hand, centralized processing is inherently more
complicated to design, test, maintain and modify;
equivalent processing power to match the capabilities of
distributed processing would imply costly solutions of
possibly lower reliability.
Several fault tolerance techniques are chosen to meet
the reliability requirement that certain single failures of
the hardware must not disable the system. These techniques
are:
use of high quality components in units whose
malfunctions are strongly dependent of the failure
rate of the individual components,
· error detection and correction,
replication of unreliable and/or critical
components or units,
on-line diagnostic programs,
self tests,
triplication (at least) of processing units,
voting by software the outputs of the processing
units (bit by bit or every few bits),
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· detection of some malfunctions,
. dynamic reconfiguration of the units and
· use of 'hot standby' spares.
With reference to FIG.2.3 it can be seen that there are
three processing levels. The first level is represented by
the microcomputers, the second level by the FT distributed
processors and the third level by the FT central computer.
The microcomputers are in charge of acquiring signals
from the sensors and performing an initial but limited
processing.
This includes smoothing signals, obtaining the mean and
standard deviation of the measurements, checking the signals
against thresholds or upper or lower limits, calibrating
sensors and amplifiers, etc.
The FT distributed processors perform more
sophisticated processing of the signals and, in addition, in
most processors some analytic models can be running in real
time for analytic redundancy comparisons. These distributed
processors basically receive data from the microcomputers
and a) check and combine the data to produce synthesized
information to be used by the central computer or b) when
automatic control is permitted, the processors perform the
computations corresponding to the control algorithms and
send the commands to the microcomputers to move the
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actuators accordingly.
For the purpose of this Thesis a certain number of
specific functions have been assumed to have been defined.
At the time of an actual design this list must be correctly
specified. It is envisioned that the minimum list of
functions should include:
validation of the signals sent by the
microcomputers. This validation should consist of
comparing the signals with previous values of the
signal sent by the same sensor (hypothesis testing)
or comparisons with another redundant sensors (note
that this validation could be performed by the
microcomputers themselves).
· comparison of the signals from the microcomputers
with data derived from analytical calculations
(analytic redundancy). The analytic calculations
may come from models of the processes running in
the distributed processors.
· control of some processes for the case of the
'GROWTH' scenario.
However, a more complete list will include the fact
that the model may have to be 'adapted' to some of the
conditions that will be encountered later in the life of the
plant or for changes in operating regimes, and adaptive
control could be used for the purpose of performing control
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even when the plant does not correspond exactly to the
original model. Also, the new parameters of the plant
should be incorporated into the new models. To estimate the
variables subject to a series of constraints, parameter
estimation may be used. Sometimes (and at least one
commercial design considers its use) special digital signal
processing techniques can be used for the purpose of doing
noise analysis for processes in which their behavior can be
determined by changes in the frequency spectrum (ie
vibration analysis of pumps, motors and turbines) as well as
sensor noise analysis on pressures, flows and ion chamber
currents.
The FT central computer receives information from the
distributed processors either to be stored in memory or to
be communicated to other computers or used to generate
displays for the operator's use.
The operators may interact with terminals to ask for
certain variables, operational data of the plant, setpoints,
present or past values, etc.
Fiber optics cables are selected to link the components
of the ICS due to their high bandwidth, electric safety
advantages and electromagnetic interference (EMI) immunity.
The use of a single cable to send many signals makes fiber
optics cost effective compared to classical hardwiring. The
links between the microcomputers and multiplexers are
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triplicated to comply with the requirement of allowing
normal processing even in the case of single failures. The
links among the distributed processors, on the other hand,
do not need to be replicated because the links and the
processors are interconnected in a fault tolerant (FT)
network. The FT network allows communications between FT
the nodes and the FT central computer even in the case of
malfunctions in the links or in the nodes.
From Chapter 3 to Chapter 6, specific details of the
ICS are treated.
In Chapter 3, the layout of the ICS in a typical PWR
plant is considered. The objective is to distribute and
interconnect the elements of the ICS so that the total
installation cost of the network is minimized. One method
for the minimization of the installation cost has been
formulated by considering it a problem with an integer
programming solution. The structure of the network is shown
in FIG.3.3. The final result of the integer programming
solution is portrayed in FIG.3.6.
Four solutions are given to the layout problem, which
come about as a combination of two situations that involve
the use of 4 or 5 links from the central computer to the
distributed computers and other two situations that
correspond to the 'INITIAL' or 'GROWTH' scenarios.
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In subsequent Chapters (4 and 5), a technique is used
to estimate the real time requirements of two algorithms:
the Kalman Filter (KF) in Chapter 4 and the Sequential
t-Test (StT) in Chapter 5. In the technique, the number of
operations that are required per iteration of an algorithm
are used to calculate the time and memory requirements for
the implementation of the algorithm in a specified
processor, considering all the time consuming operations
that take place.
The Kalman Filter can be used to estimate variables of
a process represented by a linear model. The estimated
variables are optimal in the sense that the the expected
value of the square of the error between the true variable
and the estimate is minimal. In this case it is found the
maximum number of variables and measurements that a model
can have are determined such that one cycle of the algorithm
within the processor would take a certain amount of time.
It has been calculated that a) the time spent in the
calculations is a function of the third power of the number
of variables in the model, b) 14 to 15 variables imply an
update time of (roughly) 1 second in a MOTOROLA MC6800-based
system and c) storage of the programs and data do not become
a problem given the present capacity of memories.
- 241 -
The Sequential t-Test (StT) can be used for signal
validation. The test has been developed to 'decide' if a
certain variable being measured (for example the mean value
of a temperature) is between ranges specified to give not
more than predetermined errors. The StT is used because it
was originally designed to provide the 'decision' with a
minimum average number of measurements from the variable in
question. An algorithm to use the StT was developed and it
is shown in Appendix B. With the algorithm for the StT and
the procedure of Chapter 4 used for the KF, the time and
storage required (also in the MC68000-based system) were
estimated to be 1 millisecond per measurement and 800 bytes.
Based on these numbers, the maximum number of sensors that
can be sampled by the microprocessor are calculated.
It might be assumed that the StT, used for signal
validation, would be one of the main functions performed by
the microcomputers. The 'validated signals' from the
microcomputers could be sent to the FT distributed
processors a) to be compared with the 'estimated variables'
derived from analytic redundancy calculations and b) to
perform the parameter estimation and update the model used
for analytic redundancy. However, there is some uncertainty
at the present stage of the overall research in this area
concerning how to use 'validated signals' in order to change
a model that is used to check the same signals against
analytic calculations in the case of failed sensors (or
- 242 -
sensors with uncharacterized noises).
In Chapter 6, the survivability of the ICS is
considered. Survivability is used to encompass the more
specific concepts of reliability (no 'major' repair) and
availability ('major' repairs allowed). Three models are
used: MODEL I models the reliability and availability of
the nodes, MODEL II considers the reliability and
availability of the ICS in general and MODEL III assumes
interaction in the repair of units in the ICS (units may
refer to sum of processors of the FT distributed processors
or these processors plus the microcomputers in the source
layer if the failure and repair characteristics are the
same).
Both concepts (reliability and availability) include
the so called 'minor' repair in which operators may replace
faulty units in a short time (average time 1 hour). The
node is assumed to work as long as there are more than a
specified minimum number of processors (it is recommended
that the minimum number of processors should be one to
extend the life of the system). Below the minimum, the node
is declared 'failed'. The repair action that takes the node
from the failed state is called 'major' repair. For
reliability it is assumed that the node does not have
'major' repairs (consequently, the steady state reliability
goes to zero). For availability, it is assumed that 'major'
repairs are allowed (thus, the steady state availability is,
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for the cases treated, different than zero). For
design considerations it is recommended that the concept of
availability should be used for those systems that allow
repairs from the failed states and that the steady state
availability. should be high er than the minimum availability
required for the system.
In calculations involving MODEL I and in MODEL II,
reliability is used to study the characteristics of the node
simply because the analysis of the reliability takes less
computational time than the availability. Results obtained
from reliability calculations have also been converted to
availability results.
Using MODEL I it was shown that
· the number of spares to maximize the reliability of
the nodes depends on the ratio of the failure rate
to the repair rate and the coverage of the units.
· for most of the situations considered in this work
and unless extremely high coveraes are used, the
number of units recommended to work per node is
three.
The reliability measures for the network (MODEL II)
incorporate the concept that the probability that a node may
be disconnected from the network has to be minimized. With
this reliability measure, it is found that the robabilit y
that a node is disconnected decreases if the number of nodes
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decreases. Other findings from the use of MODEL II are
that:
· the network availability can be no better than the
availability of the least available node
(distributed or central computer).
· changes in some of the parameters may produce
significant variations in the availability of the
network only when the availability of the central
computer is very high. Thus, if the central
computer is not very reliable, it is not necessary
to improve the availability of the individual
nodes, because the network availability will not
change appreciably.
if the individual nodes are unreliable, there is no
point in improving the central computer. Thus, a
highly reliable central computer must be matched
with equally reliable distributed nodes.
MODEL III is a queueing model of the system, from which
it was shown that a number of parameters related to the
repairability of the system could be succesfully modeled,
again, as a function of the ratio of the failure rate of the
individual units to the repair rate of one repairman.
It was also shown that one operator in charge of the
'minor' repairs would be enough for the ranges of the
parameters considered (failure rate lower than 0.001
[failures/hour] and repair rate higher than 1
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[r epair/h our] ) .
7.2 RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK
One of the first requirements for designing a control
system is to determine the processes that will be
controlled, the parameters that will be monitored and the
purpose of controlling these processes. For example, a
control system could be designed to control the amount of
xenon in the core, such calculations are not required in
real time because the significant changes can be observed in
periods of hours. On the contrary, if the parameter to be
controlled is the power in the core, the time constants are
of the order of milliseconds and the calculations must be
done in real time. In the first example (control of xenon),
detailed models of the core could be used; in the second
example (power control), only lumped parameter mod-ls cn be
used nowadays to keep costs low.
Thus, as a first step in the actual design of the ICS,
the processes that will be monitored and the purpose of
monitoring must be determined, so that the functions to be
performed by the processors on the signals received from the
sensors can be obtained.
The functions (or algorithms, methods, etc) will b e
related to the characteristics of the processes and their
modeling:
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· noise present in the var4 bles,
· ability to represent the system in terms of linear
differential equations about an operating point,
· possibility of errors in the modeling because the
characteristics of the system change with time
(normal or abrupt changes).
Also characteristics about the 'operator side' of th e
system must be specified:
· how functions will be distributed between the
operator and the machine,
· what kind of data the operator will need,
· how frequently the operator will require data,
· how should the data and alarms be presented (CRTs,
boards).
Given the preliminary number of variables necessary to
model each of the processes of the plant and once the
processing functions and the operator functions are
determined, the computational requirements are obtained.
Given the computational requirements, a number of
analyses can be made to guide the preliminary design (in the
same way that analyses have been made in this Thesis) for
the layout problem, the determination of real time
constraints for the Kalman Filter and the StT algorithms and
the survivability of the network. For example,
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· simulations could be used to specify the scheduling
of real-time operations per processor,
· queueing models could be used to quantify the
contention of resources for individual triads and
for the network and to define buffer sizes,
· automatic reconfiguration of the network could be
done by using optimal control theory applied to the
communication of data among nodes.
After the preliminary design is made, the architecture
presented has to be validated. A number of analytical
models exist for this purpose.
In order to do a meaningful validation,
· realistic models of the system have to be
d eveloped,
· the assumptions used in the development of the
models have to be indicated and, if possible,
justified in practice (ie the use of exponential
distributions to represent the service and repair
times in the queueing model),
· the most important characteristics of the system
have to be subject to sensitivity analysis so -hat
the tradeoffs are readily observable and the
necessity of future feedbacks is minimized.
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Once the validation is completed, the design is
modified and the validation is redone. This process is
iterated until a validated model of the computer system is
obtain ed.
The combined design presented in this Thesis can be
used as a guide for future consideration on hardware
requirements when additional information has been developed
for improving the distributed system design.
By using for the overall design the structured
methodology presented in Chapter 2 and analytical models to
represent the behavior of the system, it is expected that
the amount of feedback between the late phases of the life
cycle of the system (development and operation) and the
design phase would be minimized.
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APPENDIX A
THE SOLUTION TO THE LAYOUT PROBLEM
This Appendix shows the data that was used to generate
the results presented in Chapter 3, where the layout problem
was discussed. The variables and costs applied to the
objective function (3.1) are shown in FIG.A.1, while FIG.A.2
displays the constraints used for the same problem.
The actual input data used for the SESAME code is
presented in FIG.A.3 (reference [SESA80] ), and the results
obtained are shown in the following figures, with the
particular condition under consideration between
parenthesis: FIG.A.4 (4 links and 'INITIAL' scenario),
FIG.A.5 (4 links and 'GROWTH' scenario) , FIG.A.6 (5 links
and 'INITIAL' scenario) and FIG.A.7 (5 links and 'GROWTH'
scenario).
The output of interest to these cases is condensed in
three parts: a summary of the results and two SECTIONS
called ROWS and COLUMNS (see FIG.A.4).
The summary indicates the total cost (104779.00), the
objective function (CASE1) and the bounds to the constraints
actually used (FIRSTBND). The objective function and the
constraints were the same for the four cases.
The ROWS SECTION indicates how much was used of a
certain constraint. For example, the concentrator number 1
has 927 signals connected to its I/O ports (actually through
fiber optics) and 3169 signals are available to be
connected.
The COLUMNS SECTION presents the values that the Linear
Programming Solution provides. For example, wll = w21 = w31
= w42 = ... = 1.0, indicating that the links indicated with
the symbols wij and equal to 1.0 would connect the
multiplexer located in building i to the concentrator number
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j. Refer to Chapter 3 for the notation used in this
Appendix.
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VARIABLES AND COSTS
*******************
I w11 9704 36 w81 15075
2 w12 12146 37 w82 11169
3 w13 13122 38 w83 6775
4 w14 15075 39 w84 6775
5 w15 12146 40 w85 5310
6 w21 5310 41 w91 21991
7 w22 9704 42 w92 12146
8 w23 14100 43 w93 9216
9 w24 16052 44 w94 7263
10 w25 11169 45 w95 7263
11 w31 19958 46 xlo 25305
12 w32 20934 47 x2o 30579
13 w33 25817 48 x3o 84909
14 w34 28746 49 x4o 24720
15 w35 26793 50 x50 27648
16 w41 9216 51 x6o 28821
17 w42 5798 52 x7o 34092
18 w43 9216 53 x80 27648
19 w44 12146 54 x9o 29844
20 w45 10193 55 y12 3235
21 w51 14100 56 y13 5025
22 w52 7751 57 y14 6002
23 w53 7751 58 y15 5025
24 w54 11169 59 y23 2747
25 w55 10193 60 y24 3398
26 w61 17028 61 y25 3072
27 w62 9216 . 62 y34 2421
28 w63 6775 63 y3 5 2421
29 w64 8240 64 y45 2421
30 w65 9216 65 zlo 3398
31 w71 19958 66 z2o 2909
32 w72 13122 67 - -- z3o 3137
33 w73 9216 68 z4o 3235
34 w74 8240 69 z5o 3072
35 w75 10193
FIG. A. 1
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Group A wll + w12 +
*******
w21 + w22 +
w91 + w92 +
Group B wll + w21 +
w12 + w22 +
CCNS'RAINTS
***** ******
. .w15 + w15 l = 1
... + w25 + x2 = 1
;.. + w95 + x5. - 1
... + w91 - zl w > 0
... + w92 - z2 > 0
zS5 > 0
y23 + y24 + y25 +
z5 TI'STD
y34 + y35 + y45 - TESTC
543 w21 + ... + 78 w91 4096
543 w22 + ... + 78 w92 < 4096
543 w25 + ... + 78 w95 4096
212 wll. + 1161 w21 + ... + 138 w91 < 5276
212 w12 + 1161 w22 + ... + 138 w92 5276
212 w15 + 1161 w25 + ... + 138 w95 5276
Group F (Initially)
178 xl- + 543 x2 + ... + 78 x9 < (128
(Growth)
212 xl + 1161 x2- ... + + 138 x9. < 256
FIG.A.2
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wl 5
y12
zl
Group C
* ******
Group D
Group E
i******
+'w25 +
+ y13 +
+ z2 +
.. + w95 -
y14 + y15 +
z3w + z4 +
(Initially)
178 wll +
178 w12 +
178 w15 +
(Growth)
INPUT DATA TO SESAME
NETTY DATA Al F 80 TRUNC=8e SIZE=IOG LINE=0 COLUMN=1
* * TOP OF FILE * * *I ...+ ..... 1.... .... 2 ....+ .... 3 .... .... 4.... .... 5 ........ 6 ....+....7...
NAME NETTY
ROWS
===== A EQ, A2 = EQ, A3 = EQ, A4 = EQ, A5 = EQ, A6 = EQ,
A7 = EQ, A8 = E, A = EQ
==== = GE, B2 = GE, E3 = GE, B4 = GE, B5 = GE
Cl = EL
D1 = EQ
===== E1 = LE, E2 = LE, E3 = LE, E4 = LE, E5 s LE
F LE
X E D I T I FILE
NETTY DATA Al F 80 TRUNC=80 SZE=eOO LINE=18 COLUMN=l
Fi = LE
COST = FR
COLUMNS
Wil. Ai = 1, Bi = 1, Ei = 178, COST = 9704
WI2: Al = i, B2 = 1, E2 = 178, CUSf = 2146
W3: Al = i, D3 = 1, E3 = 1 , COST = 31 " '
W14: Al = 1, E4 = 1, E4 = 178, COS 1= 505 .
WiS: Al = 1, E.5 = I, E5 = 178, QO'T = 12146
W21: A2 = 1, BI = 1, El-=-543 COST = 5310
W22: A2 = 1, B2 = 1,E2 = 543 COST = 9704
....... ........ 2 ......... 3 .... +....4 ........ 5 .... +....6 .... +....7...
W23: A2 = I, EJ = I, E3 = 543 COST = 14100
===== W24: A2 = 1, B4 = 1, E4 = 543 COST = 16052
W25: A2 = 1, B5 = 1, E5 = 543 CULT = 11169
W31: A3 = I, 91 = 1, E = 206, COST = 19958
W32: A3 = 1, .2 = i, E2 = 2V6, CUST = 20934
W33: A3 = 1, B- = 1, '3 = 206, COST = 25817
-j -: A = , - = t, 4 = 206, CLOT _ .L z46
W35: A3 = 1, B15 - 1, ES = 206, COST = 267'93
W4S: A4 = 1, Bi = 1, E = 41, COU'T = 9216
X E D I T FILE
FIG.A.3
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Al F 80 TRUNC=80 SIZE=99 LINE=36 COLUMN-I
E2
E3
E4
E5
Et
E2
E3
E4
El
E2
E3
E4
E5
El
E2
E3
E4
E5
= 41, COS' =
= 41, CUST =
= 41, COST =
= 41, 'COST =
at-;Z Cos1T
= 3803, COST
='S803, COSr
= 803, o t80, COST
=t , COST
- 1, CUSl =
·... 3 .... 4+..
12, UOST
= 12, COST =
= 1 2, COSI'r
= 112, COST
= 112, COST
= 112, COST
= 112, CO'iS
5798
92 16
12146
01 93
= 14i50
= 7751
= 7751
= 11169
= 10193
1'7028
.4 .... ..
921 6
6775
8240
9216
= 1 9958
= 13122
- 9216
= 8240
1..i 1 9'3
.5 ..... +....6...... 7....7.
NETTY DATA
==== Wl': A? =
W81: A8 =
LW82: AB =
8 : As =
W184: A8 =
1W85: A8 =
W1 : A9'=
92: Al?W? : 9 =
W94: A9…===- ? :  -
X1O: Ai =
X2C: A2 =
X30: A3 =
XE_ : A5 =X0: A. A --' A
X E D I ' FILE'
Ai F 80 TRUNC=8 SIZE=99 LINE=54 COLUMN=1
1, 25 = 1, ES = f '2, COS] = 1193
1, 41 1 , Ei = 195'8, COST = 15075
i, B2 = , E2 = 9Y8, COE'T = 11169
1, 3= 1, E3 = 19s, COST = 6775
1, B4 =., E4 = 198, COSI' = 6775
i, .5' = 1, E5 = '9-8, COST = 5310
, B = , E'= 78, CT = 21911
1, B2 = , E2 = 78, COST = 1146
1, B3 =i, E3 = ;'"8, COST = 9216
1, B4 =1, E4 = 78, COST = 7263
, 5 = s, E -' , CO' = 7263
1, Fi = 178, COST = 25305
i, FI = ;4, CSr = 30579
1, FH = 206, COST = 84909
1, FI = 41, COST = 24720
i, Ft = 380), COST = 27648
i, Fl = 12, C' 2- 82i
1, Fi = 112, CT = 34092
1, Fi = 18, COST = 27648
X E D I T I FILE
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W42:
W43:
W44:
W45:
W52:
W53:
W54:
W61:
I . . .+.
W' :
W64:
W65:
W71:
W72:
W 73:
W74:
W75:
A4 =
A4 =
A4 =
A4 =
AS =
AS =
A5 =
A5 =
AS =
A6 =
A6. =
A6 =A46 =A6 =
A6 =
A7 =
A'? =
A7 =
A7 =
A7 =
I, B2
I, :3
1, B4
41I, £ 2
1, B2
1, B3
I, B4
1, B£
i, B2
1, I4.
I, .45
I, B5
1, P.2
1, B 31, B. 2
1, B4
I B5
= 1,
= J,
= 1,
= 1,
= 1,
= 1,
= 1,
= 1,
= 1,
= 1,
,.2..
= ,
= 1,
= S,
= ,
= 1,
= 1,
= 1,
= 1 ,
NET Y DATA
Ai F 80 TRUNC=80 SIZE=1OG LINE=73 CULUMN=i
AS = i, Fl = 198, COS' - 27648
A? = 1, Fl = 78, COST = 29044
C = 1, COST = S25
Ci =1, COST = 502
C= 1 , 0£ = 6002
Ci = i, COST = 502
Ci = 1, COS'1 = 2747
Ci = 1, COST = 3398
Ci = i, COS'r = 3072
Ct = i, cOsr = 2421
...i .... .... 2 .... .... 3 ..... 4 + 5...4 6 .... +....7...
C1 -=, CUS'I = 2421
Ct = i, COST = 2421
B = - i,.Di = , CU I - 3398
B2 = -i, Di I= , COST = 2909
pB = -1, D1 = 1, COSI' = 3137
F4 = -1, Di = i, COST.= 235
B5 = -1, D1 = i, COSr = 3072
RHS
CASEi: Al = , A2 = 1, A3 = , A4 = i, A = 1, A6 - , A7 = 1,
X E D I T i FILE .
DATA At F 8-'TRUNC=80 SIZE=100 LINE=91 COLUMN=I
CASE1: Al = i,.A = i A = ,. 4 i, A = , A6 = , A7 =
AB = 1, A9 = i, Cl = 1 O, Di = 5, E = 4096, E2 = 4096, E3
E4 = 4096, E = 4096, F = 128
BOUNDS
FIRSTE:-D: W - (0,1), W2 = (0,1), W1 = (0,1), W14 = (0,1
W21 = (0, ),
W3 = 0,I),
W4i = (O,1),
W t _ ( i0 , : )
W612 (0. 1 ),
W71 = (0,1),
W81 = (0,1),
W.. - (V, ,
XiO = (0,1),
X60 = (0,1),
Z20= (0,I),20 = 8  ),
W42 = (0,1),W32 = (0,1),
W;42 (= ,:),
W62 = (0,),
W72 - (0,1),
X492 (0,4;,
X70 = (0,),X70 (0,1),
YI4 = (0,1),
Y34 = (,1),
Z30 = (O,1),
W7.
W3
W63
W75
X30
Y35
240
= (, , W 2'4 =
= (0,1, W134 =
= (0,), W44
= (0, ), 4 .. .
= (0,1), W64 =
...5 .... + .... 6..
(0,), W44 =
= (,), 4,'4 =
= I)1$'v4 
= 0,), X40 =
= (0 ,), X90 
= (0,1), Y23 =
= (0,f), Y'45
= (0,1), Z50 =
W35
W55
==== W75
W75
X50
== NDFILE
==> FILE
1,
= 4096,
(0,1 i,
(O,1),
(o, 1,,
.I-.... ? ...
( 0 , ) ,
(0, ),
(0,1 ),
(0,1 ),
X E D IT i FILE
25,~.c -
X80:
X9O:
YI2:
YI 3:
Y 4:
Yi5:
Y23:
Y24:
Y25:
Y34:
I . . .+.
Y35:
Y45:
Z20:
Z30:
Z40:
Z50:
NETT)
= (0, ),
= (0, ),
= (0,1),
= 1(0,),
= (0,1),
= (v,f),
= (0, ),
= (0,1),
= '0,1 ),
= (0, ),
= (0, ),
NETTY DATA
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COLUMNS SECTION
NUMBER .COLUMN
24 Wit
25 W12
24 W13
27 W14
26 W15
29 W21
30 W22
31 W23
32 V24
33 W25
34 W31
35 V32
36 W33
37 W34
38 V35
39 W41
40 W42
A 41 W43
42 W44
43 W45
44 W51
45 W52
A 46 W53
47 W54
4a W55
49 V61
50 v62
51 W63
52 W64
53 W65
54 V71
55 W72
56 V73
57 V74
58 W75
59 Val
60 W82
61 W83
62 W84
63 W85
64 W91
65 W92
66 W93
67 W94
A 68 W95
69 X10
70 X20
71 X30
72 X40
73 X50
74 X60
75 X70
76 X80
77 X90
78 Y12
79 Y13
80 Y14
81 Y15
82 Y23
83 Y24
84 Y25
85 Y34
86 Y35
87 Y45
88 Z10
89 Z20
90 Z30
91 Z40
92 ZSO5
AT .. ACTIVITY... ..INPUT COST.. ..LOWER LIMIT. ..UPPER LIMIT. .REDUCED COST.
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
UL 1.000000
BS
LL
LL
LL
BS
UL 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000O
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
UL 1.0000000
BS
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000)00
LL
LL
LL
BS
UL 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
UL 1.0000000
LL
UL t. 000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
LL
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
BS 1.0000000
UL 1. 000000
9704.0000
12146.000
13122.000
15075.000
12146.000
5310.0000
9704.0000
14100.000
16052.000
11169.000
19958.000
20934.000
25817.000
28746.000
26793.000
9216.0000
5798.0000
9216.0000
12146.000
10193.000
14100.000
775t1.0000
775t1.0000
11169.000
10193.000
17028.000
9218.0000
6775.0000
8240.0000
9216.0000
19958.000
13122.000
9216.0000
8240;0000
10193.000
15075.000
t1169.000
6775.0000
6775.0000
5310.0000
21911.000
12146.000
9216.0000
7263.0000
7263.0000
25305.000
30579.000
84909.000
24720.000
27648.000
28821.000
34092.000
27648.000
29844.000
3235.0000
5025.0000
6002.0000
5025.0000
2747.0000
3398.0000
3072.0000
2421.0000
2421.0000
2421.0000
3398.0000
2909.0000
3137.0000
3235.0000
3072.0000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
4.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
t.0000000
1 .0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
- .0000000'
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
I .0000000
1.0000000
1 .0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
I.0000000
1. OOOOC
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1 .0000000
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2442.0000
3418.0000
5371.0000
2442.0000
4394.0000
8790.0000
10742.000
5859.0000
-976.00000
4883.0000
7812.0000
5859.0000
-3418.0000
2930.0000
977.00000
6349.0000
3418.0000
2442.0000
8788.0000
976.00000
-1465.0000
976.00000
11718.000
4882.0000
976.00000
1953.0000
9785.0000
5859.0000
1465.0000
1465.0000
14648.000
4883.0000
1953.0000
15601.000
25269.000
63975.000
15504.000
19897.000
20581.000
25852.000
22338.000
22581.000
1790.0000
2767.0000
1790.0000
-488.00000
163.00000
-163.00000
-814.00000
-814.00000
-814.00000
163.00000
-326.00000
-98.000000
-163.00000
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COLUMNS SECTION
NUMBER .COLUMN AT ...ACTIVITY... ..INPUT COST.. ..LOWER LIMIT. ..UPPER LIMIT. .REDUCED COST.
24 V11
25 W12
26 W13
27 W14
28 V15
29 W21
30 V22
31 W23
32 W24
33 W25
34 W31
35 W32
36 W33
37 W34
38 W35
39 W41
40 W42
41 W43
42 W44
43 V45
44 W51
45 W52
46 W53
47 V54
48 V55
49 V61
50 V62
51 W63
52 W64
53 W65
54 W71
55 W72
56 W73
57 W74
58 W75
59 W81
60 V2
61 W83
62 W84
63 W85
64 W91,
65 W92
66 V93
67 W94
A 68 W95
69 X10
70 X20
71 X30
72 X40
73 X50
74 X60
75 X70
76 XSO
77 X90
78 Y12
79 Y13
80 Y14
81 Y15
82 Y23
83 Y24
84 Y25
85 Y34
86 Y35
87 Y45
88 Z10
89 Z20
90 Z30
91 Z40
92 Z50
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
UL 1.000000
8S
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS .97142857
85 .02857143
LL
LL
LL
LL
UL 1.0000000
8S
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
BS
UL 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
UL 1.0000000
LL
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
LL
UL 1.00X00000
UL 1.0000000
BS 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
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9704.0000
12146.000
13122.000
15075.000
12146.000
5310.0000
9704.0000
14100.000
16052.000
11169.000
19958.000
20934.000
25817.000
28746.000
26793.000
9216.0000
5798.0000
9216.0000
12146.000
10193.000
14100.000
7751.0000
7751.0000
11169.000
10193.000
17028.000
9216.0000
6775..00..
8240.0000
9216.0000
19958.000
13122.000
9216.0000
8240.0000
10193.000
15075.000
11169'.000
6775.0000
6775.0000
5310.0000
21911.000
12146.000
9216.0000
7263.0000
7263.0000
25305.000
30579.000
84909.000
24720.000
27648.000
28821.000
34092.000
27648.000
29844.000
3235.0000
5025.0000
6002.0000
5025.0000
2747.0000
3398.0000
3072.0000
2421.0000
2421.0000
2421.0000
3398.0000
2909.0000
3137.0000
3235.0000
3072.0000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.000OQO
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
I.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
2442.0000
3418.0000
5371.0000
2442.0000
4394.0000
8790.0000
10742.000
5859.0000
-976.00000
4883.0000
7812.0000
5859.0000
3418.0000
3418.0000
6348.0000
4395.0000
6349.0000
3418.0000
2442.0000
8788.0000
976.00000
-1465.0000
976.0000
11718.000
4882.0000
976.00000
1953.0000
9765.0000
5859.0000
1465.0000
1465.0000
14648.000
4883.0000
1953.0000
15601.000
25269.000
63975.000
18922.000
19897.000
20581.000
25852.000
22338.000
22581.000
1790.0000
2767.0000
1790.0000
-488.00000
163.00000
-163.00000
-814.00000
-814.00000
-814.00000
163.00000
-326.00000
-98.000000
-163.00000
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COLUMNS SECTION
NUMBER .COLUMN
24 t11
A 25 V12
26 W13
27 V14
28 WiS
29 W21
30 W22
31 V23
32 W24
33 W25
34 W31
35 W32
36 W33
37 W34
38 W35
39 W41
40 W42
A 41 W43
42 W44
43 W45
44 W51
45 W52
A 46 W53
47 W54
48 W55
49 W61
50 W62
51 W63
52 W64
53 W65
54 W71
55 W72
56 W73
57 W74
58 W75
59 Wb1
60 W82
61 83
62 W84
63 W85
64 W91
65 W92
66 W93
67 W94
68 W95
69 X10
70 X20
71 X30
72 X40
73 XSO
74 X60
75 X70
76 X80
77 X90
78 Y12
79 Y13
80 Y14
81 Y15
82 Y23
83 Y24
84 Y25
85 Y34
86 Y35
87 Y45
88 Z10
89 Z20
90 Z30
91 Z40
92 Z50
AT ... ACTIVITY... .. INPUT COST..
UL 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
BS
UL 1.00000
BS
LL
LL
LL
ES 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS
UL 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS
UL 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
-LI . -
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL 
LL
BS
BS 1.0000000O
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
BS 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
BS 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
..LOWER LIMIT.
9704.0000
12146.000
13122.000
15075.000
12146.000
5310.0000
9704.0000
14100.000
16052.000
11169.000
19958.000
20934.000
25817.000
28746.000
26793.000
9216.0000
5798.0000
9216.0000
12146.000
10193.000
14100.000
7751.0000
7751.0000
11169.000
10193.000
17028.000
9216.0000
6775.0000
8240.0000
9216.0000
19958.000
13122.000
9216.0000
8240.0000
10193.000
15075.000
11169.000
6775.dooo
6775.0000
5310.0000
21911.000
12146.000
9216.0000
7263.0000
7263.0000
25305.000
30579.000
84909.000
24720.000
27648.000
28821.000
34092.000
27648.000
29844.000
3235.0000
5025.0000
6002.0000
5025.0000
2747.0000
3398.0000
3072.0000
2421.0000
2421.0000
2421.0000
3398.0000
2909.0000
3137.0000
3235.0000
3072.0000
..UPPER LIMIT.
t.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1 .0000000
1.0000000
1 .0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1. 0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
.REDUCED COST.
-2442.0000
976.00000
2929.0000
-4394.0000
4396.0000
6348.0000
1465.0000
976.00000
5859.0000
8788.0000
6835.0000
-3418.0000
2930.0000
977.00000
6349.0000
3418.0000
2442.0000
10253.000
2441.0000
1465.0000
2441.0000
11718.000
4882.0000
976.00000
1953.0000
9765.0000
5859.0000
1465.0000
1465.0000
14648.000
4883.0000
1953.0000
13159.000
20875.000
64951.000
15504.000
19897.000
22046.000
25852.000
22338.000
22581.000
-2767.0000
-977.00000
-977.0000
-3255.0000
-2604.0000
-2930.0000
-3581.0000
-3581.0000
-3581.0000
-489.00000
-261.00000
-163.00000
-326.00000
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COLUINS SECTION
NUBER .COLUMN
24 W1i
A 25 W12
26 V13
27 W14
28 V15
29 W21
30 W22
31 W23
32 Y24
33 W25
34 W31
35 W32
36 W33
37 V34
38 V35
39 W41
40 W42
A 41 W43
42 V44
43 W45
44 W51
A 45 W52
46 VS3
47 W54
48 W55
49 W61
50 W62
51 W63
52 W64
53 W65
54 W71
55 W72
56 W73
57 Y74
58 V75
59 W81
60 W82
61 W83
62 W84
63 W85
64 W91
65 W92
66 W93
67 W94
A 68 W95
69 XIO
70 X20
71 X30
72 X40
73 X50
74 X60
75 X70
76 X80
77 X90
78 Y12
79 Y13
80 Y14
81 YS1
82 Y23
83 Y24
84 Y25
85 Y34
86 Y35
87 Y45
88 Z10
89 220
90 230
91 Z40
92 Z50
AT .ACTIVITY... ..INPUT COST.. ... LOVER LMIT.., .. UPPER LIMIT.
UL 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
85
UL 1.0000000
B5
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.00O0000
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS
UL 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS t.0000ooo
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
BS 1.0000000
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
as 1.oooooo0
LL
LL
LL
as 1pOOOOO
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
LL
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
BS 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
85 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
UL 1.0000000
9704.0000
12146.000
13122.000
15075.000
12146.000
5310.0000
9704.0000
14100.000
16052.000
11169.000
19958.000
20934.000
25817.000
28746.000
26793.000
9216.0000
5798.0000
9216.0000
12146.000
10193.000
14100.000
7751.0000
7751.0000
11169.000
10193.000
17028.000
9216.0000
6775.0000
8240.0000
9216.0000
19958.000
13122.000
9216.0000
8240.0000
10193.000
15075.000
11169.000
6775.0000
6775.0000
5310.0000
21911.000
12146.000
9216.0000
7263.0000
7263.0000
253G5.000
30579.000
84909.000
24720.000
27648.000
28821.000
34092.000
27648.000
29844.000
3235.0000
5025.0000
6002.0000
5025.0000
2747.0000
3398.0000
3072.0000
2421.0000
2421.0000
2421.0000
3398.0000
2909.0000
3137.0000
3235.0000
3072.0000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000.
1.0000000
1.00000CO
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.00000001.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000
.0000000
1.0000000
1.0000000.0 00
1.00000001.0000000
.REDUCED COST.
-2442.0000
976.00000
2929.0000
-4394.0000
4396.0000
6348.0000
1465.0000
976.00000
5859.0000
8788.0000
6835.0000
-3418.0000
2930.0000
977.00000
6349.0000
3418.0000
2442.0000
10253.000
2441.0000
1465.0000
2441.0000
11718.000
4882.0000
976.00000
1953.0000
9765.0000
5859.0000
1465.0000
1465.0000
14648.000
4883.0000
1953.0000
1315.o000
20875.000
64951.000
15504.000
19897.000
22046.000
25852.000
22338.000
22581.000
-2767.0000
-977.00000
-977.00000
-3255.0000
-2604.0000
-2930.0000
-3581.0000
-3581.0000
-3581.0000
-489.00000
-261.00000
-163.00000
-326.00000
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APPENDIX B
THE SEQUENTIAL t-TEST ALGORITHM
THE DERIVATION OF THE ALGORITHM
Following the procedure indicated in reference [AMS749]
cited in Chapter 5 and using the same notation, by means of
the transformations
n
u = Z / (xi - Eo)2 / a
i=1
and
.tp 6
n n
v = (xi - 80)// (xi - 80) 2
i=1 i=1
equation (5.2) becomes
B nS 2 n-i 1 6 2 v 2 1-
----- < exp(- --- )F( ----,---;------) <
1-a 2 2 2 2 a
(B.1)
where F(a,y;x) is the confluent hypergeometric function
defined as j
Xo r(y) r(a+j) x
F(a,y;x) = - - -
j=0 r(a) r(y+j) j!
Using the recurent relation
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x+2 et-y ya
F(c+l,y;x) = ----------- F(a,y;x) + - F(a-1,;x)
a a
and with
n-3
2a = _
2
1
; Y= -- -;
2
62 v2
2
the following is obtained
n-1 1 n-3 1 n-5 1
F(---,-;x) = An(n) F(---,-;x) + Bn(n) F(---,-;x)
2 2 2 2 2 2
where
2 (x+n)-7
An(n) = ----------
n-3
4-n
and Bn(n) =-
n-3
From the above relations it is seen that it is not
possible with this formulation to reach a decision before
the fifth measurement is taken.
Equation B.1 can now be written
B n-1 1 62v2 n62 1-8
----- < exp[ln F(---,-;----) -] <
1-a 2 2 2 2 a
(B.2)
The initial values are (reference [AMS349], Chapter 5)
1 1
if n is even F(-,-;x) = exp(x) and
2 2
3 1
F(-,-;x) = exp(x) (1+2x)
2 2
if n is odd
1
F(O,-;x) = 1
2
The only calculation left is the corresponding one for
F(1,1/2;x). Also from [AMS349]
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m 1 (m-1) (m-3) x2
F(-,-;x) = exp(x) [1 + (m-l)x + ---------- - + ...]
2 2 1.3 2!
which can be written, for n = 3 (or m = n-1 = 2)
2i i
H (3-2j) x
1 X j=1
F(1,-;x) = exp(x) Z ------------- (B.3)
2 i=1 2i-1
11 (2j-1) i!
j=1
However, for real-time applications it is more
convenient to find a recurrent relation to accelerate the
computations. It can be shown that (B.3) can also be
written as
1 o
F(1,-;x) = exp(x) [1 + U(r,x)] (B.4)
2 r=1
where
1 2r-3
U(r,x) = - - ---- x U(r-l,x) and U(1,x) = x (B.5)
r 2r-1
The parameter r must be adjusted to obtain the desired
degree of accuracy. Although if r increases more accuraccy
will be obtained, the rate of convergence
[U(r+1,x)-U(r,x)]. [U(r,x)-U(r-1,x)] decreases approximately
as of 1/r. Then, increasing r will slow down the
calculations and will not necessarily increase the accuracy
too much. The tradeoff will depend on the particular
application. *
AN EXAMPLE IMPLEMENTED IN A HP-67
*The previous infinite series contained in (B.4) may be
convergent or divergent depending on the value of 6. That
can be verified using the above definition of x and from
Cauchy's test of convergence operating on eq. (B.5). The
maximun 6 is found to be max = 3.146/v. For values of 6
larger than 6max the series will diverge. The selection of
6 can be incorporated into the actual implementation.
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The flowchart shown in FIG.B.1 indicates how the
algorithm is actually executed. In FIG.B.2 the instructions
to perform it are indicated and in FIG.B.3 the algorithm is
written down in the HP-67 program language, with an
indication of how the registers are used.
The example can be taken from reference [AMS749] (cited
in Chapter 5), page XV. In that publication the example is
described in the following terms: "suppose that the
measurements of one characteristic of the products from a
certain" "process should have values centering about 1300,
ie if the process is working properly the population of
values from which the values for a given lot are taken
should be divided into two equal parts by the number 1300,
half the population should have values less than 1300 and
half greater. The values are assumed to be normally
distributed. If the process produces a population of
measurements so different that 15 percent or less have
values below 1300 and 85 percent or more above, or if 15
percent or less have values above 1300 and 85 percent or
more below, we want to be reasonably sure that the lots
produced under these conditions are rejected"."Sampling is
necessary. We cannot be certain of correct decisions by
sampling, but we can set probabilities of certain incorrect
decisions. In this case it is required that lots of
acceptable products be rejected only 5 percent of the time
and that lots for which 1300 divides the population in the
ratio 15:85 or worse be accepted not more that 5 percent of
the time".
By referring to table 2 of the same publication it is
seen that a 6 = 1 corresponds to a division of a normal
population approximately in the ratio 1587:8413, close
enough to what is required.
It will be assumed that the number of iterations
performed at the fifth measurement will be 10, then, rlast
1 0.
The test is initiated with o = 1300, a = 0.05, 
0.05, 6 = 1 and rlast = 10.
How the testing proceeds is shown in FIG.B.4. The test
terminates before the 14th sample is taken by accepting the
batch of measurements as representative of the hypothesis
made.
As an extention of the example presented in the cited
reference, the test has been repeated for different values
of 6 to show how this parameter affects the length of the
test. Remember,from Chapter 5, that this value can be set
arbitrarily in a limited range, defined by characteristics
of the real process to be sampled, and that selection could
- 262 -
be incorporated in the implementation of the program.
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!Load constants!
vV
! Reset n
!<------------.---- **
!Obtain sample~~~~~~~~~~~
!Obtain sample !! Calculate z !
_ _ _  _ _ _ _
I Test n < 5 !-------
odd ______even
.----------- !Test n odd or even!…-----------
v v
. ___-___---------___-____.
i n=5 .initialization
! .F(,1/2;x),F(1,1/2;x) !
! n>5 .calculate An and Bn
! .F((n+l)/2,1/2;x)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 
_ _ _ _-
.____________________________--
! n=6 .initialization
.F(1/2,1/2;x),F(3/2,1/2;x)!
! n>6 .calculate An and Bn
.F((n+1/2,1/2;x)
!
V
v
! Calculate L and exp(L)!
_ ___ __ _ _ __ __V 
B
exp(L) < -----
l-a -!
! .
v
! ACCEPT !
_ {_ _ _ _ -
Test
B 1-B
----- < exp(L) < -----
1-a a
! otherwise
v
go to **
-
! ----- > exp(L)
a
!
v
---------- >-----> go to * <-
n-l 1 6'v 2
L = n F(---,-;- )
2 2 2
n62
2
FIG. B.1
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PROGRAM FOR THE SEQUENTIAL t-TEST
STEP INSTRUCTION INPUT KEY OUTPUT
1 Load card
2 Input data a A a
R/S
6 R/S 6
rlast R/S rlast
eo R/S eo
3 First 4 samples xn B 0
4 From 5th sample on xn B exp(L)
5 Decision D 0 (continue)
9o to 4
1 (reject)
'- go to 6 or 7
-1 (accept)
go to 6 or 7
6 For a new case
clear registers 0 STO 0 0
STO 1 0
f P=S 0
STO 0 0
STO 1 0
STO 5 0
f P=S 0
h STI 0 go to 2
7 End
FIG.B.2
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EXAMPLE
Jr******~rd
Parameters
s amupl e
number
n
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
Comments:
a
0
6
rlast
80
sample
value
xn
1341
1376
1365
1462
1189
1329
1298
1330.
1257
1318
1543
1211
1273
1439
1259
1280
0.05
0.05
.5( .5)2
10
1300
exp(L)
6=0.5
.866
.955
.832
.934
.7 8u
.888
.741
.831
.689
.775
.635
.713
CONTINUE
* in this case, 6max = 3.02.
* upper limit = (1-B)/a = 19.0
lower limit = /(1-a) = 0.05263
* above upper limit --- > reject hypothesis
below lower limit --- > accept hypothesys
between limits --- > continue sampling
FIG. B.4
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6=1.5
.06485
.05358
.01511
ACCEPT
6=2.5
.00376
ACCEPT
6=1.0
.389
.418
.240
.259
.134
.146
.078
.079
.042
ACCEPT
APPENDIX C
SUBROUTINES USED IN THE STT ALGORITHM
In this Appendix efficient methods of calculating
square roots, natural logarithms and exponentials will be
shown. The idea is to implement non elemental functions
with the four arithmetic operations encountered in every
microprocessor.
For every algorithm it will be assumed that 10
iterations will be performed.
S QUARE ROOT
For software estimates, the square root is assumed to
be calculated by HERON's iterative method where
1 (xn) 2 + x
J X = - ( -------- - )
2 (xn)
How fast it converges will depend on the initial xo.
The total number of operations is 20 multiplications,
10 add/substr., 10 divisions, 10 calls to memory and 10
comparisons.
The total storage (program + data) equals 98 bytes.
NATURAL LOGARITHM
This operation can be implemented in the following way:
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1 1
ln x = 2 [ p + - p 3 + - p5 +... ]
3 5
where
x - 1
x +
or, equivalently:
1 1 1
In x = 2 * p ( 1 + p2( _ + p2 ( _ + p2( _ + ... )))).
3 5 7
The total number of operations is 12 multiplications,
10 additions and 22 calls to memory.
The total storage is 100 bytes.
EXPONENTIAL
A continued fraction expansion has been chosen for its
implementation and it can be written as
1 x x x x x x
1- 1+ 2- 3+ 2- 5+ 2-
which can be understood as
1
exp(x) = --- x
1 - --- x
+ --- x
2 - --- x
3 + --- x
2 - --- x
5 + ---
2 -
The total number of operations per iteration is 20
multiplications, 21 additions and 20 calls to memory.
Total storage equals 120 bytes.
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Although some of these techniques have been implemented
in floating point software packages or ROMs, they are
generally slower than those implemented in fixed point
special purpose subroutines. Here, it has been assumed that
the latter method will be used.
Consequently, the total number of operations of these
subroutines (executed once per iteration) is 52
multiplications, 41 add/substr., 10 divisions, 52 calls to
memory and 10 comparisons. The total storage (ROM) is 318
bytes.
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APPENDIX D
TIME AND MEMORY REQUIREMENTS
It is considered that every time a sample is taken an
iteration is performed. FIG.D.1 shows the number of
operations performed per iteration, including the operations
performed by the subroutines in Appendix C. The last column
indicates the instruction mix for this algorithm.
Considering that the algorithm will be implemented in a
MOTOROLA MC68000 - based system the total time required is
(4262.875 + 966.25 i) microseconds, where i is the number of
iterations to be performed. Roughly, it can be considered
that every iteration requires one milisecond.
The total storage is the sum of the main program (224
words in the HP-67 calculator = 448 byte s) and the
corresponding storage for the subroutines introduced in
Appendix B (318 bytes). The total storage becomes 766 bytes
or, approximately, .8 Kilobytes.
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APPENDIX E
MARKOV MODELING
It is known that Markov models can be used to model
with high fidelity and relative simplicity some
characteristics of computer systems. In particular, it is
useful to model the reconfiguration procedure that occurs
automatically in the system proposed in Chapter 2.
A system is said to be governed by a continuous-time
Markov model if the next state of the system depends only on
its present state and is completely independent of the past
history of the system states. In the case at hand the
states are assumed to be discrete. For example, if the
system to be modeled consists of N units (boards,
processors, computers, links) one state will consist of all
those units working correctly, ie, according to
specifications. Another state will contain those situations
in which (N-1) units work but one unit has failed. The
general state will consist of (N-I) units working and I
units failed. The last state before failure can be
considered to have only one unit working. The previous
states can be called 'operating states' because it is
assumed that the functions performed by the working units
are not interfered by the failure of the non-working units.
The operational states will be assumed to consist of
units divided into two classes: working units and
spare units. Operational units are all subject to the same
failure rates because, even when a spare unit may not be
performing the same funtions than the working units, they
will continuosly being subject to tests to assure that they
will be working properly when they are needed.
The 'failed state' considers the single case where all
N units have failed. This failed state could mean that all
the N units have simultaneously experienced an irrecoverable
malfunction or that the remaining working units attempted a
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reconfiguration after the malfunction and the process fa4led
to be completed because the malfunction actually inhibited
the reconfiguration.
Any continuous-time discrete-states Markov model is
completely specified by defining its states (N operating
states and 1 failed state in the example given above), the
probability densities of the transitions that may occur
among the states and one boundary condition for each one of
the states * (given that the model will be structured into a
set of N + 1 differential equations).
Transitions among the operating states depend on the
failure rate of the units, their repair rate (which depends
on the feasibility of identifying the failed element and the
easiness of change for a new one) and the coverage.
The previous concepts of states and transitions can be
structured in a set of differential equations.
Assume that the probability of being in state i at time
t is indicated by the symbol Pi(t). Then, the following
expression, indicates that the probability of the system
being in state i, at t+At, is equal to:
Pi(t+At) = pii.Pi(t) + pij.Pj(t)
j=i
where pij = probability that the system state changes from
state i to state j (assumed constant)
Defining the symbol aij as the transition rate from i
to j
pij
aij = lim [-------]
At->O At
and knowing that pij = 1, the basic differential
equation describing the behavior of the state is obtained:
dPi(t)
------ - aii.Pi(t) + Z aij.Pj(t)
dt j=i
From here, the set of equations describing the behavior
of the system can be written in matrix notation as
* Actually, N states and boundary conditions will be
enough for a N + 1 states model (as long as they are all
specified at the same time t) because of the extra condition
that the sum of the probabilities of being in every state at
time t is equal to 1.
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dP(t)
d... = A.P(t) (AE.1)
dt
where P(t) = vector of states Pl(t), P2(t),..., Pi(t),...,
PN(t) = dim(Nxl)
A = state transition (rate) matrix = dim(NxN)
subject to the initial conditions P(O). The usual case is
to specify these probabilities at time 0, when it is assumed
that the system starts working with all of its units on, so
that P1(0)=1 and the rest of the states are not occupied,
due to the exclusion nature of the assumption.
The difference between the definitions of reliability
and availability has been seen to be that the latter concept
accepts external repairs from the failed state. According
to a Markov model ther repair is modeled as a transition
from the failed state to one of the operating states. To
solve the set of differential equations, completely
different approaches must be used. Reliability solutions
can exhibit analytic solutions only for elemental systems.
Availability solutions are normally found by numerical
procedures. In references [BOUR71] and [NG76] , some
reliability solutions are displayed, along with more general
problems and their solutions. Reference [BOUR71] mentions
the use of the program REL70 to find the reliability of a
'typical' computer (processor and memory only). The program
CARE, version III, cited in reference [STIF79], models a
rather general computer, although its use is fairly
complicated to use by the amount of detail it needs to model
the system. Simplified, although non the less, still
accurate general programs seem in order and in reference
[NG76] the program ARIES is presented for that purpose.
Ultimately, as systems become complicated, integration
routines are used, even for reliability models, because of
roundoff errors and truncations that affect the results
sensibly.
The solution of the availability model is made in this
Thesis by integrating the set of equations (AE.1) with an
efficient fourth-order Runge-Kutta integration procedure.
If the matrix A in (AE.1) is constant, because the
transitions rates are time-invariant, the solution is
P(t) = exp(A*t) * P(0)
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An efficient procedure to find the exponential of a
matrix involves the use of the Interpolation Method
[ZADL63]. The exponential exp(A*t) is computed in the form
of matrix coefficients times the natural modes exp(ai*t) so
that
N
(A - Xi*I)
i= 1
N i=k
exp(A) = ------------------------- exp(Xk) (AE.2)
j=1 N
(Xk - Xi)
i=1
i=k
where Xi is the ith eigenvalue of A.
This equation is used whenever the matrix A has simple
eigenvalues. NG in [NG76] reports that in the reliability
modeling of fault tolerant systems, the condition of having
simple eigenvalues is met in all practical cases.
To model the reliability of the nodes, it will be
assumed that, if there are J operational units in a node,
they can be subject to three types of transitions, in which
the following situations can be identified:
a malfunction may occur, it will be detected by the
units and the system will be reconfigured switching
a spare unit on (if the failed unit was a working
unit) or having one less spare (if a spare unit
failed). Consequently, there will now be J-1
operational units in the node** and the transition
will be denominated J--->J-1,
the malfunction could be such that it can not be
detected or that a reconfiguration is impossible.
The final state will be the failed state. This
transition can be labelled J--->0.
a repair can be made, taking the system to the
situation of having one more operational unit.
This transition will be labelled J--->J+1.
These transitions, and the corresponding transition
rates, are seen in FIG.E.1 and the corresponding system of
** It is assumed that, given the failure rates
considered (typically 10 to 10 [failures/(hour*unit)],
transitions J--->J-N with N>1 are negligible (ie that the
probability that more than one unit fails in a differential
dt is negligible).
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differential equations is
Pl(t) = -N*X*P1(t) + pP2(t)
P2(t) = N*X*c*Pl(t) - ((N-1)*X+p)*P2(t) + p*P3(t)
PI(t) = (N+2-I)*X*c*PI-l(t)-((N+1-I)*X+p)*PI(t)+p*PI+1(t)
PN(t) = 2*A*c*PN-l(t) - (X+p)*PN(t) (AE.3)
and
· N .
P0(t) = - PI(t)
I=1
subject to the initial condition P1(0)=1.0 and
Pi(O)=0.0 for all i=j. The reliability of the system is, by
definition, the sum of the probabilities of being in the
operational states (note that a subset of the N number of
states 1, 2,...,N can also be defined as a valid set; in
this situation, the system will be less reliable than
considering the totallity of N states). Then, the
reliability will be
N
Reliability (t) = R(t) = Z PI(t)
I=1
The program RELNODE has been used in this Thesis to
calculate the reliability of the nodes and to plot the
results (see FIG.E.2 and subsequent figures for an output of
the program and the plot of the results) . The source
program is included in Appendix G. The reliability is found
with the help of equation (AE.2) to obtain the exponential
of the matrix A*t. The eigenvalues are found with the QR
algorithm (see references [FRAN62] and [WICK65]).
With respect to the availability modeling the only
difference with the modeling of reliability is the
transition from the failed state to an operating state.
Although a transition to any operating state is possible (ie
the final state of the transition may be a node having any
combination of working and spare units), it is found that
the availability will increase if the terminal state has as
many working units as possible (ie to the configuration that
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the node presented at time 0). Thus, it will be assumed
that this transition takes the node from the failed state to
the state that has more units working. This situation can
be seen in FIG.E.4. Taking this transition in
consideration, the system of differential equations used to
evaluate the availability of the node will a modification of
the system of differential equations (AE.3), where only the
first and last equations of the set will be modified
(corresponding to the time derivatives of P1 and PO,
respectively).
The modifications will be the following
P1(t) = -N*X*Pl(t) + p*P2(t) + p2*PO(t) (AE.4)
and
· N .
PO(t) = -E PI(t) - p2*PO(t) (AE.5)
I=1
where p2 = repair rate to take the node from the failed
state to the operational state 1, in
[repairs/hour].
From its definition,availability can be calculated by
adding the probabilities of being in the operational states,
which is
N
Availability (t) = A(t) = Z PI(t)
I=1
The system of differential equations (AE.3) with the
modifications (AE.4) and (AE.5) was solved with a numerical
procedure: a fourth-order RUNGE-KUTTA algorithm, used in
the program DYSYS, available at the Joint Computer Facility
at MIT. The subroutine used to write down the differential
equations (called EQSIM) is included in Appendix G. In this
Appendix, the availability of the node considered above (in
FIG. E.2 and FIG.E.3) is calculated. The input data file
used is shown in FIG.E.5 and the outputs from DYSYS, FIG.E.6
and the plot in FIG.E.7, are included.
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OUTPUT FROM THE PROGRAM RELNODE
******************************
Comments: in this case, we are interested in
the reliability of a node with 3
units. The reliability will be calculated
for 4 days (100 hours). The rest of the
parameters are typical of a better-than-standard
computer system.
INPUTS
+* ****
FR =
RR =
COV =
N =
C. 001 FAILURES/HOUR
1.0 REPAIRS/HOUR
0.99
3 UNITS
O UTPUTS
***Y**
MTFF = 3342.6832 HOURS
xxxx
EFR = 0.000029916087 FAILURES/HOUR
xxx
Comment: the failure rate of the 3 units
(EFR) is 30 times smaller than the
failure rate of one on them (FR).
Time
RELIABILITY
xxxxxxxxxxx
Reliability
0.10000000E+01
0 .12000000E+02.
0.23000000E+02
0.34000000E+02
0 45000000E+02
0.56000000 E+02
0.67000000E+02
0 .78000000E+02
0.89000000E+02
0.10000000E+03
0.999969.96E+00
0.99964082E+00
0.99931192E+00
0.99898314E+0 0
0. 99865443E+00
0.99832588E+ 0
0. 99799740E+00
0.99766904E+0 0
0. 99734080E+00
0.99701262E+ 0
_ . C * _
I I_ _~ I I l
t * I t I f * I ! . L A f L
TIE CFRI=0.00RlR-,COV-0.5SN3)
NODE RELIABILITY
-I . .
1005
. -- s
lfJvow
U
m
3S5
SS0
L 
--
peuE z : --
$ $ a a a aIIa a I I a a I
Cc
____
a
-
.B
" "-'
.0~ 
AVAILABILITY MODELING
*********************
Operational
units
N
Operational'
states
RR 
N-I
J
2
FIG. .4
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APPENDIX F
THE NETWORK SURVIVABILITY PROBLEM
The basis of the procedure to solve the network
reliability and availability problem is to use a recursive
algorithm presented and mentioned in Chapter 6. The details
of the algorithm can be seen in the original paper.
The algorithm divides the network in smaller networks
and, to calculate the probability the nodes are disconnected
in the network, finds the probability the nodes are
disconnected in the subnetworks. The procedure considers
the nodes and the links separate entities and assumes that
their reliability parameters (failure rates and repair
rates) are independent.
If a node is failed all paths through that node are
failed. The approach by which the reliability measures:
network reliability and network availability can be
calculated is to enumerate all 2**N possible combinations of
working and failed nodes, where N is the number of nodes.
Let s(T) be the probability that subset T of the nodes
are working. and subset N-T of the nodes are failed and let
E(T) be the value of the reliability measure in the network
on the nodes in T (those nodes that are working). Then, E,
the overall reliability measure, is given by
E = S(T) * E(T)
T
where the summation is over all subsets T of N.
The term S(T) will not take into account the existence
of links between nodes and will be concentrated on the
reliability (availability) of the nodes.
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On the other hand, E(T) will assume that the nodes are
perfect and will only take into account the failure of the
links.
©&Calculation of S(T)®&
The general combinatorial expression for
probability that subset T of the nodes are working S(T)
NN
S(T) = rc(t)*
the
is
*(r(t)**(T-1))*(( 1-r(t))**(NN-T+1))+
T-1
NN
+(1-rc(t))*
T-1
where rc(t) = reliability (availability) of the central
computer at (up to) time t.
r(t) = reliability (availability) of the nodes at
(up to) time t, as calculated by program
RELNODE (AVALNODE).
NN = number of nodes in the network including the
central computer.
T = variable that indexes the subnetworks:
T = 1, 2, ... , NN-1.
will
will
redu
However, for the purposes of being conservative, it
be stated that, if a single node fails, the network
be considered to fail. Then, the above expression is
ced to
S(T) = rc(t)*(r(t)**(NN-1))
The assumptions implied in this equation are a) at time
0, all nodes of the network are working with probability one
and b) all nodes are identical.
©&Calculation of E(T)®&
The value of the reliability measure
connected network with T perfect nodes
reference [BUZA80] in Chapter 6) which may be
T-1
E(T) = 1 -
IU-1
with E(1) = 1.0 and
in the fully
is E(T) (see
expressed as:
*E(IU)* ( (1-rl(t))**(IU*(T-IU)))
where rl(t) = reliability (availability) of a single link at
(up to) time t.
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The reliability of the links can be calculated by
considering that the process can be modeled as a single unit
subject to a constant failure rate FRL [failures/hour] or
rl(t) = exp( - FRL * t )
The availability of the links will be calculated by
considering that the process can be modeled by a two state
Markov process in which one of the states is working and the
other is failed. That can be written as
Pl(t) = - FRL * Pl(t) + RRL * P2(t)
P2(T) = FRL * Pl(t) - RRL * P2(t)
where P1(t) = probability that the link is working at time t
P2(t) = probability that the link is failed at time t
RRL = repair rate of the link [repairs/hour]
and P1(0) = 1.0
The solution to this system of two differential
equations is rl(t), the term used in the equation that finds
E(T). Thus,
1
rl(t) = ----------- (FRL * exp(-(FRL+RRL)*t) + RRL)
FRL + RRL
The availability of the central computer may also be
calculated using the same approach that is employed with the
links. Thus,
1
rc(t) = ---------- (FRC * exp(-(FRC+RRC)*t) + RRC)
FRC + RRC
where the new terms FRC and RRC are the failure rate and the
repair rate of the central computer, respectively.
The steady state availabilities
repair rate
failure rate + repair rate
are displayed for different combinations of failure
rates and repair rates in FIG.F.1.
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APPENDIX G
PROGRAMS USED IN THE THESIS
The programs that follow were used in this Thesis. The
necessary inputs and the outputs are indicated in the text
of the program. The use of double precision is recommended
for most of the variables.
Where necessary, the programs were linked with the
libraries PENPLOT and SSP (Scientific Subroutine Package)
installed at the Joint Computer Facility at MIT.
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PROGRAM RELNODE
***************
This program can be used to calculate the
reliability of a system described by the Markovian
model presented in Chapter 6 of this Thesis.
The program is interactive and instructions are
given during execution.
OPTIONS:
INPUTS:
Exit ---> 0
Proceed ---> 1
One point in time ---> 1
Many points in time ---> >1 (Note)
No plot --- > 0
Plot ---> 1
FR: Failure rate of the individual units[failures/hour] (Real)
RR: Repair rate for individual units in[repairs/hour] (Real)
C : Coverage (Real)
N : Numb er of operational units in the
node (Integer)
OUTPUTS: MTFF : Mean time to first failure [hours]
EFR : Effective failure rate of the node
[ 1 /h our]
RT : Reliability of the node
(Note) : the last point in time and the number of
decades up to that point must be specified.
DIMENSION B(10, 10),BD(10, 10),E(10),EI(10) ,EBT(10)
DIMENSION IANA(10),Y(10,100) ,XSCL(4)
COMMON C(10, 10, 10) ,CD(10, 10, 10)
REAL MTFF
INTEGER DEC,OPT,P
CHARACTER*40 CURVLAB,XLAB,YLAB
WRITE(6, 39)
FORMAT(/,' ENTER OPTION' /)
WRITE (6, ) ' EXIT--->0 '
WRITE(6,*)' PROCEED--- > 1 '
READ(5, 13) OPT
FORMAT (I3)
WRITE (6, 37) OPT
FORMAT (5X,//,' OPTION = ',I3 //)
IF(OPT.EQ.0)GO TO 1000
WRITE(6,*) ' ENTER FR,RR,COV,N'
READ(5, 11 )FR,RR,COV, N
FORMAT (3E15.5,I3)
WRITE(6, 38)FR,RR,COV, N
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C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
10
39
13
37
11
FORMAT(5X,' FR = ',E15.5,'
5X,' RR = ',E15.5,'
5X,' COV = ',E15.5,/
5X,' N = ',12X,I3,
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER NPTS'
READ (5, 1 4)NPT S
FORMAT(I4)
IF(NPTS.EQ.1)GO TO 15
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER TMAX,DEC'
READ(5,1 7)TMAX,DEC
FORMAT(E15.5,I3)
TMIN=TMAX/(10**DEC)
DELT=(TMAX-TMIN)/(NPTS-1)
TIME=TMIN
GO TO 18
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER TIME'
READ(5,16)TIME
FORMAT(E15.5)
DO 12 I=1,N
DO 12 J=1,N
B(I,J)=0.0
BD(I,J)=0.0
DO 1 I=1,N-1
BD(I,I)=-(N-I+1)*FR-RR
BD(I+1,I)=(N-I+1)*FR*COV
BD(I,I+1)=RR
BD(1, 1 )=-N*FR
BD(N,N)=-FR-RR
DO 2 K=1,N
DO 2 L=1,N
B(K,L)=BD(K, L)
FAILURES/HOUR' ,/,
REPAIRS/HOUR' ,/,
' UNITS' ,//)
EIGENVALUES (QR ALGORITHM)
CALL HSBG(N,BD,10)
CALL ATEIG(N,BD,E,
DO 3 I=1,N
DO 3 J=1,N
DO 3 K=1,N
CD(I,J,K)=0.0
C(I,J,K)=0. 0
CALL EXBT(N,B,E)
EI,IANA,1 )
C MEAN TIME TO FIRST FAILURE
C
C
MTFF=0. 0
DO 9 I=1,N
SUMMTF=0.0
DO 8 J=1,N
8 SUMMTF=SUMMTF+C(I,J,1)
9 MTFF=MTFF-SUMMTF/E(I)
295
38
1
1
1
14
17
15
16
18
12
1
2
C
C
C
3
C
EFFECTIVE FAILURE RATE
EFR=1./MTFF
RELIABILITY
DO 19 M=1,NPTS
IF(M.EQ. 1 )GO TO 20
TIME=T IME+DELT
DO 21 I=1,N
DO 21 J=1,N
DO 21 K=1,N
CD(I,J,K)=C(I,J,K)
DO 4 I=1,N
DO 4 J=1,N
CD(I,J, 1 )=CD(I,J,1 )*EXP(E(I)*TIME)
DO 5 J=1,N
EBT(J)=0. 0
DO 6 I=1, N
DO 6 J=1,N
EBT (J) =EBT (J)+CD (I, J, 1)
SUMEBT=0. 0
DO 7 J=1,N
SUMEBT=SUMEBT+EBT(J)
Y(1,M)=TIME
Y(2, M) =SUMEBT
IF(M.NE.1)GO TO 22
OUTPUTS
WRITE (6 ,23) MTFF, EFR
FORMAT(//, 10X, ' MTFF ='
1 xx' ,//,10X,' EFR = ',E1
1 //)
WRITE(6,*) '
WRITE(6,*)'
WRITE(6,*) ' Time
WRITE (6,24)Y(1,M) ,Y(2,M
FORMAT(4X, E1 5. 8, 6X, E1 5.
,E15.8,' HOURS' ,/,11X, 'xx
5.8, ' 1/HOUR',/,1 1X, 'xxx',
RELIABILITY'
XXXXXXXXXXX'
Reliability'
PLOTTING
IF(NPTS.EQ. 1 )GO
IF(M.NE.NPTS )GO
WRITE (6,41)
FORMAT(////, ' TO
TO 19
TO 19
PLOT ENTER 1' /, '
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C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
20
21
4
5
6
7
C
C
C
23
22
24
C
C
C
C
C
41
1 0 OTHERWISE',/)
READ(5,25)P
25 FORMAT(I2,/)
IF(P.EQ.O)GO TO 19
WRITE(6,28)
28 FORMAT(/,' ENTER MOVE',//,
1 ' FIRST AND LAST -> 0',/,
1 ' FIRST, NOT LAST -> 1',/,
1 ' NOT FIRST BUT LAST -> 10',/,
1 ' NOT FIRST, NOT LAST -> 11')
READ(5,31)MOVE
31 FORMAT(I3)
IF(MOVE.GE.10)GO TO 26
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER XLAB'
READ (5,29)XLAB
29 FORMAT(A40)
26 IF(MOVE.EQ.01.OR.MOVE.EQ.11)GO TO 27
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER YLAB'
READ (5,29)YLAB
27 IF(MOVE.NE.00)GO TO 36
LABEL=4
ISCL=12
GO TO 32
36 IF(MOVE.NE.01)GO TO 30
LABEL=4
ISCL=1 2
GO TO 32
30 IF(MOVE.NE.10)GO TO 35
LABEL=4
ISCL=8
GO TO 32
35 LABEL=4
ISCL=8
32 WRITE(6,*)' ENTER CURVLAB (Two spaces first)'
READ(5,33 ) CURVLAB
33 FORMAT(A4)
CALL QPICTR(Y,10,NPTS,QY(2),QX(1 ) ,QMOVE(MOVE),
1 QISCL(ISCL),QCURVLAB(CURVLAB),QXLAB(XLAB),
1 QYLAB(YLAB),QXSCL(XSCL),QLABEL(LABEL))
19 CONTINUE
GO TO 10
1000 STOP
END
SUBROUTINE EXBT(N,B,E)
COMMON C(10,10,10)
DIMENSION B(10,10),E(10),EIK(10) ,B1(10,10)
DIMENSION B2(10,10),T(10,10)
DO 600 I=1,N
DO 15 K=1,N
15 EIK(K)=E (I)-E (K)
DO 500 J=1,N
IF(J-I)100,500,200
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100 IF(J-1)110, 110, 150
200 IF(I-1 )300,300,400
300 IF(J-I-1)1 10, 110, 150
400 IF(J-I-1)110,150,150
110 DO 5 K=1,N
DO 5 L=1,N
5 B1 (K,L)=B(K,L)
DO 20 K=1,N
BI (K,K) =B (K,K)-E (J)
DO 20 L=1,N
20 B1 (K,L)=B1 (K,L)/EIK(J)
GO TO 500
150 DO 40 K=1,N
DO 40 L=1,N
40 B2(K,L)=B(K,L)
DO 25 K=1,N
B2 (K,K)=B(K,K)-E (J)
DO 25 L=1,N
25 B2 (K,L)=B2 (K,L)/EIK(J)
DO 30 K=1,N
DO 30 L=1,N
T(K,L)=0. 0
DO 30 M=1,N
30 T(K,L)=T(K,L)+B1 (K,M)*B2(M,L)
DO 35 K=1,N
DO 35 L=1,N
35 B1(K,L)=T(K,L)
500 CONTINUE
DO 60 K=1,N
DO 60 L=1,N
60 C(I,K,L)=B1 (K,L)
600 CONTINUE
RETURN
END
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C PROGRAM AVALNODE
C +****************
C
C
SUBROUTINE EQSIM
C
C This program is a subroutine of the program DYSYS,
C used to calculate the availability of a node
C described by the set of differential equations
C mentioned in the text (Chapter 6 and Appendix E).
C
C RR2 : Repair rate of one repairman, to take th e
C failed node from the failed state to an
C operational state in [repairs/hour] .
C
C The rest of the parameters are defined as in the
C program RELNODE.
C
COMMON T,DT,Y(30) ,F(30) ,STIME,FTIME,NEWDT,NEWRUN, N,
1 IPR, ICD,ICN,TBREAK,PNEXT,TBACK
C
C INPUTS
C
IF(NEWRUN.EQ.-1 )THEN
TYPE 10
10 FORMAT( 'ENTER FR,RR,COV, RR2 ')
ACCEPT * ,FR,RR,COV,RR2
END IF
C
C The system of differential equations is:
C
F(1)=-3.*FR*Y(1)+RR*Y(2)+RR2*Y(4)
F(2)=3*FR*COV*Y(1)-(2.*FR+RR)*Y(2)+RR*Y(3)
F(3)=2.*FR*COV*Y(2)-(FR+RR)*Y(3)
F(4)=-(F(1 )+F(2)+F (3))
Y(5)=Y( 1 )+Y(2)+Y(3)
C
C where (1), (2) and (3) are operational states
C and (0) is the failed state.
C F(i) indicates the time derivative of Y(i).
C Y(5) models the availability, while Y(4) calculates
C the unavailability.
C
RETURN
END
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C PROGRAM AVALCOMP
C ******
C
C
C
SUBROUTINE EQSIM
C
C This program can be used to find the reliability of
C a node with 3 working units and 0, 1 or 2 spares.
C Thus, the total number of operational units becomes
C 3, 4 or 5.
C The term 'degradation' implies that, if the node
C is allowed to work with less than three units in
C parallel, a degradation of the functions performed
C by the node may occur, although not necessarily.
C
COMMON T,DT,Y(98) ,F(98) ,STIMEIME IME,NEWDT,NEWRUN,N,
1 I PR, ICD, IC N, TBREAK,PNEXT, TBACK
IF(NEWRUN.EQ.-1)THEN
TYPE 10
10 FORMAT('ENTER FR,RR,COV' )
ACCEPT * ,FR,RR,COV
END IF
C FIRST: ONE SPARE W/O DEGRADATION
F(1)=-4.*FR*Y(1)+RR*Y(2)
F(2)=4.*FR*COV*Y(1)-(3.*FR+RR)*Y(2)
C SECOND: ONE SPARE W/DEGRADATION
F(3)=-4.*FR*Y(3)+ RR*Y(4)
F(4)=4.*FR*COV*Y(3)-(3.*FR+RR)*Y(4)+RR*Y(5)
F(5)=3.*FR*COV*Y(4)-(2.*FR+RR)*Y(5)+RR*Y(6)
F(6)=2.*FR*COV*Y(5)-(FR+RR)*Y(6)
C THIRD: TWO SPARES W/O DEGRADATION
F(7)=-5.*FR*Y(7)+RR*Y(8)
F(8)=5.*FR*COV*Y(7)-(4.*FR+RR)*Y(8)+RR*Y(9)
F(9)=4.*FR*COV*Y(8)-(3.*FR+RR)*Y(9)
C FOURTH: TWO SPARES W/DEGRADATION
F(10)=-5.*FR*Y(10)+RR*Y(11)
F(11)=5.*FR*COV*Y(10)-(4.*FR+RR)*Y(11)+RR*Y(12)
F(12)=4.*FR*COV*Y(11)-(3.*FR+RR)*Y(12)+RR*Y(13)
F(13)=3.*FR*COV*Y(12)-(2.*FR+RR)*Y(13)+RR*Y(14)
F(14)=2.*FR*COV*Y(13)-(FR+RR)*Y(14)
C FIFTH: NO SPARES W/O DEGRADATION
F(15)=-3. *FR*Y(15)
C SIXTH: NO SPARES W/DEGRADATION
F(16)=-3.*FR*Y(16)+RR*Y(17)
F(17)=3*FR*COV*Y(16)-(2.*FR+RR)*Y(17)+RR*Y(18)
F(18)=2.*FR*COV*Y (17) -(FR+RR)*Y(18)
C (1) RELIABILITY OF 3P+1S W/O D
Y(19)=Y(1)+Y(2)
C (2) RELIABILITY OF 3P+1S W/D
Y(22 )=Y(3)+Y(4)+Y(5)+Y(6)
C (3) RELIABILITY OF 3P+2S W/O D
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Y(20) =Y(7)+Y(8)+Y(9)
(4) RELIABILITY OF 3P+2S W/D
Y(23)=Y(1 0 ) +Y(11)+Y(1 2 ) +Y(1 3 ) +Y(14)
(5) RELIABILITY OF 3P W/O D
Y(15)=Y(15)
(6) RELIABILITY OF 3P W/D
Y(2 1)=Y( 16)Y 1 7)(7)+Y( 1 8)
IMPROVEMENTS
IF(Y(
Y (2 4)
Y(27)
1 5) .LE
=Y(2 1)
=Y( 19)
Y (29) =Y (27)
IF(Y(19) .LE
Y (2 5) =Y (2 2)
Y(28)=Y(20)
IF(Y(20) .LE
Y(26)=Y(23)
IF(Y(21 ) .LE
Y(30)=Y(22)
Y(32)=Y(23)
IF(Y(22) .LE
Y (31) =Y (23)
RETURN
END
E.1.E-24)GO TO 2
/Y (15)
/Y (1 5)
/Y (1 5)
3.1.E-24)GO TO 3
/Y (19)
/Y( 19)
. 1.E-24)GO TO 4
/Y(2 0)
. 1.E-24)GO TO 5
/Y(21 )
/Y (2 1)
.1.E-24)GO TO 6
/Y(22)
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C
C
C
C
2
3
4
5
6
PROGRAM RELNET
This program calculates the reliability of a
network with unreliable nodes and links. The
program is interactive and instructions are given
as the computations proceed.
Some of the parameters have been defined in
the program RELNODE. New parameters are defined
below.
CENTRAL COMPUTER: RCC = Reliability of the central
computer. Assume the minimun value it may
exhibit in the interval of interest.
NET: NN = Total number of nodes in the network not
considering the central node.
FRL = Failure rate of the links [failures/hour]
DIMENSION B(10,10),BD(10,10),E(10),EI(10),EBT(10)
DIMENSION IANA(10),P(10),S(1),Y(10,100),XSCL(4)
COMMON C(10, 10, 10),CD(10, 10, 10)
REAL MTF
INTEGER DEC,OPT,PLOT,TT
CHARACTER*40 CURVLAB,XLAB,YLAB
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER OPTION'
WRITE(6,*)' 0 --
WRITE(6,*)' OTHERWISE --
READ (5,13)OPT
FORMAT(I3)
IF(OPT.EQ.0)GO TO 1000
WRITE(6,*)' NODES: ENTER
READ(5,11 )N, FR, RR,COV
FORMAT(I3, 3E15. 5)
WRITE(6,*)' CENTRAL NODE:
READ (5, 38) RFTMP
FORMAT(E15.7)
WRITE(6,*)' NET: ENTER NN
READ(5,37)NN, FRL
FORMAT(I3,E15. 7)
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER NPTS'
READ(5, 14) NPTS
> EXIT '
'> CONTINUE'
NU,FR,RR,COV'
ENTER RFTMP'
, FRL'
FORMAT (I4)
IF(NPTS.EQ.1)GO TO 15
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER TMAX,DEC'
READ(5, 17)TMAXDEC
FORMAT(E15 5,I3)
TMIN=TMAX/(10**DEC)
DELT=(TMAX-TMIN)/(NPTS-1)
TIME=TMIN
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C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
10
13
11
38
37
14
17
GO TO 18
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER TIME'
READ(5, 16)TIME
FORMAT (E1 5. 5)
DO 12 I=1,N
DO 12 J=1,N
B(I,J)=0. 0
BD(I,J)=0.0
DO 1 I=1,N-1
BD ( I, I)=-( N-I+1 )*FR-RR
BD(I+1, I) =(N-I+1 ) *FR*COV
BD (I, I+1) =RR
BD(1 , 1 )=-N*FR
BD( N, N) =-FR-RR
DO 2 K=1,N
DO 2 L=1,N
B (K, L) =BD (K, L)
CALL HSBG(N,BD,10)
CALL ATEIG( N, BD, E,EI, IANA, 10 )
DO 3 I=1,N
DO 3 J=1,N
DO 3 K=1,N
CD(I,J,K) =0. 0
C(I,J,K) =0.
CALL EXBT(N,B,E)
MEAN TIME TO FIRST FAILURE
MTF=0. 0
DO 9 I=1,N
SUMMTF=0. 0
DO 8 J=1,N
SUMMTF=SUMMTF+C(I,J, 1)
MTF=MTF-SUMMTF/E (I)
RELIABILITY
DO 19 M=1,NPTS
IF(M.EQ. 1 )GO TO 20
T IME=T IME+DELT
DO 21 I=1,N
DO 21 J=1,N
DO 21 K=1,N
CD(I,J,K)=C (I, J,K)
DO 4 I=1, N
DO 4 J=1,N
CD(I,J,1)=CD(I,J, 1 )*EXP(E(I)*TIME)
DO 5 J=1, N
EBT(J) =0. 0
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15
16
18
12
1
2
3
C
C
C
C
C
8
9
C
C
C
C
C
20
21
4
5
DO 6 I=1,N
DO 6 J=1,N
6 EBT(J) =EBT(J)+CD(I,J,1)
SUMEBT=0.0
DO 7 J=1,N
7 SUMEBT=SUMEBT+EBT(J)
RENODE=SUMEBT
C
C PROBABILITY THAT ALL OF THE NODES ARE WORKING
C
S(NN)=RFTMP*RENODE**(NN-1)
C
C RELIABILITY OF THE NET WITH RELIABLE NODES
C
P(1)=1.0
DO 40 TT=2,NN
AUX=0.0
DO 40 IU=1,TT-1
IF(RENODE.NE.1.0)THEN
RL=EXP (-FRL*TIME)
AUX=AUX+COM(TT-1,IU-1)*P(IU)*
1 (1.0-RL)** (IU* (TT-IU))
ELSE
AUX=0.0
ENDIF
P(TT)=1.0-AUX
40 CONTINUE
C
C RELIABILITY OF THE NET WITH UNRELIABLE NODES
C
RENET=S(NN)*P(NN)
Y(1,M)=TIME
Y(2,M)=RENODE
Y (3,M)=RENET
IF(M.NE.1)GO TO 22
WRITE (6,23)MTF
23 FORMAT(30X,' MTFF =',E15.8,/,30X,'xxxx',//)
WRITE (6,44)
44 FORMAT(37X,'RELIABILITY',/,
1 37X,'xxxxxxxxxxx',//,
1 20X, 'TIME',
1 10X,'NODE RELIABILITY',
1 9X,'NET RELIABILITY',/)
22 WRITE(6,24)Y (1,M) ,Y (2,M) ,Y(3,M)
24 FORMAT(13X,E16. 8, 4X,E16.8, 10X, E15.8)
C
C
C PLOTTING
C
C
C IF(NPTS.EQ. 1)GO TO 19
IF(M.NE.NPTS)GO TO 19
WRITE(6,*)' TO PLOT ENTER 1'
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WRITE(6,*)' 0 OTHERWISE'
READ (5,25 )PLOT
FORMAT ( I2)
IF(PLOT.EQ. 0 )GO TO 19
WRITE(6,28)
FORMAT( ' ENTER MOVE',//,
FIRST AND LAST -> 0' ,/,
FIRST, NOT LAST -> 1',/,
NOT FIRST BUT LAST -> 10' ,/,
NOT FIRST, NOT LAST -> 11' )
READ(5, 31)M OVE
FORMAT (I3)
IF(MOVE.GE.10)GO TO 26
WRITE (6,*)' ENTER XLAB'
READ (5,29)XLAB
FORMAT (A40)
IF (MOVE. EQ. 01. OR. MOVE . EQ.
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER YLAB'
READ (5,29)YLAB
IF(MOVE.NE.00)GO TO 36
LABEL=4
ISCL=1 2
GO TO 32
IF(MOVE.NE.0 1
LABEL=4
ISCL=1 2
GO TO 32
IF (MOVE .NE. 1 0
LABEL=4
ISCL=8
GO TO 32
11 )GO TO 27
)GO TO 30
)GO TO 35
LABEL=4
I SCL=8
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER CURVLAB (Two spaces first) '
READ (5,33) CURVLAB
FORMAT ( A6 )
CALL QPICTR(Y, 10,NPTS,QY(2,3) ,QX(1 ) ,QMOVE(MOVE) ,
QLABEL(LABEL),
QISCL(ISCL),QCURVLAB(CURVLAB),QXLAB(XLAB),
QYLAB (YLAB) , QXSCL (XSCL))
CONTINUE
GO TO 10
STOP
END
FUNCTION COM(N1,N2)
C OM=KFACT ( N1 ) / ( KFACT ( N2 ) *KFACT ( N1 -N2 ) )
RETURN
END
FUNCTION KFACT(N)
KFACT=1
IF(N.LT.2 )THEN
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25
28
1
1
1
1
31
29
26
27
36
30
35
32
33
1
1
1
19
1000
RETURN
ELSE
DO 1 J=N,2,-1
KFACT=KFACT *J
CONTINUE
ENDIF
RETURN
END
SUBROUTINE EXBT(N,B,E)
COMMON C(10,10,10)
DIMENSION B(10,10),E(10) ,EIK(10),
B1 (10,10) ,B2 (10,10) ,T(10,10)
DO 600 I=1,N
DO 15 K=1,N
EIK(K)=E (I)-E (K)
DO 500 J=1,N
IF(J-I) 100,500,200
IF(J-1 )110,110,150
IF(I-1)300,300,400
IF(J-I-1)110,110,150
IF(J-I-1)110, 150, 150
DO 5 K=1,N
DO 5 L=1,N
B1 (K,L)=B(K,L)
DO 20 K=1,N
B1 (K,K) =B (K,K)-E (J)
DO 20
20 B1 (K,L
GO TO
150 DO 40
DO 40
40 B2 (K,L
DO 25
B2 (K,K
DO 25
25 B2 (K,L
DO 30
DO 30
30
35
500
60
600
L=1, N
)=B1 (K,L
500
K=1 , N
L=1 , N
) =B (K,L)
K=1, N
) =B (K, K)
L=1 , N
) =B2 (K, L
K= 1 , N
L=1 ,N
)/EIK(J)
-E (J)
)/EIK(J)
T(K,L)=0. 0
DO 30 M=1,N
T(K,L)=T (K,L)+B1 (K, M) *B2 (M,L)
DO 35 K=1,N
DO 35 L=1, N
B1 (K,L)=T(K,L)
CONTINUE
DO 60 K=1,N
DO 60 L=1,N
C(I,K,L)=B1(K,L)
CONTINUE
RETURN
END
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1
15
100
200
300
400
110
5
PROGRAM AVALNET
SUBROUTINE EQSIM
This program is a subroutine of the program
DYSYS. The program calculates the availability
of the nodes and the network of a fully connected
network with unreliable nodes and links.
New parameters are defined below.
NODE: RR2 = repair rate from the failed state
[r epair s/hour]
CENTRAL COMPUTER: FRC = failure rate of the central
computer [failur es/hour]
RRC = repair rate of the central computer
[repairs/hour]
LINKS: RRL = repair rate of the links [repairs/hour]
COMMON T,DT,Y(30),F(30) ,STIME,FTIME,NEWDT,NEWRUN, N,
1 IPR,ICD,ICN, TBREAK,PNEXT,TBACK
DIMENSION S(1) ,P(10) 
INTEGER TT
IF(NEWRUN.EQ. -1 )THEN
WRITE(6, 1)
FORMAT(' ENTER THE FOLLOWING DATA',//,
1 ' NODES : NU = Number of units per node',/,I ' ***** VR = FailIIre ri -f inAi tiAA
units' ,/,
RR = Repair rate (minor) ',/,
RR2 = Repair rate (major)',/,
COV = Coverage' ,/,
NN = Number of nodes (with CC)',/,
CENTRAL COMPUTER : FRC = Failure rate of the
CC' ,/,
CC' /,
RRC = Repair rate of the
LINKS : FRL = Failure rate of th
' ***** RRL = Repair rate of the
ACCEPT*,NU, FR,RR,RR2, COV, NN, FRC,RRC
END IF
IF( NU. EQ. 3)THEN
F(1)=-3 . *FR*Y(1 ) ++R*Y (2) +RR2*Y (4)
F(2)=3.*FR*COV*Y(1)-(2.*FR+RR)*Y(2)
F(3)=2.*FR*COV*Y(2)-(FR+RR)*Y(3)
Y(4)=1.-(Y(1)+Y(2)+Y(3))
AN=1 . -Y (4)
le links' ,/,
' links' ,/)
_, FRL, RRL
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C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
Y (7) =AN
ELSE IF(NU.EQ.4)THEN
F(1)=-4.*FR*Y(1)+RR*Y(2) +RR2*Y(5)
F(2)=4.*FR*COV*Y(1)-(3.*FR+RR)*Y(2)+RR*Y(3)
F(3)=3.*FR*COV*Y(2)-(2.*FR+RR)*Y(3)+RR*Y(4)
F(4)=2.*FR*COV*Y(3)-(FR+RR)*Y(4)
Y(5)=1.-(Y(1)+Y(2)+Y(3)+Y(4))
AN=1.-Y(5)
Y (7)=AN
ELSE IF(NU.EQ.5)THEN
F(1)=-5.*FR*Y( 1)+RR*Y(2RR2*Y((6)
F(2)=5.*FR*COV*Y(1)-(4.*FR+RR)*Y(2)+RR*Y(3)
F(3)=4.*FR*COV*Y(2)-(3.*FR+RR)*Y(3)+RR*Y(4)
F(4)=3.*FR*COV*Y(3)-(2.*FR+RR)*Y(4)+RR*Y(5)
F(5)=2.*FR*COV*Y(4)-(FR+RR)*Y(5)
Y(6)=1.-(Y(1)+Y(2)+-Y(3)+Y(4)+Y(5))
AN=1.-Y(6)
ENDIF
C
C
C CENTRAL COMPUTER AVAILABILITIES
C
C
ANA=(FRC*EXP(-(FRC+RRC)*T)+RRC)/(FRC+RRC)
C
C
C LINK AVAILABILITIES
C
C
AL=(FRL*EXP(-(FRL+RRL)*T)+RRL)/(FRL+RRL)
C
C
C UNAVAILABILITY OF THE NET CONSIDERING RELIABLE NODES
C
C
P(1)=1.0
DO 10 TT=2,NN
AUX=0.0
DO 20 IU=1,TT-1
IF(RENODE.NE.1.0)THEN
AUX=AUX+COM(TT-1,IU-1)*P(IU)*(1.0-AL)**(IU*
1 (TT-IU))
ELSE
AUX=0.0
ENDIF
20 CONTINUE
P(NN)=1 .0-AUX
10 CONTINUE
C
C
C PROBABILITY THAT ALL OF THE NODES ARE WORKING
C
C
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S (NN) =ANA*Y(7)**(NN-1)
AVAILABILITY OF THE
UNRELIABLE NODES
NET CONSIDERING
Y(8)=S(NN)*P(NN)
FOR THE NODE
Y(9)=1. 0-Y(7)
FOR THE NET
Y(10) =1.0-Y(8)
Y(11)=1.-S(NN)
Y(12) -1 .0-P (NN)
Y(13)=1.0-AL
RETURN
END
FUNCTION COM(N1,N2)
COM=KFACT(N1)/(KFACT(N2)*KFACT(N1-N2))
RETURN
END
FUNCTION KFACT(N)
IF(N.LT.2 )THEN
KFACT=1
RETURN
ELSE
KFACT=1
DO 1 J=N,2,-1
KFACT=KFACT*J
CONTINUE
ENDIF
RETURN
END
- 309 -
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
C
1
PROGRAM QWR
The following program calculates characteristics of
a M/M,/KC/K/K queuing system.
INPUTS: ALFA
AMU
K
KC
OUTPUTS:ALQ
WQ
D
= Failure rate of the units [f./h]
= Repair rate, one unit [rep./hour]
= Number of units
= Number of repairmen
= Av. number of units to be repaired
= Av. waiting time in queue
= Probab. that a unit has to
be repaired
wait to
EQ = Av. waiting time for those units
that must wait repair
AL = Av. number of units down
W = Total av. waiting time
ALAMBDA = Rate of incoming units
RHO = Server utilization
DOUBLE PRECISION ALFA,AMU,PP,POAUX,PZERO,P,ALQ, AL,
ALAMBDA,W,WQ, D,EQ,RHO,TEST
DIMENSION P(100),PP(100)
WRITE(6,2)
FORMAT( ' ENTER: ALFA Failure Rate of Units [1/hr] ',
/,8x,'AMU Repair Rate of Units [1/hr]',/,8x,
'K Total # of units',/,8X,'TEST',/)
READ(5, 3)ALFA,AMU,K
FORMAT(2D10. 3,I4)
TEST=1.OD-20
IF(M.EQ.1)GO TO 6
WRITE(6,*)' ENTER: KC # of Repairmen'
READ(5,5)KC
FORMAT (I4)
HERE BEGINS THE PROGRAM
DO 7 I=1,KC
PP(I)=(FN(K,I)/FACT(I)
DO 8 I=KC+1,K
AKC=FLOAT(KC)
)*(ALFA/AMU)**I
THE PARAMETER TEST IS USED TO
LARGE FACTORIALS.
AVOID CALCULATION OF
IF(PP(I-1).LT.TEST)THEN
PP(I)=0.0
GO TO 8
ELSE
PP(I)=FN(K, I)*(ALFA/AMU)**I/
(FACT(KC)*AKC** ( I-KC))
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C
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C
C
C
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C
1
2
3
4
5
C
C
C
6
7
C
C
C
C
1
ENDIF
C ONTI NUE
POAUX=0 .0
DO 9 I=1,K
POAUX=POAUX+PP(I)
PZERO=1 . /(1 . +P OAUX)
DO 10 I=1,K
P (I)=PP(I) *PZERO
WRITE (6, 103) I,P (I)
FORMAT(10X, 'I =',I3,5X, 'P(I)
CONTINUE
-' ,E10.3)
**CALCULATE OTHER PARAMETERS**
ALQ=0. 0
DO 11 I=KC+1,K
ALQ=ALQ+ (I-KC) *P (I)
AL= (AMU*ALQ+ALFA*K) /(ALFA+AM)U)
ALAMBDA=ALFA*AMU* (K-ALQ) /(ALFA+AMU)
WQ=ALQ* ( 1 ./ALFA+1 ./AMU) / (K-ALQ)
W=WQ+ 1./AMU
D=0 .0
DO 12 I=KC,K
D=D+P (I)
EQ=WQ/D
RHO=ALAMBDA/(AMU*KC)
**OUTPUT**
WRITE (6, 13)ALFA, AMU,K,KC,ALQ, WQ, D, EQ, AL, W
WRITE (6, 13)ALAMBDA, RHO
FORMAT(//, 10X,'INPUTS' ,/,10X, '******',//,
1 ' ALFA Failure rate of units', 24x,f10.5,
1 ' 1/hr' ,/,' AMU Repair rate of one repairman',
1 17x,fl 0. 5,' 1/hr' ,/,
1 ' K Number of servers' ,29x,I3,/,
1 ' KC Number of repairmen' ,27x,I3,//,
1 10X, 'OUTPUTS' /,10X, '******' //
1 ' ALQ Average # of units to be repaired',10x,
1 E12.5,/,
1 ' WQ Average waiting time in queue to repair',
1 6X,F10.5,' hrs' ,/,
1 ' D Prob. a unit has to wait to be repaired',
1 6x,F10.5,/,' EQ Average waiting time for those
1 who must wait' ,lx,
1 f10.5,' hrs' ,/,
1 ' AL Average # of units down ( ALQ+in repair )
1 ' ,4X,fl0.5,/,
1 ' W Total average waiting time ( queue +1 repair )',f10.5,' hrs',/,
1 ' ALAMBDA Rate of incoming units' ,23x,fl0.5, '1/hr',
1 /, ' RHO Server utilization' ,27x,fl0.5 ,//)
WRITE(6,*) ' TO MODIFY ALFA, AMU OR K --- > 1'
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8
9
103
10
C
C
C
11
12
C
C
C
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WRITE(6,*)' TO MODIFY KC --- > 2'
WRITE(6,*) ' TO END THIS RUN --- > 0'
READ(5, 5)M
IF(M.EQ. 1) GO TO 1
IF(M.EQ.2) GO TO 4
STOP
END
FUNCTION FACT(N)
AN=FLOAT (N)
FACT=1.0
IF(AN.LT.2.0)THEN
RETURN
ELSE
DO 1 J=N,2,-1
FACT=FACT*J
ENDIF
RETURN
END
FU'-CTION FN(M,N)
AM- 'LOAT(M)
F N=AM
IF( N.EQ. 1 )THEN
RETURN
ELSE
DO 1 J=1,N-1
FN=FN* (AM-J)
RETURN
ENDIF
END
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